Una Stojnic – författare

Natural languages are riddled with context-sensitivity. One and the same string of words can express many different meanings on occasion of use, and yet we understand one another effortlessly, on the fly. How do we do so? What fixes the meaning of context-sensitive expressions, and how are we able to recover the meaning so effortlessly? This book offers a novel response: we can do so because we draw on a broad array of subtle linguistic conventions that determine the interpretation of context-sensitive items. Contrary to the dominant tradition, which maintains that the meaning of context-sensitive language is underspecified by grammar and that interpretation relies on non-linguistic cues and speakers'' intentions, this book argues that meaning is determined entirely by discourse conventions, rules of language that have largely been missed and the effects of which have been mistaken for extra-linguistic effects of an utterance situation on meaning. The linguistic account of context developed here sheds a new light on the nature of linguistic content and the interaction between content and context. At the same time, it provides a novel model of context that should constrain and help evaluate debates across many subfields of philosophy where appeal to context has been common, often leading to surprising conclusions such as epistemology, ethics, value theory, metaphysics, metaethics, and logic.

Natural languages are riddled with context-sensitivity. One and the same string of words can express many different meanings on occasion of use, and yet we understand one another effortlessly, on the fly. How do we do so? What fixes the meaning of context-sensitive expressions, and how are we able to recover the meaning so effortlessly? This book offers a novel response: we can do so because we draw on a broad array of subtle linguistic conventions that determine the interpretation of context-sensitive items. Contrary to the dominant tradition, which maintains that the meaning of context-sensitive language is underspecified by grammar and that interpretation relies on non-linguistic cues and speakers'' intentions, this book argues that meaning is determined entirely by discourse conventions, rules of language that have largely been missed and the effects of which have been mistaken for extra-linguistic effects of an utterance situation on meaning. The linguistic account of context developed here sheds a new light on the nature of linguistic content and the interaction between content and context. At the same time, it provides a novel model of context that should constrain and help evaluate debates across many subfields of philosophy where appeal to context has been common, often leading to surprising conclusions such as epistemology, ethics, value theory, metaphysics, metaethics, and logic.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Language introduces readers to the main issues and theories in the philosophy of language as currently practised. Written by leading researchers and covering the central topics in the contemporary philosophical study of language, the twenty-seven chapters provide an overview of the state of the art, and a presentation of cutting-edge developments. Topics covered include: the nature of language; the nature and role of semantic and attitudinal content; the dynamics of communication and speech acts; meta-semantics and reference grounding; tense and modality; discourse dynamics and information structure; and the expressive, evaluative, subjective, and social aspects of language. Although some of the articles focus directly on technical issues following the recent approach of linguistically oriented philosophy of language, the majority of the contributions are primarily focused on foundational questions drawn from traditional philosophy of language. The volume offers a reconsideration of these foundational issues in a new light, while still bearing in mind the formal developments in recent literature, as well as a presentation of new foundational issues that have emerged as a result of these developments.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Language introduces readers to the main issues and theories in the philosophy of language as currently practised. Written by leading researchers and covering the central topics in the contemporary philosophical study of language, the twenty-seven chapters provide an overview of the state of the art, and a presentation of cutting-edge developments. Topics covered include: the nature of language; the nature and role of semantic and attitudinal content; the dynamics of communication and speech acts; meta-semantics and reference grounding; tense and modality; discourse dynamics and information structure; and the expressive, evaluative, subjective, and social aspects of language. Although some of the articles focus directly on technical issues following the recent approach of linguistically oriented philosophy of language, the majority of the contributions are primarily focused on foundational questions drawn from traditional philosophy of language. The volume offers a reconsideration of these foundational issues in a new light, while still bearing in mind the formal developments in recent literature, as well as a presentation of new foundational issues that have emerged as a result of these developments.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Language introduces readers to the main issues and theories in the philosophy of language as currently practised. Written by leading researchers and covering the central topics in the contemporary philosophical study of language, the twenty-seven chapters provide an overview of the state of the art, and a presentation of cutting-edge developments. Topics covered include: the nature of language; the nature and role of semantic and attitudinal content; the dynamics of communication and speech acts; meta-semantics and reference grounding; tense and modality; discourse dynamics and information structure; and the expressive, evaluative, subjective, and social aspects of language. Although some of the articles focus directly on technical issues following the recent approach of linguistically oriented philosophy of language, the majority of the contributions are primarily focused on foundational questions drawn from traditional philosophy of language. The volume offers a reconsideration of these foundational issues in a new light, while still bearing in mind the formal developments in recent literature, as well as a presentation of new foundational issues that have emerged as a result of these developments.

