Keith Neilson – författare

Britain and the Last Tsar is a fundamental re-interpretation of British foreign and defence policy before the First World War. The current orthodoxy asserts that the rise of an aggressive and powerful Germany forced Britain - a declining power - to abandon her traditional policy of avoiding alliances and to enter into alliance with Japan (1902), France (1904), and Russia (1907) in order to contain the German menace. In a controversial rejection of this theory, Keith Neilson argues that Britain was the pre-eminent world power in 1914 and that Russia, not Germany, was the principal long-term threat to Britain's global position. This original and important study shows that only by examining Anglo-Russian relations and eliminating an undue emphasis on Anglo-German affairs can an accurate picture of Britain's foreign and defence policy before 1914 be gained.

Written by an international group of distinguished historians, this volume offers both a more balanced and more particularized approach to the Cold War than has yet been available. The contributors seek to present the Cold War as a historical event, free from the heretofore widespread tendency to blame individuals, countries, and ideologies for what has occurred. They also demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing views of the Cold War as primarily a struggle for supremacy between the two superpowers, the Cold War was not a single phenomenon. Rather, they argue, the Cold War manifested itself in a number of ways, depending upon the country under consideration. While the main protagonists were the United States and the Soviet Union, other nations brought their own histories to the events after World War II, and these experiences influenced the ways in which the Cold War was perceived by and affected each country.Following an introduction by the editors, the book is divided into chapters which address the Cold War experiences of individual countries and regions--the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Canada, Australia, and the Middle East. The contributors show that, in each case, the decisions made after 1945 had a specific and unique context that determined their nature. For example, following the war, the United States was thrust into a position of global predominance, a position it had not previously held. This resulted in changes in the U.S government on a scale not seen since the Civil War. Britain, on the other hand, preferred to focus on the re-establishment of her position as a world power rather than on the narrow issue of European defense considered so important by the Americans. The contributors conclude that the Cold War must be seen not necessarily as a clash of ideologies, but rather as a particular example of what happens at the end of a war when a new balance of power must be established and new relationships forged between states. Their insights into this complex process will be invaluable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students seeking a useful introduction to the myriad facets of the Cold War.

For too long military history has ignored the role of intelligence. As a result, many people do not realize that military intelligence has played a significant role in history. However, intelligence gathering, evaluation, and analysis has always been part of war. Lack of knowledge of how intelligence has been utilized in wars makes for an incomplete and inaccurate picture of historical events. While many are aware of such things as the Allied code-breaking efforts in World War II, few know that similar activities were undertaken as early as the beginning of recorded history. By examining a number of case studies from Roman times to the present, Go Spy the Land reveals the essential continuity in military intelligence, the fact that many of the problems involved in military intelligence have remained constant, and the nature of the problems themselves.According to the authors, military intelligence has always been an important aspect of military planning and campaigns. Furthermore, military intelligence in its essentials has not changed over time: while technology and society have affected the ways in which this essential activity has been carried out, the problems inherent in the task have remained constant. The latter conclusion is something not generally appreciated in the intelligence field, which has been dominated by historians studying the twentieth century. This collection not only provides important case studies, but also shows that much of what is claimed as exclusively a product of the twentieth century has its roots as far back in time as the Roman Empire.

From Thermopylae to Belfast, elite military formations have been deployed against conventional or irregular forces. This study offers a superb analysis of elites in military history. A collection of brilliant studies by distinguished scholars, it illuminates, through a combination of overview and case study, a historical subject that has profound implications for the development of specialized forces in the post-Cold War Era. The study uses a comparative approach which investigates the topic over time and across culture.

These essays explore the link between the naval strength and global power of Great Britain and the United States from 1815 to the present. The British Way of Warfare assumed that the country with control of the sea could ensure safe and rapid communications for its commerce. The American theory of naval strategy, on the other hand, assumed that one had to engage the enemy in order to assure command of the sea. These case studies illustrate once again that naval history must include cultural, economic, political, and social contexts.

Historians often ignore, treat cursorily, or relegate to footnotes specific incidents in international relations in order to facilitate the construction of a larger narrative. The contributors to this volume argue that researchers do so to their peril, as individual or seemingly isolated incidents can play significant roles in the overall course of history. Incidents are crucial in determining the mental maps that decision makers form regarding the countries and individuals with whom they interact. Incidents can either initiate or block new policies with consequences that are both far-reaching and unexpected.People make foreign policy and an understanding of what elements of an incident were important to these individuals at key points essential to an appreciation of policies subsequently advocated. How individuals view other cultures and nations, how they react to the actions of such nations, and their perceptions of such actions all form key components in this study. Using a variety of examples, these essays show the value of detailed examinations of events, illuminating such matters as British policy in the Far East, French imperial policy, Italian military actions in the interwar period, British attitudes toward Hitler, and the effect of the Soviet Union on British thinking in the 1930s.

