Ben Bramble - Böcker
Visar alla böcker från författaren Ben Bramble. Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.
6 produkter
6 produkter
425 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
This volume collects twelve new essays by leading moral philosophers on a vitally important topic: the ethics of eating meat. Some of the key questions examined include: Are animals harmed or benefited by our practice of raising and killing them for food? Do the realities of the marketplace entail that we have no power as individuals to improve the lives of any animals by becoming vegetarian, and if so, have we any reason to stop eating meat? Suppose it is morally wrong to eat meat--should we be blamed for doing so? If we should be vegetarians, what sort should we be?
348 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being:· lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and· temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time (momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life (periodic well-being).Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being.The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being
202 kr
Kommande
Why we shouldn’t colonize Mars or the Moon, or even vacation thereIf certain business titans, corporations, and governments have their way, humans will someday be living, working, and vacationing in space. This is the much-vaunted New Space Age, and in Lunacy, philosopher Ben Bramble explains why it is a giant mistake. Bramble systematically refutes each of the ten most influential reasons given for this new generation of space exploration (and habitation), from the idea of Mars as a backup plan in case Earth meets an untimely end to the charms of friendship with extraterrestrials. Doing so, he reflects on deeper issues, exploring such questions as what the point of the human story is and what a good future for humanity would truly involve. (Spoiler alert: it includes solving problems on Earth.)Bramble does not think we should get out of space entirely. On the contrary, he thinks that there is an important and exciting future in space science. Our activities in space, he tells us, should be animated by a curiosity about space itself rather than narrow economic or military interests.
576 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.
2 088 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.
826 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being:· lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and· temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time (momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life (periodic well-being).Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being.The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being