Natural languages are riddled with context-sensitivity. One and the same string of words can express many different meanings on occasion of use, and yet we understand one another effortlessly, on the fly. How do we do so? What fixes the meaning of context-sensitive expressions, and how are we able to recover the meaning so effortlessly? This book offers a novel response: we can do so because we draw on a broad array of subtle linguistic conventions that determine the interpretation of context-sensitive items. Contrary to the dominant tradition, which maintains that the meaning of context-sensitive language is underspecified by grammar and that interpretation relies on non-linguistic cues and speakers' intentions, this book argues that meaning is determined entirely by discourse conventions, rules of language that have largely been missed and the effects of which have been mistaken for extra-linguistic effects of an utterance situation on meaning. The linguistic account of context developed here sheds a new light on the nature of linguistic content and the interaction between content and context. At the same time, it provides a novel model of context that should constrain and help evaluate debates across many subfields of philosophy where appeal to context has been common, often leading to surprising conclusions such as epistemology, ethics, value theory, metaphysics, metaethics, and logic.

It's a platitude that words can harm. But some words are more prone to do so than others--they are pejorative by design. Among those, slurs are particularly inflammatory: these are the epithets that derogate purely on the basis of group-membership, for example, on the basis of race, ethnicity, origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or ideology. Inflammatory Language is in large part about pejoratives, but mainly about this subclass of particularly inflammatory words, with a characteristic offensive sting. Slurs are powerful linguistic weapons: slurring someone constitutes a transgression more severe than an insult; it is an act of bigotry, not mere rudeness, derogating the entire group at once. Moreover, the offensive effect of a slur is surprisingly sticky, as even mere mentionings of slurs carry the risk of triggering their sting, so much so that such tokenings often have a full-on taboo status, subject to media censorship, sometimes even legislation.What is the source of this characteristic offensive sting that makes slurs such powerful linguistic weapons? A natural--and predominant--assumption is that it's some aspect of their meaning, semantically encoded or pragmatically conveyed. Consequently, most efforts at understanding slurs have been attempts to characterize their meanings and how they compose with those of other expressions, in a way that generates the offensive sting. However, even those who reject this majority position trace the offensive sting down to slurring words, arguing that it is their taboo status, or offensive tone, that explains their sting. Una Stojnić and Ernie Lepore argue this is a mistake. The distinctive pejorative effect of slurs, their characteristic sting, is not a matter of meaning, nor even language. Rather it is akin to the sting triggered by offensive gestures, symbols, or imagery, in that it is constituted by associations attached to and triggered by slurs' articulatory form--their typical pronunciation or spelling.

It''s a platitude that words can harm. But some words are more prone to do so than others--they are pejorative by design. Among those, slurs are particularly inflammatory: these are the epithets that derogate purely on the basis of group-membership, for example, on the basis of race, ethnicity, origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or ideology. Inflammatory Language is in large part about pejoratives, but mainly about this subclass of particularly inflammatory words, with a characteristic offensive sting. Slurs are powerful linguistic weapons: slurring someone constitutes a transgression more severe than an insult; it is an act of bigotry, not mere rudeness, derogating the entire group at once. Moreover, the offensive effect of a slur is surprisingly sticky, as even mere mentionings of slurs carry the risk of triggering their sting, so much so that such tokenings often have a full-on taboo status, subject to media censorship, sometimes even legislation.What is the source of this characteristic offensive sting that makes slurs such powerful linguistic weapons? A natural--and predominant--assumption is that it''s some aspect of their meaning, semantically encoded or pragmatically conveyed. Consequently, most efforts at understanding slurs have been attempts to characterize their meanings and how they compose with those of other expressions, in a way that generates the offensive sting. However, even those who reject this majority position trace the offensive sting down to slurring words, arguing that it is their taboo status, or offensive tone, that explains their sting. Una Stojnić and Ernie Lepore argue this is a mistake. The distinctive pejorative effect of slurs, their characteristic sting, is not a matter of meaning, nor even language. Rather it is akin to the sting triggered by offensive gestures, symbols, or imagery, in that it is constituted by associations attached to and triggered by slurs'' articulatory form--their typical pronunciation or spelling.