Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought – serie

The history of strategic bombing is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of strategic bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.

Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics—the three layers of policy and action inherent to all military efforts—are the focus of this historical analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War. The American theory of counterrevolutionary warfare is examined in light of American military practice, especially that of the Marine Corps, during the period of America's greatest involvement, 1965-1972, and at the site of the most intense combat, the five northern provinces known as I Corps. Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, this inquiry indicates that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Specifically, this work demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.

Aronsen draws on recently declassified documents in Ottawa and Washington to provide a reassessment of Canada's special relationship with the U.S. Toward this end, detailed new information is provided about Canada's contribution to the creation of the postwar economic order from the Bretton Woods Agreement to GATT. Canada's cooperation was rewarded by special economic concessions including the extension of the Hyde Park agreement in 1945, the inclusion of the off-shore purchases clause to the Marshall Plan, and Article II of the NATO Treaty. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Canada's resources played a crucial role in the production of weapons systems for the new air/atomic strategic doctrine. Several policies were adopted to facilitate the expansion of Canadian defense production, notably the relaxation of regulations on technology transfer; the encouragement of private sector investment; and the negotiation of long-term contracts at above-market prices. In the midst of these unprecendented peacetime developments Time Magazine observed that Canada had become America's Indispensable Ally.

U.S. and British naval power developed in quite different ways in the early 20th century before the Second World War. This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each. Naval power was the single greatest manifestation of national power for both countries. Their armies were small and their air forces only existed for part of the period covered. For Great Britain, naval power was vital to her very existence, and for the U.S., naval power was far and away the most effective tool the country could use to exercise armed influence around the world. Therefore, the decisions made about the relative strengths of the two navies were in many ways the most important strategic choices the British and American governments ever made. An important book for military historians and those interested in the exercise and the extension of power.

This study brings together military history and intellectual history to provide a better understanding of the factors that influence military thinking and practice. In particular, Ramsay covers thought concerning the evolution of British minor tactics between 1870 and 1918, from the era of the black powder rifle wielded by a career soldier to the age of the citizen soldier in the Great War. The development of new military technologies in the last quarter of the 19th century led to novel tactical systems, which included new, decentralized methods of tactical command and control at a time when mass, citizen-based armies were becoming the norm in Europe. While the British Army's system of command and control evolved to meet these new combat conditions, its response was conditioned by the officers' assessment of the rank and file who served in its peacetime volunteer army as well as by the corporate interests of the professional officer corps. This development marked a watershed in military practice and theory, the transition from closely supervised small units under the immediate command of a career officer, to decentralized tactics under the direction of a junior officer or NCO who had been a civilian before the war.Using models such as those proposed by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Ramsay treats military theory in the same manner as intellectual historians have regarded other areas of reasoning, to illustrate the forces that can shape military theory and to provide an explanation of those that may impede necessary changes in military thinking. To date, tactical studies have rarely looked below the battalion level of command; thus, the technology of the First World War has been extensively studied, but the psychology far less so. This is ironic given that armies of the First World War relied more than any earlier armies on conscripted civilians from a political and social culture that strove to suppress violence in civil society. As a result, this book will interest sociologists and psychologists who seek insight into the history of their disciplines, as well as cultural and social historians who study British history.

Historians often ignore, treat cursorily, or relegate to footnotes specific incidents in international relations in order to facilitate the construction of a larger narrative. The contributors to this volume argue that researchers do so to their peril, as individual or seemingly isolated incidents can play significant roles in the overall course of history. Incidents are crucial in determining the mental maps that decision makers form regarding the countries and individuals with whom they interact. Incidents can either initiate or block new policies with consequences that are both far-reaching and unexpected.People make foreign policy and an understanding of what elements of an incident were important to these individuals at key points essential to an appreciation of policies subsequently advocated. How individuals view other cultures and nations, how they react to the actions of such nations, and their perceptions of such actions all form key components in this study. Using a variety of examples, these essays show the value of detailed examinations of events, illuminating such matters as British policy in the Far East, French imperial policy, Italian military actions in the interwar period, British attitudes toward Hitler, and the effect of the Soviet Union on British thinking in the 1930s.

