Anil Gomes – författare

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant''s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant''s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant''s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In whatsense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role doesself-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe?These essays showcase the depth of Kant''s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant''s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant''s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant''s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant''s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In whatsense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role doesself-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe?These essays showcase the depth of Kant''s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant''s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.

We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects such as us must be related to an objective world. Philosophers in the twentieth century were less ambitious: self-conscious subjects must only think or experience the world as objective. The Practical Self argues that the answer to our question lies in a set of enigmatic remarks by the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. ''One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning'', Lichtenberg writes. ''To say cogito is already too much To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.'' Lichtenberg is raising a puzzle here about our grounds for recognising ourselves as the agents of our thinking. Its solution is to understand that we have practical grounds to think of ourselves as the intellectual agents. We are thus practical selves: intellectual agents who have distinctively practical grounds to recognise ourselves as such. And our faith in ourselves as practical selves is sustained through interaction with others. The argument of this book is that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking and that this faith is sustained by a practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others.

We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects such as us must be related to an objective world. Philosophers in the twentieth century were less ambitious: self-conscious subjects must only think or experience the world as objective. The Practical Self argues that the answer to our question lies in a set of enigmatic remarks by the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. ''One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning'', Lichtenberg writes. ''To say cogito is already too much To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.'' Lichtenberg is raising a puzzle here about our grounds for recognising ourselves as the agents of our thinking. Its solution is to understand that we have practical grounds to think of ourselves as the intellectual agents. We are thus practical selves: intellectual agents who have distinctively practical grounds to recognise ourselves as such. And our faith in ourselves as practical selves is sustained through interaction with others. The argument of this book is that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking and that this faith is sustained by a practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others.

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant's writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant's critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant's account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe?These essays showcase the depth of Kant's writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant's writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is a towering figure of modern Western philosophy, someone whose thought continues to exert an influence across all areas of the discipline. His work is characterized by both breadth and unity: he writes powerfully about mind, epistemology, metaphysics, logic, mathematics, natural science, ethics, politics, aesthetics, education, and more. And across those areas, his work is concerned with defending a view of human beings and their place in nature according to which our own reason enables us to discover and uphold the laws of nature and freedomthat is, to think for ourselves.The Oxford Handbook of Kant provides an up-to-date account of recent scholarship on Kant's philosophy, taking in all areas of his writings. It will be essential reading for students and researchers who want to think for themselves about the topics he wrote with such insight. The individual chapters to this Handbook each provide a scholarly analysis and assessment of some aspect of Kant's thought, and the collection ranges across all the areas to which Kant contributed. It collectively presents a picture of where the study of Kant's philosophy finds itself at this point in the twenty-first century.