History and Philosophy of Psychology – serie

My fIrst encounter with the name of William Charles Wells, over twenty years ago, was an oblique reference to his Essay upon single vision that Wheatstone (1838) made in a classical article on binocular vision. The reference was enigmatic because it stated that few had paid attention to Wells' theory of visual direction, while doing little to infonn the reader of its novelty. I was fortunate in having the excellent facility of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Department of the Library at the University of St. Andrews near at hand, so that I could cousult a copy of Wells' monograph. However, I was not aware of the full import of its contents until Hiroshi Ono visited Dundee from York University, Ontario, in 1980. Hiroshi had previously fonnalised the principles of binocular visual direction that Hering (1879) had proposed. He returned one day from St. Andrews, having read Wells' Essay upon single vision, amazed to have found that Wells had perfonned similar experiments and reached similar conclusions to Hering. Hiroshi Ono has done much to bring Wells' work on binocular single vision to the notice of visual scientists, although its reception has not been without opposition. As I read more of Wells' work on vision I became aware of its breadth as well as its depth. In addition to his essay on binocular single vision, he wrote about and conducted experiments on accommodation, visual acuity, visual persistence, and vertigo.

For the last 25 years, Kurt Danziger's work has been at the center of developments in history and theory of psychology. This volume makes Danziger's work the focal point of a variety of contributions representing several active areas of research. The authors are among the leading figures in history and theory of psychology from North America, Europe and South Africa, including Danziger himself. This work will serve as a point of departure for those who wish to acquaint themselves with some of the most important issues in this field.

For more than half of the 20* century, psychologists sought to locate the causes of behaviour in individuals and tended to neglect the possibility of locating the psy­ chological in the social.

There are no books precisely parallel to this one. The main works of the major authors in phenomenological philosophy (but not phenomenological psychology) are in print – we mean Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau- Ponty. General texts on the phenomenological approach in philosophy – including ones which take a historical approach – are available. Notable are: H. Spiegelberg (1981) The Phenomenological Movement (3rd edition) The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. D. Moran (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology London, Routledge. There are several accounts of psychology from a phenomenological viewpoint in print, some of which refer to the philosophical roots. The extent of the reference varies. None fully spells the connections out, and none has a historical perspective. For example: R .S. Valle and S. Halling (1989) Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology New York, Plenum Press. E. Spinelli (2005) The Interpreted World: An introduction to phenomenological psychology (2nd edition) London, Sage. H.R. Pollio, T.B. Henley and C.T. Thompson (1997) The Phenomenology of Everyday Life Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. K. Dahlberg, N. Drew, and M. Nyström (2001) Reflective Lifeworld Research Stockholm, Studentlitteratur. There are books in print which are much more concerned with the practicalities of phenomenologically-based research in psychology than with the history and philosophy underlying this. The most used example is probably: C. Moustakas (1994) Phenomenological Research Methods Thousand Oaks, Sage.  I would characterize the current book, in contrast to the above, as having phenomenologically-based research in psychology firmly in view, but addressing in detail the historical development of the phenomenological movement in philosophy insofar as it illuminates the inmpact on psychology. So – the historical development of phenomenological philosophy and the impact, at each stage, on psychology.Answering as a collateral effect the question, What is phenomenological psychology? It is essential to offer an authoritative account of these matters now because: Qualitative research in psychology has achieved acceptance in Europe (though the acceptance is less in the United States at present), and with qualitative research in general, phenomenologically-based research is widely practiced. The British Psychological Society – by whom undergraduate degrees in psychology are accredited (and without this accreditation, students cannot progress to professional training) – has just begun to demand qualitative research training as part of the research methods and practical training programme. This book uniquely contains material that would be needed for a thorough background in phenomenological psychology. The British Psychological Society has also just begun to demand a core module in the History and Philosophy of Psychology as part of the advanced undergraduate education of psychology students. This book – though not intended as a core elementary text – would be right as background reading. In associated, applied areas throughout the world (e.g. health psychology, organizational and industrial psychology, counseling, nursing) phenomenological approaches are well accepted and very widely used. However, the meaning of the approach is often misunderstood – often boiling down to a report of, e.g. patients’ statements about such-and-such a thing. Experience is not rigorously addressed. This book provides a necessary corrective, and indicates what the options are for phenomenologically-based research, and the basis of these options within the history of phenomenological philosophy.

