Andrea Kern – författare

How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge? The skeptic finds this question impossible to answer. If we can err, then it seems the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong. Most contemporary epistemologists agree with the skeptic that we can never believe on grounds that exclude error. Sources of Knowledge moves beyond this predicament by demonstrating that some major problems of contemporary philosophy have their roots in the lack of a metaphysical category that is fundamental to our self-understanding: the category of a rational capacity for knowledge.Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a ratio­nal capacity. This enables us to appreciate human fallibility without falling into skepticism, for it allows us to understand how we can form beliefs about the world on grounds that exclude error. Knowledge is a fundamental capacity of the human mind. Human beings, as such, are knowers. In this way, Sources of Knowledge seeks to understand knowledge from within our self-understanding as knowers. It develops a metaphysics of the human mind as existing through knowledge of itself, which knowledge—as the human being is finite—takes the form of a capacity.Regaining the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge, Kern makes a powerful and original contribution to philosophy that reinvigorates the tradition of Aristotle and Kant—thinkers whose relevance for contemporary epistemology has yet to be fully appreciated.

This Element is about Wittgenstein's engagement with skepticism. Two forms of skepticism will be at the center of this Element: skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 'external world,' and skepticism concerning our knowledge of 'other minds.' It will be shown that Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor an anti-skeptic. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks of the skeptic's doubt as a form of denial: a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have. The aim of this Element is to bring out what it means to think of the skeptic's doubt in a Wittgensteinian way, that is, as a doubt that manifests a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have, rather than a philosophical position about the possibility of knowledge that is either true or false and hence an object either of justification or refutation. Wittgenstein's relation to skepticism is therefore unique and highly original.

This Element is about Wittgenstein's engagement with skepticism. Two forms of skepticism will be at the center of this Element: skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 'external world,' and skepticism concerning our knowledge of 'other minds.' It will be shown that Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor an anti-skeptic. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks of the skeptic's doubt as a form of denial: a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have. The aim of this Element is to bring out what it means to think of the skeptic's doubt in a Wittgensteinian way, that is, as a doubt that manifests a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have, rather than a philosophical position about the possibility of knowledge that is either true or false and hence an object either of justification or refutation. Wittgenstein's relation to skepticism is therefore unique and highly original.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2020 im Fachbereich Soziologie - Kommunikation, Note: 1,3, Universitat Koblenz-Landau, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Wie bestimmen Kommunikationsmedien die zeitlichen Ablaufe unseres Alltags und welche Rolle spielen dabei digitale Medien?Zu Beginn wird ein Uberblick uber grundsatzliche Annahmen uber Massenmedien und Zeitkonstruktion geliefert, auf denen sich die weiteren Ausfuhrungen aufbauen. Daraufhin werden Medien auf ihre (zeitlichen) Strukturen hin untersucht, wobei an dieser Stelle die Literatur von Beck (1994) ma geblich als Grundlage verwendet wurde. Nach der genaueren Erlauterung von Medienhandeln als Zeithandeln wird auf Medienhandeln mit digitalen Medien und ihre zeitlichen Auswirkungen eingegangen, um mit einem Fazit und einem darin verorteten Ausblick abzuschlie en.

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2021 im Fachbereich Soziologie - Medien, Kunst, Musik, Note: 1,3, Universitat Koblenz-Landau, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Wie verandern sich im Zuge digitaler Medien Gemeinschaftlichkeit und Skandalisierungsprozesse? Inwieweit wirkt sich dies auf die Meinungsauerung des einzelnen aus? Zunachst mochte ich den Begriff der Medien erklaren und welchen Einfluss sie auf die Wirklichkeitskonstruktion von einzelnen haben. Nach der Bezugnahme auf neue Medien wird auf das Wirken von Gemeinschaftlichkeit im Allgemeinen sowie in digitalen sozialen Netzwerken eingegangen. Daraufhin steht der Skandalisierungsprozess, bezogen auf Massenmedien sowie auf Sozialen Medien, im Fokus und in inwiefern jener nicht nur die Meinungsbildung, sondern offentliche Meinungsau erung des einzelnen beeinflusst. Abschlie end werden die Kernaussagen kurz zusammengefasst und auf noch forschungsbedingte Lucken eingegangen.