Eduardo Ferme – författare

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 16th Ibero-American Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IBERAMIA 2018, held in Trujillo, Peru,in November 2018.The 41 papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 92 submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: Knowledge Engineering, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning under Uncertainty., Multiagent Systems., Game Theory and Economic Paradigms,  Game Playing and Interactive Entertainment,  Ambient Intelligence,  Machine Learning Methods, Cognitive Modeling,General AI, Knowledge Engineering, Computational Sustainability and AI, Heuristic Search and Optimization and much more.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 16th Ibero-American Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IBERAMIA 2018, held in Trujillo, Peru,in November 2018.The 41 papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 92 submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: Knowledge Engineering, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning under Uncertainty., Multiagent Systems., Game Theory and Economic Paradigms,  Game Playing and Interactive Entertainment,  Ambient Intelligence,  Machine Learning Methods, Cognitive Modeling,General AI, Knowledge Engineering, Computational Sustainability and AI, Heuristic Search and Optimization and much more.

Belief change (also referred to as logic of theory change or as belief revision) is a research area that models how rational agents modify their beliefs in response to new information or experiences. It emerged as a major field of study in the mid-1980s and has since become a key topic across disciplines such as philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence. The one that is nowadays considered the standard model of belief change is the AGM model, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson in the Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1985 (the so-called AGM paper).In the four decades that have followed since, the area has developed rapidly and in many directions. The AGM model inspired many researchers to propose extensions and generalizations (for an overview see Belief Change by Fermé and Hansson, Springer, 2018), from among which the authors highlight the models of non-prioritized belief change: These are models in which the belief change operators considered do not give priority to the new information received (contrary to what is the case regarding the AGM model which fulfils the principle of primacy of new information). For example, the output of a non-prioritized revision may not contain the new belief that has motivated that revision. Analogously, the outcome of a non-prioritized contraction may still contain the sentence by which the contraction is made.In a deep and comprehensive manner, this book summarises the contributions made to the modelling of non-prioritized belief change in the literature from 1985. All models are presented and taxonomized according to their main characteristics.

Belief change (also referred to as logic of theory change or as belief revision) is a research area that models how rational agents modify their beliefs in response to new information or experiences. It emerged as a major field of study in the mid-1980s and has since become a key topic across disciplines such as philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence. The one that is nowadays considered the standard model of belief change is the AGM model, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson in the Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1985 (the so-called AGM paper).In the four decades that have followed since, the area has developed rapidly and in many directions. The AGM model inspired many researchers to propose extensions and generalizations (for an overview see Belief Change by Fermé and Hansson, Springer, 2018), from among which the authors highlight the models of non-prioritized belief change: These are models in which the belief change operators considered do not give priority to the new information received (contrary to what is the case regarding the AGM model which fulfils the principle of primacy of new information). For example, the output of a non-prioritized revision may not contain the new belief that has motivated that revision. Analogously, the outcome of a non-prioritized contraction may still contain the sentence by which the contraction is made.In a deep and comprehensive manner, this book summarises the contributions made to the modelling of non-prioritized belief change in the literature from 1985. All models are presented and taxonomized according to their main characteristics.

This book constitutes the proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2014, held in Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, in September 2014. The 35 full papers and 14 short papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 121 submissions. They are organized in topical sections named: description logics; automated reasoning; logics for uncertain reasoning; non-classical logics; answer-set programming; belief revision; dealing with inconsistency in ASP and DL; reason about actions and causality; system descriptions; short system descriptions; and short papers. The book also contains 4 full paper invited talks.

This book constitutes the proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2014, held in Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, in September 2014. The 35 full papers and 14 short papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 121 submissions. They are organized in topical sections named: description logics; automated reasoning; logics for uncertain reasoning; non-classical logics; answer-set programming; belief revision; dealing with inconsistency in ASP and DL; reason about actions and causality; system descriptions; short system descriptions; and short papers. The book also contains 4 full paper invited talks.

This book explains how the logic of theory change employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework, iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal frameworks, and criticism of the model.