There are no books precisely parallel to this one. The main works of the major authors in phenomenological philosophy (but not phenomenological psychology) are in print – we mean Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau- Ponty. General texts on the phenomenological approach in philosophy – including ones which take a historical approach – are available. Notable are: H. Spiegelberg (1981) The Phenomenological Movement (3rd edition) The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. D. Moran (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology London, Routledge. There are several accounts of psychology from a phenomenological viewpoint in print, some of which refer to the philosophical roots. The extent of the reference varies. None fully spells the connections out, and none has a historical perspective. For example: R .S. Valle and S. Halling (1989) Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology New York, Plenum Press. E. Spinelli (2005) The Interpreted World: An introduction to phenomenological psychology (2nd edition) London, Sage. H.R. Pollio, T.B. Henley and C.T. Thompson (1997) The Phenomenology of Everyday Life Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. K. Dahlberg, N. Drew, and M. Nyström (2001) Reflective Lifeworld Research Stockholm, Studentlitteratur. There are books in print which are much more concerned with the practicalities of phenomenologically-based research in psychology than with the history and philosophy underlying this. The most used example is probably: C. Moustakas (1994) Phenomenological Research Methods Thousand Oaks, Sage.  I would characterize the current book, in contrast to the above, as having phenomenologically-based research in psychology firmly in view, but addressing in detail the historical development of the phenomenological movement in philosophy insofar as it illuminates the inmpact on psychology. So – the historical development of phenomenological philosophy and the impact, at each stage, on psychology.Answering as a collateral effect the question, What is phenomenological psychology? It is essential to offer an authoritative account of these matters now because: Qualitative research in psychology has achieved acceptance in Europe (though the acceptance is less in the United States at present), and with qualitative research in general, phenomenologically-based research is widely practiced. The British Psychological Society – by whom undergraduate degrees in psychology are accredited (and without this accreditation, students cannot progress to professional training) – has just begun to demand qualitative research training as part of the research methods and practical training programme. This book uniquely contains material that would be needed for a thorough background in phenomenological psychology. The British Psychological Society has also just begun to demand a core module in the History and Philosophy of Psychology as part of the advanced undergraduate education of psychology students. This book – though not intended as a core elementary text – would be right as background reading. In associated, applied areas throughout the world (e.g. health psychology, organizational and industrial psychology, counseling, nursing) phenomenological approaches are well accepted and very widely used. However, the meaning of the approach is often misunderstood – often boiling down to a report of, e.g. patients’ statements about such-and-such a thing. Experience is not rigorously addressed. This book provides a necessary corrective, and indicates what the options are for phenomenologically-based research, and the basis of these options within the history of phenomenological philosophy.

For more than half of the 20* century, psychologists sought to locate the causes of behaviour in individuals and tended to neglect the possibility of locating the psy­ chological in the social. In the late 1960s, a reaction to that neglect brought about a "crisis" in social psychology. This "crisis" did not affect all social psychologists; some remained seemingly oblivious to its presence; others dismissed its signifi­ cance and continued much as before. But, in certain quarters, the psychological was re-conceptualised as the social, and the social was taken to be sui generis. Moreover, the possibility of developing general laws and theories to describe and explain social interaction was rejected on the grounds that, as social beings, our actions vary from occasion to occasion, and are, for many reasons, unrepeatable. There is, so it was thought, an inherent instability in the phenomena of interest. The nomothetic ideal was said to rest on individualistic cause-effect positivism of the kind which (arguably) characterised the natural sciences, but social psychology (so it was said) is an historical inquiry, and its conclusions are necessarily historically relative (Gergen, 1973). Events outside psychology converged to give impetus to the "crisis" within.

