In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not only be one universal truth. Rather, Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together. Wong's interesting position draws from Western and Eastern philosophies, psychology, evolutionary theory, history and literature.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

Moral Relativity: Reconciling Objectivity and Subjectivity provides a compelling framework for understanding moral experience through the lens of relativism. The book contends that there is no single true morality and argues that this perspective best explains the dual nature of moral experience, which combines elements of objectivity—such as truth claims and rational argumentation—with elements of subjectivity, including deep cultural and individual disagreements. By exploring the nature of moral language and its relationship to truth, facts, and human behavior, the book examines how moral statements and values are influenced by diverse cultural, philosophical, and linguistic contexts. This approach critiques absolutist claims of a singular moral truth while offering a nuanced explanation of moral plurality that embraces the complexity of moral discourse.The book also integrates contemporary developments in the philosophy of language to address long-standing challenges in metaethics. By building on advancements in theories of truth, reference, and translation, it critiques older approaches rooted in verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction. Instead, it proposes a new relativist framework that bridges the perceived gap between the objective and subjective dimensions of morality. Drawing on examples from moral philosophy, comparative ethics, and sociocultural analysis, the book demonstrates how relativist theories can provide a coherent reconciliation of moral diversity with the shared human pursuit of ethical understanding. This innovative perspective challenges traditional moral paradigms, offering a robust theoretical foundation for analyzing the interplay between cultural relativism and moral objectivity.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

Moral Relativity: Reconciling Objectivity and Subjectivity provides a compelling framework for understanding moral experience through the lens of relativism. The book contends that there is no single true morality and argues that this perspective best explains the dual nature of moral experience, which combines elements of objectivity—such as truth claims and rational argumentation—with elements of subjectivity, including deep cultural and individual disagreements. By exploring the nature of moral language and its relationship to truth, facts, and human behavior, the book examines how moral statements and values are influenced by diverse cultural, philosophical, and linguistic contexts. This approach critiques absolutist claims of a singular moral truth while offering a nuanced explanation of moral plurality that embraces the complexity of moral discourse.The book also integrates contemporary developments in the philosophy of language to address long-standing challenges in metaethics. By building on advancements in theories of truth, reference, and translation, it critiques older approaches rooted in verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction. Instead, it proposes a new relativist framework that bridges the perceived gap between the objective and subjective dimensions of morality. Drawing on examples from moral philosophy, comparative ethics, and sociocultural analysis, the book demonstrates how relativist theories can provide a coherent reconciliation of moral diversity with the shared human pursuit of ethical understanding. This innovative perspective challenges traditional moral paradigms, offering a robust theoretical foundation for analyzing the interplay between cultural relativism and moral objectivity.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

The Chinese ethical tradition has often been thought to oppose Western views of the self as autonomous and possessed of individual rights with views that emphasize the centrality of relationship and community to the self. The essays in this collection discuss the validity of that contrast as it concerns Confucianism, the single most influential Chinese school of thought. Alasdair MacIntyre, the single most influential philosopher to articulate the need for dialogue across traditions, contributes a concluding essay of commentary. This is the only consistently philosophical collection on Asia and human rights and could be used in courses on comparative ethics, political philosophy and Asian area studies.

The Chinese ethical tradition has often been thought to oppose Western views of the self as autonomous and possessed of individual rights with views that emphasize the centrality of relationship and community to the self. The essays in this collection discuss the validity of that contrast as it concerns Confucianism, the single most influential Chinese school of thought. Alasdair MacIntyre, the single most influential philosopher to articulate the need for dialogue across traditions, contributes a concluding essay of commentary. This is the only consistently philosophical collection on Asia and human rights and could be used in courses on comparative ethics, political philosophy and Asian area studies.

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not only be one universal truth. Rather, Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together. Wong's interesting position draws from Western and Eastern philosophies, psychology, evolutionary theory, history and literature.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.

Moral Relativity: Reconciling Objectivity and Subjectivity provides a compelling framework for understanding moral experience through the lens of relativism. The book contends that there is no single true morality and argues that this perspective best explains the dual nature of moral experience, which combines elements of objectivity—such as truth claims and rational argumentation—with elements of subjectivity, including deep cultural and individual disagreements. By exploring the nature of moral language and its relationship to truth, facts, and human behavior, the book examines how moral statements and values are influenced by diverse cultural, philosophical, and linguistic contexts. This approach critiques absolutist claims of a singular moral truth while offering a nuanced explanation of moral plurality that embraces the complexity of moral discourse.The book also integrates contemporary developments in the philosophy of language to address long-standing challenges in metaethics. By building on advancements in theories of truth, reference, and translation, it critiques older approaches rooted in verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction. Instead, it proposes a new relativist framework that bridges the perceived gap between the objective and subjective dimensions of morality. Drawing on examples from moral philosophy, comparative ethics, and sociocultural analysis, the book demonstrates how relativist theories can provide a coherent reconciliation of moral diversity with the shared human pursuit of ethical understanding. This innovative perspective challenges traditional moral paradigms, offering a robust theoretical foundation for analyzing the interplay between cultural relativism and moral objectivity.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

Moral Relativity: Reconciling Objectivity and Subjectivity provides a compelling framework for understanding moral experience through the lens of relativism. The book contends that there is no single true morality and argues that this perspective best explains the dual nature of moral experience, which combines elements of objectivity—such as truth claims and rational argumentation—with elements of subjectivity, including deep cultural and individual disagreements. By exploring the nature of moral language and its relationship to truth, facts, and human behavior, the book examines how moral statements and values are influenced by diverse cultural, philosophical, and linguistic contexts. This approach critiques absolutist claims of a singular moral truth while offering a nuanced explanation of moral plurality that embraces the complexity of moral discourse.The book also integrates contemporary developments in the philosophy of language to address long-standing challenges in metaethics. By building on advancements in theories of truth, reference, and translation, it critiques older approaches rooted in verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction. Instead, it proposes a new relativist framework that bridges the perceived gap between the objective and subjective dimensions of morality. Drawing on examples from moral philosophy, comparative ethics, and sociocultural analysis, the book demonstrates how relativist theories can provide a coherent reconciliation of moral diversity with the shared human pursuit of ethical understanding. This innovative perspective challenges traditional moral paradigms, offering a robust theoretical foundation for analyzing the interplay between cultural relativism and moral objectivity.This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.

The Chinese ethical tradition has often been thought to oppose Western views of the self as autonomous and possessed of individual rights with views that emphasize the centrality of relationship and community to the self. The essays in this collection discuss the validity of that contrast as it concerns Confucianism, the single most influential Chinese school of thought. Alasdair MacIntyre, the single most influential philosopher to articulate the need for dialogue across traditions, contributes a concluding essay of commentary. This is the only consistently philosophical collection on Asia and human rights and could be used in courses on comparative ethics, political philosophy and Asian area studies.

The Chinese ethical tradition has often been thought to oppose Western views of the self as autonomous and possessed of individual rights with views that emphasize the centrality of relationship and community to the self. The essays in this collection discuss the validity of that contrast as it concerns Confucianism, the single most influential Chinese school of thought. Alasdair MacIntyre, the single most influential philosopher to articulate the need for dialogue across traditions, contributes a concluding essay of commentary. This is the only consistently philosophical collection on Asia and human rights and could be used in courses on comparative ethics, political philosophy and Asian area studies.

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.