Often the only time a nation evaluates the education of its armed forces is during the aftermath of a great military disaster. Even in the light of an overwhelming victory, such as the Gulf War, questions about how well military education was addressing the study of asymmetric warfare, the Revolution in Military Affairs, the role of non-state actors and international relations in the new world order were the subject of debate in and around the various staff colleges and military universities in the West. This work brings together the ideas of international scholars, all recognized as leaders in their fields, to examine the professional military education experience of various nations during the last 250 years. Case studies of each branch of the military reveal success and failure in the past and present, with a goal of improving military education in the future.Underlying themes clearly reveal the need for those questioning military education to utilize history as the preferred method and model of imperial analysis. These include economics and defense spending; national psyches and the proper maintenance of armed forces; and the importance of individuals, both military and civilian, with a clear vision, determination, and the moral courage to formulate and support military education programs. In practice, training often predominates over education, and the result has frequently been an officer corps that has not functioned well in peacetime preparations and has ultimately failed on the battlefield due to an inability to think effectively. This study highlights the role of civilian educators as vital in the creation of successful educational programs.

How and why did Britain become involved in the First World War? Taking into account the scholarship of the last twenty-five years, this second edition of Zara S. Steiner's classic study, thoroughly revised with Keith Neilson, explores a subject which is as highly contentious as ever.While retaining the basic argument that Britain went to war in 1914 not as a result of internal pressures but as a response to external events, Steiner and Neilson reject recent arguments that Britain became involved because of fears of an 'invented' German menace, or to defend her Empire. Instead, placing greater emphasis than before on the role of Russia, the authors convincingly argue that Britain entered the war in order to preserve the European balance of power and the nation's favourable position within it.Lucid and comprehensive, Britain and the Origins of the First World War brings together the bureaucratic, diplomatic, economic, strategical and ideological factors that led to Britain's entry into the Great War, and remains the most complete survey of the pre-war situation.

This new study brings together leading experts to show how the modern world began with the coming of the railway. They clearly explain why it had a greater impact than any other technical or industrial innovation before and completely redefined the limits of the civilized world. While the effect of railways on economic development is self-evident, little attention has been paid to their impact on international relations. This is unfortunate, for in the period from 1848 to 1945, railways were an important element in the struggle between the Great Powers. This took many forms. Often, as in East Asia, the competition for railway concessions reflected the clash of rival imperial interests. The success or failure of this competition could determine which of the European Powers was to dominate and exploit the markets of China and Siam. Just as often, railways were linked with military matters. Prussia’s success in the wars of German unification depended on its strategic railways just as much as on the strength of its armies, and the rail links remained a vital aspect of German military thinking before the First World War. So, too, did they for the Russians, whose vast Empire required rail links capable of moving the Tsarist army quickly and competently. Just as importantly, railways could be vital for Imperial defence, as the British discovered on the North-West frontier of India.This book will be of much interest to students of international history, military history and strategic studies.

Chief among the personnel at the Foreign Office is the Permanent Under-secretary, the senior civil servant who oversees the department and advises the Foreign Secretary. This book is a study of the twelve men who held this Office from 1854–1946.

Chief among the personnel at the Foreign Office is the Permanent Under-secretary, the senior civil servant who oversees the department and advises the Foreign Secretary. This book is a study of the twelve men who held this Office from 1854–1946.

This new study brings together leading experts to show how the modern world began with the coming of the railway. They clearly explain why it had a greater impact than any other technical or industrial innovation before and completely redefined the limits of the civilized world. While the effect of railways on economic development is self-evident, little attention has been paid to their impact on international relations. This is unfortunate, for in the period from 1848 to 1945, railways were an important element in the struggle between the Great Powers. This took many forms. Often, as in East Asia, the competition for railway concessions reflected the clash of rival imperial interests. The success or failure of this competition could determine which of the European Powers was to dominate and exploit the markets of China and Siam. Just as often, railways were linked with military matters. Prussia’s success in the wars of German unification depended on its strategic railways just as much as on the strength of its armies, and the rail links remained a vital aspect of German military thinking before the First World War. So, too, did they for the Russians, whose vast Empire required rail links capable of moving the Tsarist army quickly and competently. Just as importantly, railways could be vital for Imperial defence, as the British discovered on the North-West frontier of India.This book will be of much interest to students of international history, military history and strategic studies.

