David W. K. Yeung – författare

Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort."Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College“Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games.

Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort."Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College“Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games.

This volume gathers together 26 selected papers from the International Congress of Mathematicians' 1st Satellite Conference on Game Theory and its Applications (2002). It contains four sections: Foundations, Concepts, and Structure; Equilibrium Properties; Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences; Computational Aspects of Games. The first section explores fundamental ideas, leading to new and analytically interesting analysis of current problems, new games and new modeling approaches. Papers in the second section discuss issues in the solution of games, and present a number of potentially fruitful ideas regarding game equilibrium. The third and fourth sections are devoted to applications to the natural and social sciences and to computation. The articles on market structure and game-based computations would be of particular interest to researchers and practitioners.

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called "coalitions") are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.