An examination of the political and diplomatic role of American nuclear weapons in conflicts with a non-nuclear China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, this study analyzes the American tendency to become involved in confrontations with far weaker powers over issues of very little strategic significance to the United States. Washington threatens these adversaries with the use of incommensurate levels of force, then ultimately backs down in the face of international and domestic opposition to ill-considered plans to use force. Unlike works on nuclear history that have either focused on superpower nuclear conflicts and ignored cases of American nuclear diplomacy toward non-nuclear adversaries, or those that have focused merely on the outcomes of nuclear threats against non-nuclear powers, this book considers in depth American nuclear diplomacy toward China during the whole period of Sino-American military confrontations.Soman offers new insights on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War, the extent of nuclear diplomacy during the war, and the way in which the war ended. He argues that the goal of American nuclear diplomacy in the spring of 1955 was to provoke a war with China, rather than to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Finally, he lays out, for the first time in print, the elaborate diplomacy that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated to defuse the 1958 crisis, involving a major shift in American policy that still remains hidden from the public as well as historians. Highlighting the central role of nuclear diplomacy in these crises, this book draws conclusions on the efficacy of such diplomacy, the impact of these crises on the development of policies of massive retaliation and limited war, the consequences of Dulles's brinkmanship, and the revival of nuclear diplomacy by the Clinton administration in conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries.

The threat of terrorism knows no borders, and, given the complexities of today's global system, no nation can afford to stand alone. This study considers the role that international cooperation plays in assisting elite military forces engaged in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, particularly hostage rescue efforts. Using historical examples from the experiences of Great Britain and the United States, the author concludes that cooperation (ranging from shared intelligence, to forward base access, to the provision of observers) can provide significant advantages in dealing with low-intensity operations. However, the most fruitful joint efforts involve shared activities by countries that possess a similar threat perception, usually in part a result of a common sociology in their view of historical developments.Before turning to modern counter-terrorism, Taillon addresses the respective military experiences of Britain and America within the wider realm of conventional and low-intensity operations. The main Anglo-American focus of the book gives primary importance to the developments and doctrine for the employment of special forces, as well as an analysis of more recent low-intensity and counter-terrorism operations, such as the 1980 Iranian embassy siege in London and the failure, that same year, of the American hostage rescue attempt in Teheran. Taillon hopes to identify and highlight those key aspects of cooperation at an international level which have, at least in part, been absolutely essential to successful counter-terrorist operations in the past and which seem destined to remain so in the future.

J. Butler Wright brought his young bride and son to Russia in the fall of 1916 to take up duties as counselor to the American Embassy in Petrograd. He had no idea that he would soon witness one of the most amazing events in history—the collapse of Imperial Russia and the advent of the Soviet Union. Recording daily events and observations in his diary, Wright left a vivid description of the day-to-day uncertainty in revolutionary Russia and American activities during this chaotic time. This account demonstrates how confused and dangerous diplomatic representation can be during times of crisis. While often missing the mark in what was happening in Russia, Wright and his fellow diplomats fulfilled their duty diligently.From an official audience with the Tsar in early 1917 to a fantastic journey across Russia on the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1918, Wright recorded his observations on events, people, culture, intrigue, danger, and the normal occurrences of daily life. Throughout it all, Wright remained dedicated to his duty as an American representative and constantly searched for an effective American reaction to what was happening in Russia. On a personal level, however, Wright's concern for the safety of his wife and son during this chaotic time reveals that it was not always about duty to country.

