Leon A. Petrosyan – författare

Various imperfections in existing market systems prevent the free market from serving as a truly efficient allocation mechanism, but optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure.

It covers a wide spectrum of topics, among which are: game theory and management applications in fields such as: strategic management, industrial organization, marketing, operations and supply chain management, public management, financial management, human resources, energy and resource management, and others;

This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018)  held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.

This book is devoted to game theory and its applications to environmental problems, economics, and management. It collects contributions originating from the 12th International Conference on “Game Theory and Management” 2018 (GTM2018)  held at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia, from 27 to 29 June 2018.

This book includes papers presented at the ISDG12-GTM2019 International Meeting on Game Theory, as a joint meeting of the 12th International ISDG Workshop and the 13th "International Conference on Game Theory and Management”, held in St. Petersburg in July 2019.The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

This book includes papers presented at the ISDG12-GTM2019 International Meeting on Game Theory, as a joint meeting of the 12th International ISDG Workshop and the 13th "International Conference on Game Theory and Management”, held in St. Petersburg in July 2019.The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort."Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College“Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games.

Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort."Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College“Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is trulya world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games.

This book features contributions from the GTM 2020 International Meeting on Game Theory held virtually from St. Petersburg, Russia, including presentations by plenary speakers. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

This book features contributions from the GTM 2020 International Meeting on Game Theory held virtually from St. Petersburg, Russia, including presentations by plenary speakers. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

This book collects a selection of the articles presented at the virtual conference “Game Theory and Applications”, organized in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2022.

This book collects a selection of the articles presented at the virtual conference “Game Theory and Applications”, organized in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2022. The articles in this collection cover all the main applications of game theory, interpolating mathematical methods with economics, biology, sociology, mobile systems, and social networks. Scholars in the field will find this to be a valuable contribution.

This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015.  These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results.  Some of these includeA new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory;A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities;The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits;A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body;The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equilibria of games with an aggregative structure;Generalized nucleoli and generalized bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation;Bayesian networks and games of deterrence; andA new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form.The maturity and vitality of modern-day game theory are reflected in the new ideas, novel applications, and contributions of young researchers represented in this collection.  It will be of interest to anyone doing theoretical research in game theory or working on one its numerous applications.

It covers a wide spectrum of topics, among which are: game theory and management applications in fields such as: strategic management, industrial organization, marketing, operations and supply chain management, public management, financial management, human resources, energy and resource management, and others;

This volume gathers together 26 selected papers from the International Congress of Mathematicians' 1st Satellite Conference on Game Theory and its Applications (2002). It contains four sections: Foundations, Concepts, and Structure; Equilibrium Properties; Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences; Computational Aspects of Games. The first section explores fundamental ideas, leading to new and analytically interesting analysis of current problems, new games and new modeling approaches. Papers in the second section discuss issues in the solution of games, and present a number of potentially fruitful ideas regarding game equilibrium. The third and fourth sections are devoted to applications to the natural and social sciences and to computation. The articles on market structure and game-based computations would be of particular interest to researchers and practitioners.

The classical optimal control theory deals with the determination of an optimal control that optimizes the criterion subjects to the dynamic constraint expressing the evolution of the system state under the influence of control variables. If this is extended to the case of multiple controllers (also called players) with different and sometimes conflicting optimization criteria (payoff function) it is possible to begin to explore differential games. Zero-sum differential games, also called differential games of pursuit, constitute the most developed part of differential games and are rigorously investigated. In this book, the full theory of differential games of pursuit with complete and partial information is developed. Numerous concrete pursuit-evasion games are solved (”life-line” games, simple pursuit games, etc.), and new time-consistent optimality principles in the n-person differential game theory are introduced and investigated.

Game theory is a branch of modern applied mathematics that aims to analyze various problems of conflict between parties that have opposed, similar or simply different interests.Games are grouped into several classes according to some important features. In this volume zero-sum two-person games, strategic n-person games in normal form, cooperative games, games in extensive form with complete and incomplete information, differential pursuit games and differential cooperative n-person games are considered.

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.

Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called "coalitions") are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

William Jevons (1866 and 1871) established a ground-breaking milestone with "A General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" for economic analysis. Jevons' work was praised as the start of the mathematical method in the discipline of economics, which is inherently a subject involved with mathematics and quantities. This book focuses on the most fast-evolving and encompassing area in political economy — the dynamic global political economy. Under the high level of globalization currently, intertemporal and cross-boundary interactive elements are present in political-economic encounters. Indeed, almost all studies in the political economy may fall into the study of dynamic global political economy. Since the world has changed significantly, new mathematics developed by the authors of this book is used to formulate a general mathematical theory for the dynamic global political economy nowadays. A distinctive feature of the current book is that it combines advanced mathematics, game-theoretic concepts, and economics to develop a general mathematical theory supporting the study of the dynamic global political economy.The book covers mathematical theory for different areas of the dynamic global political economy. In addition, it explicates the application of the mathematical theory in real-world scenarios, including (i) environmental degradation under an uncoordinated interaction scenario, (ii) global climate accords with collaboration and cooperation, (iii) trade network involving the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) and Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative, and (iv) random termination of international joint ventures.