Orrin Schwab – författare

Schwab examines America's decision to stand in Vietnam with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965.The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

The Vietnam War was in many ways defined by a civil-military divide, an underlying clash between military and civilian leadership over the conflict's nature, purpose and results. This book explores the reasons for that clash—and the results of it.The relationships between the U.S. military, its supporters, and its opponents during the Vietnam War were both intense and complex. Schwab shows how the ability of the military to prosecute the war was complicated by these relationships, and by a variety of nonmilitary considerations that grew from them. Chief among these was the military's relationship to a civilian state that interpreted strategic value, risks, morality, political costs, and military and political results according to a different calculus. Second was a media that brought the war—and those protesting it—into living rooms across the land.As Schwab demonstrates, Vietnam brought together two leadership groups, each with very different operational and strategic perspectives on the Indochina region. Senior military officers favored conceptualizing the war as a conventional military conflict that required conventional means to victory. Political leaders and critics of the war understood it as an essentially political conflict, with associated political risks and costs. As the war progressed, Schwab argues, the divergence in perspectives, ideologies, and political interests created a large, and ultimately unbridgeable divide between military and civilian leaders. In the end, this clash of cultures defined the Vietnam War and its legacy for the armed forces and for American society as a whole.

Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape the policies of the US and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape US policy and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.

Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape the policies of the US and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.Schwab's work is five-part analysis of US policy and strategy in the Persian Gulf from 1990-2003. He begins the work by analyzing the prominence of the Persian Gulf in US global strategic thinking during the last decade of the Cold War. By that time, gulf oil had secured a paramount place in the minds of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part two dissects the relationship that individuals and regional governments in the Persian Gulf shared with the US. Here, Schwab also examines US perceptions of those entities and demonstrates how they helped shape US policy and define the status of those nations in the eyes of US policymakers. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the paradigm shifted dramatically. Part three examines US decision-making in the period immediately after that invasion. Schwab demonstrates that while forging a broad coalition to turn back Iraq was a significant diplomatic achievement, the international determination that defined the conflict in 1990-1991 eroded and gave way to a cumbersome policy of containment. That policy ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the coalition forged by the first Bush administration and burdened his successors as they struggled to achieve the longstanding goal of creating stability throughout the region. Part four explores the efforts of the Clinton and second Bush administrations in the Gulf. Saddam was one of the primary concerns of the Clinton administration, but so too were al-Qaeda, North Korea, China, and especially Yugoslavia. Indeed, his was the first administration to truly attempt to deal with these kinds of problems in a post-Cold War world. Despite their differences, there was a tremendous amount of continuity in the policies pursued by Clinton and George W. Bush. September 11 changed that, however, as Schwab chronicles in part five. In that section he explores how the current administration's adoption of a more proactive strategy of retaliation and preventative war has given rise to a new national security regime increasingly designed to fight asymmetric war while eliminating perceived threats to our national security and interests.

The Vietnam War was in many ways defined by a civil-military divide, an underlying clash between military and civilian leadership over the conflict's nature, purpose and results. This book explores the reasons for that clash—and the results of it.The relationships between the U.S. military, its supporters, and its opponents during the Vietnam War were both intense and complex. Schwab shows how the ability of the military to prosecute the war was complicated by these relationships, and by a variety of nonmilitary considerations that grew from them. Chief among these was the military's relationship to a civilian state that interpreted strategic value, risks, morality, political costs, and military and political results according to a different calculus. Second was a media that brought the war—and those protesting it—into living rooms across the land.As Schwab demonstrates, Vietnam brought together two leadership groups, each with very different operational and strategic perspectives on the Indochina region. Senior military officers favored conceptualizing the war as a conventional military conflict that required conventional means to victory. Political leaders and critics of the war understood it as an essentially political conflict, with associated political risks and costs. As the war progressed, Schwab argues, the divergence in perspectives, ideologies, and political interests created a large, and ultimately unbridgeable divide between military and civilian leaders. In the end, this clash of cultures defined the Vietnam War and its legacy for the armed forces and for American society as a whole.

Schwab examines America's decision to stand in Vietnam with a fresh perspective provided by new archival materials and the intellectual synthesis of institutional, political, and diplomatic history. Vietnam policy is shown at many different levels, from the presidency down to the level of CIA operatives in the field and public opinion specialists on the White House staff. The views of State Department officers, foreign public opinion, editorials in major U.S. newspapers, and the powerful leaders of both Congressional houses reveal an informed and highly conflicted public leadership well before American combat troops were committed in large numbers in the summer of 1965.The study begins with John F. Kennedy's inaugural address in January of 1961 and proceeds to show the decision-making rocess regarding Vietnam and Indochina through the several critical events that led to Johnson's famous press conference speech of 1965. The author contends that responsibility for the war and its tragic consequences should not be placed upon individuals, but rather at the levels of the state, society, and the international system. This view of agency existing at a higher level than the presidency challenges the dominant view of most diplomatic historians and other writers who have focused on the blunders and misperceptions of policy makers.

Joe Gilbert has just turned 40.He drives on the Strip for a living. He has meandered through life, serving in combat in the Middle East, going to graduate school to become a college professor, owning his own business. Now his journey is through the most remarkable piece of real estate in North America, the Las Vegas Strip. In that journey he will find a lot of himself and a lot about others.