This volume presents twelve original papers on constructivism - some sympathetic, others critical - by a distinguished group of moral philosophers. ''Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.'' So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures ''KantianConstructivism in Moral Theory''. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximallymetaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The essays collected here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches andperspectives.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

This volume presents twelve original papers on constructivism - some sympathetic, others critical - by a distinguished group of moral philosophers. 'Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.' So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory'. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximally metaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The essays collected here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches and perspectives.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.

In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.

Key Features:

Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers today Clearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to students Addresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral life Provides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further reading Important issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.

This volume presents twelve original papers on constructivism - some sympathetic, others critical - by a distinguished group of moral philosophers. ''Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.'' So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures ''KantianConstructivism in Moral Theory''. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximallymetaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The essays collected here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches andperspectives.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.

This volume presents twelve original papers on constructivism - some sympathetic, others critical - by a distinguished group of moral philosophers. 'Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.' So wrote John Rawls in his highly influential 1980 Dewey lectures 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory'. Since then there has been much discussion of constructivist understandings, Kantian or otherwise, both of morality and of reason more generally. Such understandings typically seek to characterize the truth conditions of propositions in their target domain in maximally metaphysically unassuming ways, frequently in terms of the outcome of certain procedures or the passing of certain tests, procedures or tests that speak to the distinctively practical concerns of deliberating human agents living together in societies. But controversy abounds over the interpretation and the scope as well as the credibility of such constructivist ideas. The essays collected here reach to the heart of this contemporary philosophical debate, and offer a range of new approaches and perspectives.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.Key Features:Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers todayClearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to studentsAddresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral lifeProvides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further readingImportant issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.

Utilitarianism directs us to act in ways that impartially maximize welfare or utility or at least aim to do that. Some find this view highly compelling. Others object that it has intuitively repugnant results, that it condones evildoing and injustice, that it is excessively imposing and controlling, that it is alienating, and that it fails to offer meaningful, practical guidance.

In this ‘Little Debates’ volume, James Lenman argues that utilitarianism’s directive to improve the whole universe on a cosmic time scale is apt to lead it down a path of imperious moral overreach. The project, he further maintains, ultimately shipwrecks on an extreme lack of epistemic humility in framing the determinants of what is morally right and wrong beyond the limits of what we can ever hope to know. Utilitarianism thus leaves us morally clueless. In contrast, Ben Bramble seeks to develop and defend an original form of utilitarianism, less vulnerable than other, more familiar versions to a number of important objections, including those raised by Lenman. He aims to avoid such unappealing results by presenting it as a claim about what we have the most reason to do, and not as a theory of right action, which Bramble urges we should understand quite differently by reference to what would motivate virtuous people.

Key Features:

Focuses on one of the dominant ethical theories debated by moral philosophers today Clearly written, free of jargon and technicality, and highly accessible to students Addresses questions of great importance to anyone wishing to grow in understanding of human moral life Provides a glossary of key terms highlighted in bold as well as a bibliography for further reading Important issues discussed include: welfare; value; right action; virtue; impartiality; obligations to non-human animals; the badness of human extinction; the happiness of future people; the ethics of climate change; the long term future; and the moral significance of the limits to what we can know.