W. Wat Hopkins – författare

On July 21, 1990, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., announced his resignation from the nation's highest court. The judicial career of the man who Wat Hopkins considers the United States Supreme Court's premier protector of expression came to an end. Hopkins examines the body of Justice Brennan's free expression jurisprudence and shows how Justice Brennan's theory of free expression was built on the metaphor of a marketplace of ideas.Hopkins' analysis is based primarily on an examination of the significant free expression cases during Brennan's thirty-four year term. He concludes that Brennan developed a philosophically sound First Amendment theory that was accepted by the Court, but is not being applied today with the force necessary to make it truly effective. This detailed examination of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence is a noteworthy addition to legal history and scholarship.

The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which recently turned 50, has been hailed as the primary means by which US citizens can know about how their governors operate in a democratic republic. Recently, however, it has been criticized as ineffective because it is cumbersome and full of loopholes. This book examines the role and effectiveness of the FOIA, comparing the FOIA world with the pre-FOIA world, rating its effectiveness compared to other access laws internationally, examining ways in which it can be improved, and questioning whether it should be dismantled and replaced. This book was originally published as a special issue of Communication Law and Policy.

The need to protect free speech on matters of governing importance--more than any other element of government--is the defining factor of a free society. Nowhere in the law is that prospect more clearly explained than in the opinion in Times v. Sullivan. This special issue provides an example of the breadth and scope of Times v. Sullivan and the ways in which the case continues to impact the jurisprudence of free expression. It is introduced by two essays designed to provide an overview of the case, providing insights into the origins of the dispute the Court was called upon to settle. The next four articles are testimony to breadth the opinion in this case, particularly dealing with aspects not often considered. Combined, they all demonstrate the lasting significance of what may be the most important free expression case the Court has delivered.

In 1952, legal scholar and historian Frederick S. Siebert published his monumental study of three centuries of press freedom in England, in which he enunciated and supported two propositions that were remarkable for their simplicity. The second of the propositions has become a guiding principle in the study of free expression. This special issue provides a remarkable body of work focusing on this key proposition in the context of one of today's great tragedies--September 11, 2001. It begins with an essay examining cycles of stability/stress and the reactions to those cycles, followed by the application of a concept to courtroom access issues following September 11. The last two articles provide an account of how times of stress--the period following the events of September 11, in particular--inhibit academic freedom and an overview of Siebert's life and work.

The need to protect free speech on matters of governing importance--more than any other element of government--is the defining factor of a free society. Nowhere in the law is that prospect more clearly explained than in the opinion in Times v. Sullivan. This special issue provides an example of the breadth and scope of Times v. Sullivan and the ways in which the case continues to impact the jurisprudence of free expression. It is introduced by two essays designed to provide an overview of the case, providing insights into the origins of the dispute the Court was called upon to settle. The next four articles are testimony to breadth the opinion in this case, particularly dealing with aspects not often considered. Combined, they all demonstrate the lasting significance of what may be the most important free expression case the Court has delivered.

In 1952, legal scholar and historian Frederick S. Siebert published his monumental study of three centuries of press freedom in England, in which he enunciated and supported two propositions that were remarkable for their simplicity. The second of the propositions has become a guiding principle in the study of free expression. This special issue provides a remarkable body of work focusing on this key proposition in the context of one of today's great tragedies--September 11, 2001. It begins with an essay examining cycles of stability/stress and the reactions to those cycles, followed by the application of a concept to courtroom access issues following September 11. The last two articles provide an account of how times of stress--the period following the events of September 11, in particular--inhibit academic freedom and an overview of Siebert's life and work.

The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which recently turned 50, has been hailed as the primary means by which US citizens can know about how their governors operate in a democratic republic. Recently, however, it has been criticized as ineffective because it is cumbersome and full of loopholes. This book examines the role and effectiveness of the FOIA, comparing the FOIA world with the pre-FOIA world, rating its effectiveness compared to other access laws internationally, examining ways in which it can be improved, and questioning whether it should be dismantled and replaced. This book was originally published as a special issue of Communication Law and Policy.

Hate speech has been a societal problem for many years and has seen a resurgence recently alongside political divisiveness and technologies that ease and accelerate the spread of messages. Methods to protect individuals and groups from hate speech have eluded lawmakers as the call for restrictions or bans on such speech are confronted by claims of First Amendment protection. Problematic speech, the argument goes, should be confronted by more speech rather than by restriction. Debate over the extent of First Amendment protection is based on two bodies of law—the practical, precedent determined by the Supreme Court, and the theoretical framework of First Amendment jurisprudence. In Hate Speech is Not Free: The Case Against Constitutional Protection, W. Wat Hopkins argues that the prevailing thought that hate is protected by both case law and theory is incorrect. Within the Supreme Court’s established hierarchy of speech protection, hate speech falls to the lowest level, deserving no protection as it does not advance ideas containing social value. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s cases addressing protected and unprotected speech set forth a clear rationale for excommunicating hate speech from First Amendment protection.