Raising money was one of the great successes of the Irish government, as the funds provided the sinews of war with which to fight Britain. This book details the history of the financing of the Irish revolution from both domestic and international loans. Divisions in Irish society over the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the creation of the Irish Free State led to the outbreak of the Civil War. The Free State's ability to deny the anti-Treaty forces access to the loan funds through a ten-year court battle would prove a powerful weapon in defeating the Republicans.The Dáil government depended on the loans to finance their operations, and the failure of the anti-Treaty forces was due in part to their shortage of funds. International complications arose for the Free State when courts in Dublin and New York disagreed over dispersal of the money. Upon his return to government office, Eamon de Valera appealed to bond holders, particularly those in the United States, to give the loan money to him to found an opposition newspaper. Only when de Valera himself formed a government would all of the bond money be repaid. These events would raise questions of international law, and the results would shape Irish relations with the United States for a decade.

Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 examines the nature of the inter-Service crisis between the British Army and the RAF over the provision of effective air support for the army in the Second World War. Material for this book is drawn primarily from the rich collection of documents at the National Archives (UK) and other British archives. The author makes a highly original point that Britain's independent RAF was in fact a disguised blessing for the Army and that the air force's independence was in part a key reason why a successful solution to the army's air support problems was found. The analysis traces why the British army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support and how an effective system of support was organized by the RAF. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origins and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.The provision of direct air support was of central importance to the success enjoyed by Anglo-American armies during the latter half of the Second World War. First in North Africa, and later in Italy and North-West Europe, American, British and Empire armies fought most if not all of their battles with the knowledge that they enjoyed unassailable air superiority throughout the battle area. This advantage, however, was the product of a long and bitter dispute between the British Army and the Royal Air Force that began at the end of the First World War and continued virtually unabated until it was resolved in late 1942 and early 1943 when the 2nd Tactical Air Force was created. Battlefield experience and, in particular, success in North Africa, combined with the hard work, wisdom and perseverance of Air Marshals Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham, the active co-operation of General Bernard Montgomery, and the political authority of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, produced a uniquely British system that afforded the most comprehensive, effective and flexible air support provided by any air force during the war. The book is divided into two equal parts of five chapters. Part one surveys how the British Army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support, and part two explains how an effective system of air support was organized by the middle years of the war. The analysis traces Britain's earliest experience with aircraft in the Great War 1914-1918, the inter-war period of doctrinal development and inter-Service rivalry, and the major campaigns in France and the Middle East during the first half of the Second World War when the weaknesses in Army-RAF co-operation were first exposed and eventually resolved. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origin and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.

In America's foreign affairs there has been a delicate balance between often conflicting imperatives of interests, ideals, and power. How these imperatives have intersected to shape the constellation of American foreign policy decisions throughout the nation's history and, indeed, how they have served to advance or subvert attainment of America's regional, hemispheric and global ambitions, is the subject of this study. This collection of essays explores seminal decisions in American foreign policy and diplomatic history, from the early National period to the Vietnam War, each of which proved to be a turning point, and then asks readers to consider alternative futures based upon different courses of action. Nielson underscores how history could, and perhaps should, have been different.U.S. foreign policy has in large measure been contingent upon decisions made by individuals in positions of power. Their personalities, characters, and assumptions about duty and America's role in the world have uniquely shaped policy choices and, thus, the course of foreign affairs, for better or worse. This book hopes to show that history is ever fluid, unpredictable, and problematic. It will complement traditional texts as a what if counterpoint which will stimulate interest in and speculation about leadership roles, national interest, and decision making in foreign policy.

Historians often ignore, treat cursorily, or relegate to footnotes specific incidents in international relations in order to facilitate the construction of a larger narrative. The contributors to this volume argue that researchers do so to their peril, as individual or seemingly isolated incidents can play significant roles in the overall course of history. Incidents are crucial in determining the mental maps that decision makers form regarding the countries and individuals with whom they interact. Incidents can either initiate or block new policies with consequences that are both far-reaching and unexpected.People make foreign policy and an understanding of what elements of an incident were important to these individuals at key points essential to an appreciation of policies subsequently advocated. How individuals view other cultures and nations, how they react to the actions of such nations, and their perceptions of such actions all form key components in this study. Using a variety of examples, these essays show the value of detailed examinations of events, illuminating such matters as British policy in the Far East, French imperial policy, Italian military actions in the interwar period, British attitudes toward Hitler, and the effect of the Soviet Union on British thinking in the 1930s.

