Dale R. Herspring – författare

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Throughout its existence, the Red Army was viewed as a formidable threat. By the end of the Cold War, however, it had become the weakest link in the Soviet Union’s power structure. Always subordinate to the Communist Party, the military in 1991 suddenly found itself answering instead to the president of a democratic state. Dale Herspring closely examines how that relationship influenced the military’s viability in the new Russian Federation.

Herspring’s book is the first to assess the relationship between the Russian military and the political leadership under Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin. He depicts an outmoded and demoralized military force still struggling to free itself from Cold War paradigms, while failing to confront not only debacles in Afghanistan and Chechnya but also a rise in crime and corruption within the ranks. He reveals how Gorbachev neglected the military to save Russia from internal collapse and Yeltsin reneged on continuing promises of support. And, while Putin claims a better understanding of the armed forces, he has severely tightened his control over the military while monitoring its struggle toward modernization.

Herspring argues that presidential leadership—or a significant lack thereof—has been the key variable determining the kind of military Russia puts in the field. It has been up to the president to ensure that the high command makes a successful transition to the new polity—otherwise combat readiness will decline and generals and admirals could become politicized. By focusing on how the high command has reacted to each president’s decisions and leadership style, Herspring shows that, in spite of the continued importance of the military’s bureaucratic structure, personality factors have assumed a much more important role than in the past.

The Kremlin and the High Command provides the most complete analysis to date of the Russian president’s influence on the Russian officer corps, the soldiers they lead, and their army’s combat readiness. Shedding light on the chaos that has plagued the USSR and Russia over the past 25 years, it also suggests how the often fraught relationship between the president and the high command must evolve if the Russian Federation is to evolve into a truly democratic nation.

While presidents have always kept a watchful eye on the military, our generals have been equally vigilant in assessing the commander-in-chief. Their views, however, have been relatively neglected in the literature on civil-military relations. By taking us inside the military’s mind in this matter, Dale Herspring’s new book provides a path-breaking, utterly candid, and much-needed reassessment of a key relationship in American government and foreign policymaking.

As Herspring reminds us, that relationship has often been a very tense, even extremely antagonistic one, partly because the military has become a highly organized and very effective bureaucratic interest group. Reevaluating twelve presidents—from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush—Herspring shows how the intensity of that conflict depends largely on the military’s perception of the president’s leadership style. Quite simply, presidents who show genuine respect for military culture are much more likely to develop effective relations with the military than those who don’t.

Each chapter focuses on one president and his key administrators—such as Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, and Donald Rumsfeld—and contains case studies showing how the military reacted to the president’s leadership. In the final chapter, Herspring ranks the presidents according to their degree of conflict with the military: Lyndon Johnson received exceedingly low marks for being overbearing and dismissive of the armed forces, further aggravating his Vietnam problem. George H. W. Bush inspired respect for not micromanaging military affairs. And Bill Clinton was savaged both privately and publicly by military leaders for having been a “draft dodger,” cutting Pentagon spending, and giving the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” tag an unnecessarily high profile.

From World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Herspring clearly shows how the nature of civilian control has changed during the past half century. He also reveals how the military has become a powerful bureaucratic interest group very much like others in Washington—increasingly politicized, media-savvy, and as much accountable to Congress as to the commander-in-chief.

Ultimately, The Pentagon and the Presidency illuminates how our leaders devise strategies for dealing with threats to our national security—and how the success of that process depends so much upon who’s in charge and how that person’s perceived by our military commanders.