Constitutional structures are an important mechanism for structuring the politics of multinational democracies, especially the political jousting between sub-state demoi and the state demos in plurinational polities. This book analyzes the interaction, which can be bi-directional, between constitutional structures and the trends and evolution of the heterogenous political orientations in substate national societies and majority nations in liberal democracies. “Constitutional structures” refers to a wide variety of institutions and processes, and they create territorial regimes, which constitute distinctive models of state: unitarism, federalism, autonomism, regionalism, consociationalism, or even colonialism. Multinational democracies differ in the constitutional limitations and/or opportunities for accommodation of diversity offered by constitutional structures.The authors in this collection utilize diverse methods and address these issues from different disciplinary perspectives. The book contains analyses of Québec-Canada, Catalonia-Spain, Puerto Rico-USA, Italy and its special regions, Scotland-United Kingdom, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Corsica-France, the Åland Islands-Finland, Mauritius, Fiji, and other cases.