Terrorism and its manifestations continue to evolve, becoming deadlier and more menacing. This study considers the evolution of terrorism since 1968 and how airlines and governments have attempted to deal with this form of violence through a series of nonforce strategies. Using historical examples, we see how governments, particularly the United States, attempted to counter politically motivated aerial hijacking with metal detectors, legal means, and, finally, in frustration, counterviolence operations to subdue terrorists. As nations witnessed aerial hijacking and sieges, the requirement for paramilitary and military counterterrorist forces became a necessity.Through use of examples from Israel (Entebbe 1976), West Germany (Mogadishu 1977), and Egypt (Malta 1985), Taillon concludes that cooperation—ranging from shared intelligence to forward base access and observers—can provide significant advantages in dealing with low-intensity operations. He hopes to highlight those key aspects of cooperation at an international level which have, at least in part, been vital to successful counterterrorist operations in the past and, as we witnessed again in the campaign in Afghanistan, are destined to remain so in the future.

Raising money was one of the great successes of the Irish government, as the funds provided the sinews of war with which to fight Britain. This book details the history of the financing of the Irish revolution from both domestic and international loans. Divisions in Irish society over the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the creation of the Irish Free State led to the outbreak of the Civil War. The Free State's ability to deny the anti-Treaty forces access to the loan funds through a ten-year court battle would prove a powerful weapon in defeating the Republicans.The Dáil government depended on the loans to finance their operations, and the failure of the anti-Treaty forces was due in part to their shortage of funds. International complications arose for the Free State when courts in Dublin and New York disagreed over dispersal of the money. Upon his return to government office, Eamon de Valera appealed to bond holders, particularly those in the United States, to give the loan money to him to found an opposition newspaper. Only when de Valera himself formed a government would all of the bond money be repaid. These events would raise questions of international law, and the results would shape Irish relations with the United States for a decade.

Schwab examines America's decision to stand in Vietnam with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965.The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

At midnight on October 2, 1990, the West German armed forces took over the approximately 90,000 men comprising the National People's (East German) Army (NVA) and assumed control of its substantial arsenal. This study is an analysis of that unification from its beginning in July 1990 to the end of summer of 1993 when all applications for future service of former NVA officers and non-commissioned officers had been processed. Using numerous un-published sources and interviews, the author addresses the following areas: the organization used by the Bundeswehr and the political control exerted in the Takeover, the key decisions reached and the explanation of these decisions, the relationship of the Takeover to the new Army Structure 5 being implemented at the time, and the effect of the Takeover on the Bundeswehr's operational readiness, especially its ability to perform its new tasks identified in the spring 1991.The first scholarly study of the Takeover, this study focuses on 11 key decisions, made not only for military reasons, but also for political, economic, social, and psychological purposes. Overall, the Takeover was a success in light of the numerous goals it achieved while avoiding the outbreak of violence. The Bundeswehr achieved this success mainly because it relied on liberal democratic principles, including those comprising the unique German concept of Innere F^Duhrung (civic education and moral leadership). This book also provides an overall evaluation of the Takeover and contributes to theory-building on army amalgamations.

War proved a seminal influence on the shape of the 20th century. This collection provides various essays addressing the phenomenon of war as viewed through the eyes of the fin de siecle. Leading scholars of war, international relations, and international law offer general or specific insights into war's consequences during the last one hundred years. Combined, the essays demonstrate the centrality of 20th century war to the development of the modern state system, international jurisprudence, and contemporary society.Donald Watt provides an overview of the use of the term war in its legal and practical sense. John Lynn addresses the transformation of military professional forces through the century. Donna Arzt explores the slow convergence of humanitarian law with human rights laws as witnessed in the latter half of the century. The contours of the national security state that emerged in many forms through the late century are detailed in contributions by Lawrence Aronsen, Geoffrey Smith, and Gary Hess. Finally, efforts to avert war through arms control, disarmament, arms reduction, and peace-keeping are examined in essays by Norman Hillmer and Erik Goldstein.

Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943 examines the nature of the inter-Service crisis between the British Army and the RAF over the provision of effective air support for the army in the Second World War. Material for this book is drawn primarily from the rich collection of documents at the National Archives (UK) and other British archives. The author makes a highly original point that Britain's independent RAF was in fact a disguised blessing for the Army and that the air force's independence was in part a key reason why a successful solution to the army's air support problems was found. The analysis traces why the British army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support and how an effective system of support was organized by the RAF. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origins and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.The provision of direct air support was of central importance to the success enjoyed by Anglo-American armies during the latter half of the Second World War. First in North Africa, and later in Italy and North-West Europe, American, British and Empire armies fought most if not all of their battles with the knowledge that they enjoyed unassailable air superiority throughout the battle area. This advantage, however, was the product of a long and bitter dispute between the British Army and the Royal Air Force that began at the end of the First World War and continued virtually unabated until it was resolved in late 1942 and early 1943 when the 2nd Tactical Air Force was created. Battlefield experience and, in particular, success in North Africa, combined with the hard work, wisdom and perseverance of Air Marshals Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham, the active co-operation of General Bernard Montgomery, and the political authority of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, produced a uniquely British system that afforded the most comprehensive, effective and flexible air support provided by any air force during the war. The book is divided into two equal parts of five chapters. Part one surveys how the British Army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support, and part two explains how an effective system of air support was organized by the middle years of the war. The analysis traces Britain's earliest experience with aircraft in the Great War 1914-1918, the inter-war period of doctrinal development and inter-Service rivalry, and the major campaigns in France and the Middle East during the first half of the Second World War when the weaknesses in Army-RAF co-operation were first exposed and eventually resolved. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origin and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.

U.S. and British naval power developed in quite different ways in the early 20th century before the Second World War. This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each. Naval power was the single greatest manifestation of national power for both countries. Their armies were small and their air forces only existed for part of the period covered. For Great Britain, naval power was vital to her very existence, and for the U.S., naval power was far and away the most effective tool the country could use to exercise armed influence around the world. Therefore, the decisions made about the relative strengths of the two navies were in many ways the most important strategic choices the British and American governments ever made. An important book for military historians and those interested in the exercise and the extension of power.

The years from 1934 to 1937 were a time during which the British Empire was confronted with the emergence of the triple threat of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy. The goal of British policy was easily defined: the protection and promotion of Britain's vast interests. While Neville Chamberlain and Sir Robert Vansittart agreed on the goal, they disagreed on the means to achieve it. Their disagreement stemmed partly from their different understandings of the nature of the Third Reich; Vansittart understood better than Chamberlain the implications of Hitler's Weltanschauung. But their different strategies also reflected the fact that Chamberlain did not share Vansittart's belief in the necessity of pursuing alliance diplomacy to protect the world-wide security and interests of the British Empire. While the prime minister realized that Britain's problems were global in scope, he thought Britain could solve each problem on a bilateral basis. In other words, Britain should approach Germany, Japan, and Italy directly to settle outstanding disputes. Vansittart did not believe, however, that Britain's problems could be solved on a bilateral basis, for the interdependence of events in every region of the globe militated against bilateral solutions.

Aronsen draws on recently declassified documents in Ottawa and Washington to provide a reassessment of Canada's special relationship with the U.S. Toward this end, detailed new information is provided about Canada's contribution to the creation of the postwar economic order from the Bretton Woods Agreement to GATT. Canada's cooperation was rewarded by special economic concessions including the extension of the Hyde Park agreement in 1945, the inclusion of the off-shore purchases clause to the Marshall Plan, and Article II of the NATO Treaty. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Canada's resources played a crucial role in the production of weapons systems for the new air/atomic strategic doctrine. Several policies were adopted to facilitate the expansion of Canadian defense production, notably the relaxation of regulations on technology transfer; the encouragement of private sector investment; and the negotiation of long-term contracts at above-market prices. In the midst of these unprecendented peacetime developments Time Magazine observed that Canada had become America's Indispensable Ally.