Perspectives in Ethology - Böcker

ON THE FUTURE OF PERSPECTIVES When Patrick Bateson and Peter Klopfer offered me the editorship of Perspectives in 1992, the world of academic publishing was in one of its periodic upheavals. Subscriptions to series-even distinguished series such as Perspec­ tives-had been declining and individual volume prices had been rising, a trend that if continued could only result in the series pricing itself out of the market. In the course of the negotiations around the change of editors, the publishers offered a cost-cutting solution: change the production pattern to "camera ready" and elimi­ nate the costs of indexing and proofreading. While I could see the sense in this proposal, I was reluctant to accept it. Part of what I had always liked about the volumes in this series was that they were real books, intelligently proofread, nicely laid out, and provided with proper indexes. Thus, I in return offered a "Devil's bargain": the publisher should maintain the present quality of the series for two more volumes and make a renewed effort to advertise the series to our ethological and sociobiological colleagues, while I as the new series editor committed myself to a renewed effort to make Perspectives the publication of choice for writers who are trying to get their message out to the world intact and readers who are seeking clear, coherent, comprehensive and untrammeled presentations of authors' ideas and research programs.

This volume is perhaps best characterized by its interdisciplinary nature and reliance on an eclectic range of approaches. One theme that naturally emerges from the collected essays is that of causation versus analogy. Phenomena defined at multiple levels can in principle be studied in two ways - vertically and horizontally. The vertical strategy directly specifies causal relations holding between levels, whereas the horizontal approach looks for parallels between levels, seeking to isolate shared causal properties. One of the essays here stands directly for the vertical strategy, while another warns explicitly against the perils of a loose selectionist analogy among levels. Other parallels between evolution and culture are probed, calling attention to the general limits of analogy, or carefully noting the respects in which the proposed analogy is expected to break down. The other themes of economics, optimization, and stability, when not explicitly mentioned, lurk in the background of any treatment of culture and behaviour in relation to natural selection.

Richerson and Boyd analyze the possible relations between climatic change in the Pleistocene and the evo­ lution of social learning, evaluating the boundary conditions under which social learning could increase fitness and contribute to culture.

In the preface to the first volume of this series we set out our aims, which were to encourage fresh perspectives in ethology and provide a forum for new ideas. We still feel that in the perfectly proper search for high stan­ dards of evidence, methodology has tended to remain the master rather than the servant of most aspects of ethological work. It is easy for us all to forget that the kinds of data we collect are largely determined by the kinds of questions we ask. Even an ethologist with the professed goal of providing a straightforward account of behavior must incorporate into his or her descriptions a great many assumptions about the organization of that be­ havior. Inevitably some facets of what went on will have been selected at the expense of others. This is sometimes done, for example, in the service of a theory that the fundamental unit for description is the fixed action pattern. Our point is not that constraints on the collection of data are bad but that the theory which gives rise to the selection of evidence should not be neglected. In the first volume, the choice of topics and authors was based upon our views about the exciting or developing issues in ethology. This volume represents a more opportunistic approach: the articles were selected from among the many offered to us as best conforming to our aims. Neverthe­ less, certain themes do emerge.

This volume is devoted principally to the theme of behavioral develop­ ment. The study of ontogeny has attracted some of the most bitter and protracted controversies in the whole field of ethology and psychology. This is partly because the arguments have reflected more general and continuing ideological battles about nature and nurture. In the opening essay, Oppenheim shows how these debates have recurred in much the same form over the last century. His chapter also brings out a more worrying feature of such argument. He demonstrates that authors who are well known for their strongly held partisan views have written in much more balanced ways than is usually admitted. Although the ex­ cluded middle is familiar enough in academic argument, the dynamic tensions actually present in developing systems may be particularly prone to polarize debate about what is actually happening. This point is elegantly explored by Oyama in her essay on her concept of maturation.

Sociobiology is the play of the season. Its success is mellsured by its immense popularity and perhaps by the controversy it has generated as well. Unfortunately, neither its popularity nor the resulting controversy seems likely to assure progress toward understanding sociobiological issues. The play has too many actors and, it seems, the casting has been poor; the players are unable to maintain their roles. At center stage, of course, is E. O. Wilson and his monumental opus Sociobiology. 1 In the wings, and making periodic entrances, are an assort­ ment of brilliant, committed, and aggressive adversaries. On cue, one of them steps out and decries the self-fulfilling nature of sociobiological prophesies. The arguments of the adversaries are varied. They warn that if all nonhuman primate societies tolerate aggression and man is also a pri­ mate, then aggression may come to be considered "normal" and therefore acceptable. Their dire warnings may also have real impact on policy, alter­ ing, for example, a research program intended to examine longitudinally the relation between a supernumerary chromosome and certain behavioral disorders. The rationale is that since the afflicted infants would have to be identified and the study obviously does assume that psychopathology is linked to the chromosome aberration, the attitudes of the child's parents could well contribute to abnormal behavior that might otherwise not appear.