Uri Bar-Joseph – författare

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

The Angel is an award–winning expose about the sensational life and mysterious death of Ashraf Marwan, an Egyptian senior official who spied for Israel.A National Jewish Book Awards WinnerBasis for the Netflix Original MovieA Best Intelligence Book by The American Association of Former Intelligence OfficersAs the son-in-law of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close advisor to his successor, Anwar Sadat, Ashraf Marwan had access to the deepest secrets of the country''s government. But Marwan himself had a secret: He was a spy for the Mossad, Israel''s intelligence service. Under the codename "The Angel," Marwan turned Egypt into an open book for the Israeli intelligence services—and, by alerting the Mossad in advance of the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Yom Kippur, saved Israel from a devastating defeat.Drawing on meticulous research and interviews with many key participants, political science professor Uri Bar-Joseph''s The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel pieces together Marwan''s story. In the process, he sheds new light on this volatile time in modern Egyptian and Middle Eastern history, culminating in 2011''s Arab Spring. The Angel also chronicles the discord within the Israeli government that brought down Prime Minister Golda Meir.However, this nail-biting narrative doesn''t end with Israel''s victory in the Yom Kippur War. Marwan eluded Egypt''s ruthless secret services for many years, but then somebody talked. In 2007, his body was found in the garden of his London apartment building. Police suspected he had been thrown from his fifth-floor balcony, and thanks to explosive new evidence, Bar-Joseph can finally reveal who, how, and why.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases.Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

This book studies intelligence intervention in politics in the modern democratic state. In theory, intelligence work should be objective, autonomous, and free of political influence; at its best, it should be guided solely by the professional ethic of intelligence. In reality, however, unavoidable political pressures, as well as bureaucratic and personal interests, can and often do influence the conduct of intelligence work. In tracing and explaining the effects of these pressures and interests on the behavior of intelligence organizations and individuals, Uri Bar-Joseph analyzes four cases of intelligence intervention in politics: the 1961 Bay of Pigs episode; the 1954 Israeli "Unfortunate Business Affair"; the 1920 British "Henry Wilson Affair"; and the 1924 “Zinoviev Letter Affair."

An analysis of Israel's relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

A detailed account of the way Israel dealt with the Iraqi nuclear buildup between its launch in 1974 and the destruction of the Tamuz I reactor on 7 June 1981. This updated account includes formerly classified information and photographs taken during the mission and from US spy satellites.

A detailed account of the way Israel dealt with the Iraqi nuclear buildup between its launch in 1974 and the destruction of the Tamuz I reactor on 7 June 1981. This updated account includes formerly classified information and photographs taken during the mission and from US spy satellites.

Examines how Israel was caught by surprise in the opening stages of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.Based on many formerly undisclosed intelligence and military documents, the secret protocols of discussions on the eve of the war, and interviews with relevant figures, The Watchman Fell Asleep is a compelling account of Israel's intelligence failure before the 1973 Arab attack known as the Yom Kippur War. The Hebrew version of this book was awarded the Tshetshik Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel's Security in 2001, and the Israeli Political Science Association's Best Book Award in 2002. Available here in English for the first time, Uri Bar-Joseph has crafted an authoritative explanation of the most traumatic event in Israel's stormy history and one of the biggest strategic military surprises of the twentieth century.

An analysis of Israel''s relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

An analysis of Israel''s relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel''s present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel''s future war objectives.

This volumes discusses three principal issues: the Israeli army and the Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA); Israel''s present and future answers to the threays of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and the impact of societal, political, and technological changes on Israel''s future war objectives.

A detailed account of the way Israel dealt with the Iraqi nuclear buildup between its launch in 1974 and the destruction of the Tamuz I reactor on 7 June 1981. This updated account includes formerly classified information and photographs taken during the mission and from US spy satellites.

A detailed account of the way Israel dealt with the Iraqi nuclear buildup between its launch in 1974 and the destruction of the Tamuz I reactor on 7 June 1981. This updated account includes formerly classified information and photographs taken during the mission and from US spy satellites.

An analysis of Israel's relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.