Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialis
Fritz W. Scharpf is codirector of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, and a former director of the International Institute of Management and Administration, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. He has taught at the Yale Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and at the University of Konstanz. He has published widely on constitutional law, democratic theory, policy formation and policy implementation, political economy, negotiation theory, and game theory.
Innehållsförteckning
Introduction, 1 Policy Research in the Face of Complexity, 2 Actor-Centered Institutionalism, 3 Actors, 4 Actor Constellations, 5 Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions, 6 Negotiated Agreements, 7 Decisions by Majority Vote, 8 Hierarchical Direction, 9 Varieties of the Negotiating State