Ylwa Sjölin Wirling – författare
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Models are used to explore possibilities across all scientific fields. Climate models simulate the potential future climatic conditions under various emissions scenarios, macroeconomic models investigate the implications of various fiscal and monetary policy initiatives, and infectious diseases models study the spread of viral diseases under a range of conditions. Such modeling approaches have not gone ignored by philosophers of science, but they have only recently started to explicitly address modeling the possible. So far, the discussion has been spread across a variety of more or less isolated pockets of debate in the philosophy of science. Modeling the Possible: Perspectives from Philosophy of Science draws together these studies, focusing specifically on how various modeling practices probe possibilities and justify claims concerning them.The volume is divided into three sections, plus an introductory chapter. The introductory chapter provides a state-of-the-art survey of the discussions of modeling possibilities within the philosophy of science, as well as an introduction to the book’s main themes and individual papers. The three sections focus on different kinds of possibility concepts, possibility spaces, and how-possibly modeling in practical situations. The chapters contained in this volume address conceptual and theoretical issues while also presenting case studies from various scientific domains: physics, evolutionary and synthetic biology, network science, climate science, economics, and epidemiology.Essential reading for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and modelers in various scientific disciplines, Modeling the Possible is also suitable for anyone interested in model-based scientific inferences, their validity, and the policy conclusions derived from them.
Del 33 - Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensis
Modal empiricism made difficult : an essay in the meta-epistemology of modality
Häftad, Engelska, 2019
325 kr
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Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of mo¬dality, by using modal empiricism – a form of modal epistemology – as a running example. In particular, I investigate the assumption that it is important to be able to meet the integration challenge. Meeting the integration challenge is a source of serious difficulty for many approaches, but modal empiricism is supposed to do well in this respect. But I argue that once we have a better grasp of what the integration challenge is, it is not obvious that it presents no problem for modal empiricism. Moreover, even if modal empiricism could be said to be in a relatively good position with respect to integration, it comes at the cost of a forced choice between far-reaching partial modal scepticism and non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view that more than one modal epistemology will be correct. While non-uniformism might not in itself be unpalatable, it must be defined and defended in a way which squares with the modal empiricist’s other commitment. I explore two ways of doing so, both involving a revised idea of the integration challenge and its role for the epistemology of modality. One involves a bifurcation of the integration challenge, and the other a restriction of the integration challenge’s relevance. Both ways are interesting, but neither is, as it turns out, a walk in the park.