A major re-interpretation of international relations in the period from 1919 to 1939. Avoiding such simplistic explanations as appeasement and British decline, Keith Neilson demonstrates that the underlying cause of the Second World War was the intellectual failure to find an effective means of maintaining the new world order created in 1919. With secret diplomacy, alliances and the balance of power seen as having caused the First World War, the makers of British policy after 1919 were forced to rely on such instruments of liberal internationalism as arms control, the League of Nations and global public opinion to preserve peace. Using Britain's relations with Soviet Russia as a focus for a re-examination of Britain's dealings with Germany and Japan, this book shows that these tools were inadequate to deal with the physical and ideological threats posed by Bolshevism, fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism.

A major re-interpretation of international relations in the period from 1919 to 1939. Avoiding such simplistic explanations as appeasement and British decline, Keith Neilson demonstrates that the underlying cause of the Second World War was the intellectual failure to find an effective means of maintaining the new world order created in 1919. With secret diplomacy, alliances and the balance of power seen as having caused the First World War, the makers of British policy after 1919 were forced to rely on such instruments of liberal internationalism as arms control, the League of Nations and global public opinion to preserve peace. Using Britain's relations with Soviet Russia as a focus for a re-examination of Britain's dealings with Germany and Japan, this book shows that these tools were inadequate to deal with the physical and ideological threats posed by Bolshevism, fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism.

These studies show how the British Empire used its maritime supremacy to construct and maintain a worldwide defence for its imperial interests. They rebut the idea that British defence policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was primarily concerned with the balance of power in Europe.

These studies show how the British Empire used its maritime supremacy to construct and maintain a worldwide defence for its imperial interests. They rebut the idea that British defence policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was primarily concerned with the balance of power in Europe.

In his groundbreaking book The British Way in Warfare (Routledge, 1990), David French outlined the skillful combination of maritime, economic and diplomatic power employed by Britain to achieve its international goals. Almost two decades later, this collection offers a reassessment of French's thesis, using it as a lens through which to explore Britain's relationship with various kinds of power (military and civil) and how this was employed across the globe. In particular, each essay addresses the ways in which the use of power manifested itself in the maintenance of Britain's place within the international system between 1856 and 1956. Adopting twin methodologies, the collection firstly addresses the broad question of Britain's relationship with other Great Powers and how these influenced the strategies used, before then testing these with specific case studies. By taking this approach, it is possible to discern which policies were successful and which failed, and whether these remained constant across time and space. Measuring Britain's strategy against her commercial, imperial, and military competitors (including France, the USA, Italy, Germany, and Russia) allows intriguing conclusions to be drawn about just how an essentially maritime power could compete with much larger - and potentially more powerful - continental rivals. With contributions from an outstanding selection of military scholars, this collection addresses fundamental questions about the intersection of military, economic and diplomatic history, that are as relevant today as they were during the height of Britain's imperial power. It will prove essential reading, not only for those with an interest in British military history, but for anyone wishing to understand how power - in all its multifaceted guises - can be employed for national advantage on the international stage.

In his groundbreaking book The British Way in Warfare (Routledge, 1990), David French outlined the skillful combination of maritime, economic and diplomatic power employed by Britain to achieve its international goals. Almost two decades later, this collection offers a reassessment of French's thesis, using it as a lens through which to explore Britain's relationship with various kinds of power (military and civil) and how this was employed across the globe. In particular, each essay addresses the ways in which the use of power manifested itself in the maintenance of Britain's place within the international system between 1856 and 1956. Adopting twin methodologies, the collection firstly addresses the broad question of Britain's relationship with other Great Powers and how these influenced the strategies used, before then testing these with specific case studies. By taking this approach, it is possible to discern which policies were successful and which failed, and whether these remained constant across time and space. Measuring Britain's strategy against her commercial, imperial, and military competitors (including France, the USA, Italy, Germany, and Russia) allows intriguing conclusions to be drawn about just how an essentially maritime power could compete with much larger - and potentially more powerful - continental rivals. With contributions from an outstanding selection of military scholars, this collection addresses fundamental questions about the intersection of military, economic and diplomatic history, that are as relevant today as they were during the height of Britain's imperial power. It will prove essential reading, not only for those with an interest in British military history, but for anyone wishing to understand how power - in all its multifaceted guises - can be employed for national advantage on the international stage.

Based on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.

Based on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.