Thomas Sattig – författare

Thomas Sattig develops and defends a novel philosophical picture of ordinary objects, such as persons, tables, trees, and mountains. His theory carves a middle way between the two accounts that have dominated traditional metaphysics of material objects, namely, classical mereology and Aristotelian hylomorphism. It answers metaphysical, semantical, and psychological questions in a unified framework: What is the nature of ordinary objects? How do we speak about suchobjects? And how do we conceive of them? The core thesis is that ordinary objects lead double lives: they are compounds of matter and form; and since their matter and form have different qualitative profiles, ordinary objects can be described differently from different conceptual perspectives. Aphilosophical theory of ordinary objects faces the hard task of saving our common-sense conception of objects from a wide range of hard problems that present our familiar worldview as internally inconsistent and as incompatible with plausible metaphysical principles. The book argues that the proposed theory does a better job than its rivals in saving the appearances. The key that unlocks each problem is that seemingly inconsistent judgements about objects are really consistent because theymanifest different perspectives on the same double-layered objects. Many long-standing philosophical mysteries about ordinary objects dissolve, once we realize that they lead double lives. The theory contributes to a wide variety of philosophical debates, including those about parts and composition,persistence, coincidence and constitution, personal identity, modality de re, the grounding problem, determinism, vague objects, the problem of the many, and relativistic metaphysics.

Time organizes things in a dynamic fashion, whereas space organizes things in a static fashion-so things in time undergo passage, whereas things in space do not. What makes the temporal organization of things dynamic? What is the nature of the passage of time? Traditional discussions of passage have taken one of two perspectives. Some philosophers start with passage as a phenomenon that occurs in the physical world. They ask what constitutes this objective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in metaphysics and the foundations of physics. Others begin with passage as a phenomenon that is given in our experiences of the world. They ask what constitutes this subjective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.In How Time Passes, Thomas Sattig gives both perspectives on passage equal weight. The first part of the book concerns the existence and nature of physical passage. The second part is concerned with the existence and nature of experiential passage. In both parts, the standard kind of explanation of passage is juxtaposed with a new kind of explanation. On the tripartite approach, which has dominated classical and contemporary philosophy of time, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of changing with respect to what is past, what is present, and what is future. On the geometrical approach, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of being temporally organized in a manner that does not involve the holding of any geometrical relations between them.

Time organizes things in a dynamic fashion, whereas space organizes things in a static fashion-so things in time undergo passage, whereas things in space do not. What makes the temporal organization of things dynamic? What is the nature of the passage of time? Traditional discussions of passage have taken one of two perspectives. Some philosophers start with passage as a phenomenon that occurs in the physical world. They ask what constitutes this objective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in metaphysics and the foundations of physics. Others begin with passage as a phenomenon that is given in our experiences of the world. They ask what constitutes this subjective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.In How Time Passes, Thomas Sattig gives both perspectives on passage equal weight. The first part of the book concerns the existence and nature of physical passage. The second part is concerned with the existence and nature of experiential passage. In both parts, the standard kind of explanation of passage is juxtaposed with a new kind of explanation. On the tripartite approach, which has dominated classical and contemporary philosophy of time, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of changing with respect to what is past, what is present, and what is future. On the geometrical approach, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of being temporally organized in a manner that does not involve the holding of any geometrical relations between them.

Time organizes things in a dynamic fashion, whereas space organizes things in a static fashion-so things in time undergo passage, whereas things in space do not. What makes the temporal organization of things dynamic? What is the nature of the passage of time? Traditional discussions of passage have taken one of two perspectives. Some philosophers start with passage as a phenomenon that occurs in the physical world. They ask what constitutes this objective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in metaphysics and the foundations of physics. Others begin with passage as a phenomenon that is given in our experiences of the world. They ask what constitutes this subjective phenomenon. Theirs is a project in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.In How Time Passes, Thomas Sattig gives both perspectives on passage equal weight. The first part of the book concerns the existence and nature of physical passage. The second part is concerned with the existence and nature of experiential passage. In both parts, the standard kind of explanation of passage is juxtaposed with a new kind of explanation. On the tripartite approach, which has dominated classical and contemporary philosophy of time, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of changing with respect to what is past, what is present, and what is future. On the geometrical approach, the denizens of time undergo passage, in virtue of being temporally organized in a manner that does not involve the holding of any geometrical relations between them.

Thomas Sattig's book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. He brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking our ordinary conception of time with the physicist's conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, Sattig explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world.The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say 'yes', three-dimensionalists say 'no'. Sattig develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues that Sattig discusses are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.

Thomas Sattig develops and defends a novel philosophical picture of ordinary objects, such as persons, tables, trees, and mountains. His theory carves a middle way between the two accounts that have dominated traditional metaphysics of material objects, namely, classical mereology and Aristotelian hylomorphism. It answers metaphysical, semantical, and psychological questions in a unified framework: What is the nature of ordinary objects? How do we speak about such objects? And how do we conceive of them? The core thesis is that ordinary objects lead double lives: they are compounds of matter and form; and since their matter and form have different qualitative profiles, ordinary objects can be described differently from different conceptual perspectives. A philosophical theory of ordinary objects faces the hard task of saving our common-sense conception of objects from a wide range of hard problems that present our familiar worldview as internally inconsistent and as incompatible with plausible metaphysical principles. The book argues that the proposed theory does a better job than its rivals in saving the appearances. The key that unlocks each problem is that seemingly inconsistent judgements about objects are really consistent because they manifest different perspectives on the same double-layered objects. Many long-standing philosophical mysteries about ordinary objects dissolve, once we realize that they lead double lives. The theory contributes to a wide variety of philosophical debates, including those about parts and composition, persistence, coincidence and constitution, personal identity, modality de re, the grounding problem, determinism, vague objects, the problem of the many, and relativistic metaphysics.

This Element is a survey of central topics in the metaphysics of material objects. The topics are grouped into four problem spaces. The first concerns how an object's parts are related to the object's existence and to the object's nature, or essence. The second concerns how an object persists through time, how an object is located in spacetime, and how an object changes. The third concerns paradoxes about objects, including paradoxes of coincidence, paradoxes of fission, and the problem of the many. The fourth concerns views with radical consequences regarding the existence of composite material objects, including mereological nihilism, ontological anti-realism, and deflationism.

This Element is a survey of central topics in the metaphysics of material objects. The topics are grouped into four problem spaces. The first concerns how an object''s parts are related to the object''s existence and to the object''s nature, or essence. The second concerns how an object persists through time, how an object is located in spacetime, and how an object changes. The third concerns paradoxes about objects, including paradoxes of coincidence, paradoxes of fission, and the problem of the many. The fourth concerns views with radical consequences regarding the existence of composite material objects, including mereological nihilism, ontological anti-realism, and deflationism.