My fIrst encounter with the name of William Charles Wells, over twenty years ago, was an oblique reference to his Essay upon single vision that Wheatstone (1838) made in a classical article on binocular vision. The reference was enigmatic because it stated that few had paid attention to Wells' theory of visual direction, while doing little to infonn the reader of its novelty. I was fortunate in having the excellent facility of the Rare Books and Manuscripts Department of the Library at the University of St. Andrews near at hand, so that I could cousult a copy of Wells' monograph. However, I was not aware of the full import of its contents until Hiroshi Ono visited Dundee from York University, Ontario, in 1980. Hiroshi had previously fonnalised the principles of binocular visual direction that Hering (1879) had proposed. He returned one day from St. Andrews, having read Wells' Essay upon single vision, amazed to have found that Wells had perfonned similar experiments and reached similar conclusions to Hering. Hiroshi Ono has done much to bring Wells' work on binocular single vision to the notice of visual scientists, although its reception has not been without opposition. As I read more of Wells' work on vision I became aware of its breadth as well as its depth. In addition to his essay on binocular single vision, he wrote about and conducted experiments on accommodation, visual acuity, visual persistence, and vertigo.

This book explores the importance of the work of Franco Basaglia, a pioneer in the democratic psychiatry movement. Using a multidisciplinary approach combining philosophy and psychology this volume seeks to illuminate the past and create a clearer picture of Basaglia's impact in conceptualizing modern psychiatric care. It reviews the contemporary status of care and offers new insights for a critical evaluation of care that takes the psychiatric revolution to a new level.Highlights Basaglia’s diagnostic and clinical practiceEmploys a multi-disciplinary approachJoins phenomenology and critical theory

This book explores the importance of the work of Franco Basaglia, a pioneer in the democratic psychiatry movement. Using a multidisciplinary approach combining philosophy and psychology this volume seeks to illuminate the past and create a clearer picture of Basaglia's impact in conceptualizing modern psychiatric care. It reviews the contemporary status of care and offers new insights for a critical evaluation of care that takes the psychiatric revolution to a new level.Highlights Basaglia’s diagnostic and clinical practiceEmploys a multi-disciplinary approachJoins phenomenology and critical theory

​​Edgar Rubin was one of the outstanding pioneers of perceptual psychology in the early twentieth century. His approach involved a turning away from an earlier elementaristic psychology towards an approach based on “perceptual wholes.” Rubin’s approach is closely linked to the Gestalt revolution in perceptual psychology and was eagerly embraced by the Gestaltists. This has often led to Rubin being classified as a Gestalt psychologist. This misrepresents his position as is shown in the book. Rubin’s aim was to develop a descriptive psychology — or aspective psychology to use his terminology — which would do full justice to the complex nature of psychological phenomena. Thus he rejected attempts by the Gestalt psychologists to explain diverse phenomena within a single overarching framework. While Rubin is internationally often misclassified as a Gestalt psychologist, in Denmark he is often hailed as a pioneer of a specific Danish “school of phenomenology.” This also misrepresents Rubin’s approach who was highly critical of psychological “schools.” His criticisms of the overambitious theoretical aspirations of Gestalt psychology, his negative attitude towards school formation in psychology were both highly prescient. What remains today of Gestalt psychology is primarily its descriptive parts; the idea of schools of psychology, so common in early twentieth century psychology is now seen as a totally outmoded viewpoint. There is an interesting moral in this story for the history and status of psychology; to wit, that Rubin’s emphasis on the correct description of psychological phenomena shows what is likely to live on as classic contributions to psychology. This certainly holds for his own work on figure and ground which, after almost a century, is still universally known and admired by psychologists. He was indeed a consummate psychological observer. The book argues for the importance of description in psychology.​