Vineeta Yadav – författare

Political corruption is one of the globe''s most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav tackles the puzzle of corruption by analyzing the role that business lobbying plays in it. She shows that the structure of a developing nation''s legislative institutions frequently determines whether such institutions promote or restrain corruption. Combining focused studies of legislative institutions and business groups in India and Brazil with a broader survey of corruption in sixty four developing democracies, Yadav shows how systems with powerful parties rather than ones with powerful individual legislators encourage the most corruption. A rigorous comparative examination of the connections between political institutions, lobbying, and corruption, this work will reshape our understanding of how developing country democracies can both discourage and encourage bribery, vote buying, and influence peddling.

A data-driven explanation of when successful religious parties reduce the civil liberties of their citizens in Muslim-majority countries and when they don't.Religious parties are increasingly common across the world. More and more, they participate in elections, win legislative seats, and join governments, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. Since they are often founded on orthodox principles that are inconsistent with liberal democracy, their rise potentially holds consequences for the prospects of liberal democratic values and practices-and this risk has inspired much heated debate. In Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties, the award-winning political science scholar Vineeta Yadav considers a question that has been central to the discussion: Will the success of religious parties lead to declines in the civil liberties of their citizens? Yadav summarizes the popular and academic sides of the conversation and addresses the weaknesses of both by presenting an original empirical analysis of religious parties' actual relationship to civil liberties. Many believe that if religious parties come to power, they will curb civil liberties in order to realize their religious visions. Academic research on religious parties, however, claims that the need to compete in elections incentivizes religious parties to moderate their behaviors and policies, including on civil liberties. Neither of these assertions has been systematically tested until now. With this book, Yadav adjudicates the debate using systematic data that covers all Muslim-majority countries for a period of almost forty years. She highlights the role that religious lobbies play in this issue and goes on to identify the specific conditions under which religious parties do or don't curb civil liberties. A sweeping comparative account that combines large-N analysis with focused studies of Turkey and Pakistan, this book will reshape our understanding of the relationship between religious party strength and the preservation of civil liberties.

A data-driven explanation of when successful religious parties reduce the civil liberties of their citizens in Muslim-majority countries and when they don''t.Religious parties are increasingly common across the world. More and more, they participate in elections, win legislative seats, and join governments, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. Since they are often founded on orthodox principles that are inconsistent with liberal democracy, their rise potentially holds consequences for the prospects of liberal democratic values and practices-and this risk has inspired much heated debate. In Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties, the award-winning political science scholar Vineeta Yadav considers a question that has been central to the discussion: Will the success of religious parties lead to declines in the civil liberties of their citizens? Yadav summarizes the popular and academic sides of the conversation and addresses the weaknesses of both by presenting an original empirical analysis of religious parties'' actual relationship to civil liberties. Many believe that if religious parties come to power, they will curb civil liberties in order to realize their religious visions. Academic research on religious parties, however, claims that the need to compete in elections incentivizes religious parties to moderate their behaviors and policies, including on civil liberties. Neither of these assertions has been systematically tested until now. With this book, Yadav adjudicates the debate using systematic data that covers all Muslim-majority countries for a period of almost forty years. She highlights the role that religious lobbies play in this issue and goes on to identify the specific conditions under which religious parties do or don''t curb civil liberties. A sweeping comparative account that combines large-N analysis with focused studies of Turkey and Pakistan, this book will reshape our understanding of the relationship between religious party strength and the preservation of civil liberties.

A data-driven explanation of when successful religious parties reduce the civil liberties of their citizens in Muslim-majority countries and when they don''t.Religious parties are increasingly common across the world. More and more, they participate in elections, win legislative seats, and join governments, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. Since they are often founded on orthodox principles that are inconsistent with liberal democracy, their rise potentially holds consequences for the prospects of liberal democratic values and practices-and this risk has inspired much heated debate. In Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties, the award-winning political science scholar Vineeta Yadav considers a question that has been central to the discussion: Will the success of religious parties lead to declines in the civil liberties of their citizens? Yadav summarizes the popular and academic sides of the conversation and addresses the weaknesses of both by presenting an original empirical analysis of religious parties'' actual relationship to civil liberties. Many believe that if religious parties come to power, they will curb civil liberties in order to realize their religious visions. Academic research on religious parties, however, claims that the need to compete in elections incentivizes religious parties to moderate their behaviors and policies, including on civil liberties. Neither of these assertions has been systematically tested until now. With this book, Yadav adjudicates the debate using systematic data that covers all Muslim-majority countries for a period of almost forty years. She highlights the role that religious lobbies play in this issue and goes on to identify the specific conditions under which religious parties do or don''t curb civil liberties. A sweeping comparative account that combines large-N analysis with focused studies of Turkey and Pakistan, this book will reshape our understanding of the relationship between religious party strength and the preservation of civil liberties.

Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In the past, it proved difficult to measure, and the political science literature on it was thin. In recent years, political scientists have greatly improved their analytical tools for analyzing and contextualizing corruption, and it is now a hot topic in the discipline. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav examines corruption levels in sixty-four developing democracies over a twenty-year period. Her comparative focus is on Brazil and India, two of the most important developing nations. Drawing from a 2005-06 survey of Brazilian and Indian businesses that she conducted, Yadav finds that legislative institutions are central in determining the degree and type of corruption. Most importantly, in legislatures where the party holds sway (as opposed to individual legislators), the level of corruption is higher. Party costs are higher than that of any one legislator, which explains part of the difference. More fundamentally, the fact that different systems offer different incentives to business groups and legislatures explains why some systems are less corrupt than others. Given structural variation across democratic political systems, her book allows to predict which states are most susceptible to political corruption, and which reforms might best alleviate the problem.

Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In the past, it proved difficult to measure, and the political science literature on it was thin. In recent years, political scientists have greatly improved their analytical tools for analyzing and contextualizing corruption, and it is now a hot topic in the discipline. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav examines corruption levels in sixty-four developing democracies over a twenty-year period. Her comparative focus is on Brazil and India, two of the most important developing nations. Drawing from a 2005-06 survey of Brazilian and Indian businesses that she conducted, Yadav finds that legislative institutions are central in determining the degree and type of corruption. Most importantly, in legislatures where the party holds sway (as opposed to individual legislators), the level of corruption is higher. Party costs are higher than that of any one legislator, which explains part of the difference. More fundamentally, the fact that different systems offer different incentives to business groups and legislatures explains why some systems are less corrupt than others. Given structural variation across democratic political systems, her book allows to predict which states are most susceptible to political corruption, and which reforms might best alleviate the problem.

Political corruption is one of the globe''s most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav tackles the puzzle of corruption by analyzing the role that business lobbying plays in it. She shows that the structure of a developing nation''s legislative institutions frequently determines whether such institutions promote or restrain corruption. Combining focused studies of legislative institutions and business groups in India and Brazil with a broader survey of corruption in sixty four developing democracies, Yadav shows how systems with powerful parties rather than ones with powerful individual legislators encourage the most corruption. A rigorous comparative examination of the connections between political institutions, lobbying, and corruption, this work will reshape our understanding of how developing country democracies can both discourage and encourage bribery, vote buying, and influence peddling.

The power granted to the courts, both in a nation’s constitution and in practice, reveals much about the willingness of the legislative and executive branches to accept restraints on their own powers. For this reason, an independent judiciary is considered an indication of a nation’s level of democracy. Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee use a data set covering 159 developing countries, along with comparative case studies of Brazil and Indonesia, to identify the political conditions under which de jure independence is established. They find that the willingness of political elites to grant the courts authority to review the actions of the other branches of government depends on the capacity of the legislature and expectations regarding the judiciary’s assertiveness.

Moving next to de facto independence, Yadav and Mukherjee bring together data from 103 democracies in the developing world, complemented by case studies of Brazil, India, and Indonesia. Honing in on the effects of electoral institutions, the authors find that, when faced with short time horizons, governments that operate in personal vote electoral systems are likely to increase de facto judicial independence whereas governments in party-centered systems are likely to reduce it.

The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role that business mobilization can play in reducing corruption under some conditions in dictatorships. It investigates how political competition for an elected legislature affects the incentives of dictators to engage in corruption. The study relies on case studies from Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. The book is accessible to a wide audience without requiring sophisticated statistical training.

The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role that business mobilization can play in reducing corruption under some conditions in dictatorships. It investigates how political competition for an elected legislature affects the incentives of dictators to engage in corruption. The study relies on case studies from Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. The book is accessible to a wide audience without requiring sophisticated statistical training.

The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role that business mobilization can play in reducing corruption under some conditions in dictatorships. It investigates how political competition for an elected legislature affects the incentives of dictators to engage in corruption. The study relies on case studies from Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. The book is accessible to a wide audience without requiring sophisticated statistical training.

The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships studies how institutional and social factors influence corruption in dictatorships. Dictatorships are often synonymous with high levels of corruption, yet Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue otherwise. The authors ask why corruption has declined in some but not other authoritarian regimes. What are the main political factors that drive some autocrats to curb corruption? The book explores the role that business mobilization can play in reducing corruption under some conditions in dictatorships. It investigates how political competition for an elected legislature affects the incentives of dictators to engage in corruption. The study relies on case studies from Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. The book is accessible to a wide audience without requiring sophisticated statistical training.

When and why are right-wing populist (RWP) parties electorally successful in developing democracies? What are the consequences of their electoral success? The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties and Reversal of Economic Reforms in Developing Democracies presents an original theoretical framework that is grounded in the socio-economic characteristics of developing countries to answer these questions. Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue that when a sudden reversal financial crisis occurs in a highly clientelist developing democracy, RWP parties can successfully win the electoral support of voters, particularly those belonging to the traditional group in society. They secure their win by promising to adopt nationalist economic policies to restore the social and economic status of voters, particularly those belonging to the traditional groups. Upon winning elections, they deliver on this program by adopting protectionist trade policies and reducing the independence of their country’s central banks so they can manipulate monetary policy to support dominant group voters. Consequently, they reverse key elements of economic globalization. To provide evidence for these claims the authors conduct in-depth analyses of two important cases – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of India and the Partido Social Liberal (PSL) of Brazil using survey experiments and qualitative evidence, and they analyze Time-Series Cross-Sectonial data for 58 developing countries from 1980 to 2018 to establish the generalizability of their arguments.

This book seeks to answer a number of key questions about the relationship between the IMF, developing states and the impact of financial crises on human rights abuses, including: Why do some but not other IMF-assisted developing states experience the joint outbreak of currency and sudden reversal crises under the Fund’s program?; What are some of the short-term political ramifications of such crises?; Why do human rights violation by governments increase sharply in the wake of twin currency and sudden reversal crisis in some but not all crisis-affected countries?