Edward N. Luttwak – författare
Visar alla böcker från författaren . Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.
21 produkter
21 produkter
Häftad, Engelska, 2016
314 kr
Coup d’État astonished readers when it first appeared in 1968 because it showed, step by step, how governments could be overthrown. Translated into sixteen languages, it has inspired anti-coup precautions by regimes around the world. In addition to these detailed instructions, Edward Luttwak’s revised handbook offers an altogether new way of looking at political power—one that considers, for example, the vulnerability to coups of even the most stable democracies in the event of prolonged economic distress.The world has changed dramatically in the past half century, but not the essence of the coup d’état. It still requires the secret recruitment of military officers who command the loyalty of units well placed to seize important headquarters and key hubs in the capital city. The support of the armed forces as a whole is needed only in the aftermath, to avoid countercoups. And mass support is largely irrelevant, although passive acceptance is essential. To ensure it, violence must be kept to a minimum. The ideal coup is swift and bloodless. Very violent coups rarely succeed, and if they trigger a bloody civil war they fail utterly.Luttwak identifies conditions that make countries vulnerable to a coup, and he outlines the necessary stages of planning, from recruitment of coconspirators to postcoup promises of progress and stability. But much more broadly, his investigation of coups—updated for the twenty-first century—uncovers important truths about the nature of political power.
Häftad, Engelska, 2000
251 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
Häftad, Engelska, 1994
319 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
Häftad, Engelska, 2002
355 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
“If you want peace, prepare for war.” “A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive.” “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict.In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of “post-heroic” war in Kosovo in 1999—an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed.In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world’s foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.
Häftad, Engelska, 2011
262 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In this book, the distinguished writer Edward N. Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire, eight hundred years by the shortest definition. This extraordinary endurance is all the more remarkable because the Byzantine empire was favored neither by geography nor by military preponderance. Yet it was the western empire that dissolved during the fifth century.The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies. Born in the fifth century when the formidable threat of Attila’s Huns were deflected with a minimum of force, Byzantine strategy continued to be refined over the centuries, incidentally leaving for us several fascinating guidebooks to statecraft and war.The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2012
236 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
As the rest of the world worries about what a future might look like under Chinese supremacy, Edward Luttwak worries about China’s own future prospects. Applying the logic of strategy for which he is well known, Luttwak argues that the most populous nation on Earth—and its second largest economy—may be headed for a fall.For any country whose rising strength cannot go unnoticed, the universal logic of strategy allows only military or economic growth. But China is pursuing both goals simultaneously. Its military buildup and assertive foreign policy have already stirred up resistance among its neighbors, just three of whom—India, Japan, and Vietnam—together exceed China in population and wealth. Unless China’s leaders check their own ambitions, a host of countries, which are already forming tacit military coalitions, will start to impose economic restrictions as well.Chinese leaders will find it difficult to choose between pursuing economic prosperity and increasing China’s military strength. Such a change would be hard to explain to public opinion. Moreover, Chinese leaders would have to end their reliance on ancient strategic texts such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While these guides might have helped in diplomatic and military conflicts within China itself, their tactics—such as deliberately provoking crises to force negotiations—turned China’s neighbors into foes. To avoid arousing the world’s enmity further, Luttwak advises, Chinese leaders would be wise to pursue a more sustainable course of economic growth combined with increasing military and diplomatic restraint.
Häftad, Engelska, 2026
310 kr
Kommande
“Rich with rare detail, much of it a result of the authors’ access to the IDF’s inner sanctums and their intimate knowledge of grand strategy and military history.” –Wall Street JournalA world-leading military strategist and an IDF insider explain the improbable success of the Israeli armed forces.When the Israel Defense Forces was established in 1948, the emerging Jewish state lacked sufficient weaponry and the capacity to produce it. Forced to make do, the IDF relied on a spirit of improvisation.Today that same spirit has secured the IDF a place among the world’s most powerful militaries. In The Art of Military Innovation, Edward Luttwak and Eitan Shamir trace the roots of this astounding success. What sets the IDF apart, they argue, is its structure. From its inception, it has been the world’s only one-service military, with air, naval, and land forces collected in a single institutional body. This unique architecture, coupled with a youthful officer corps, encourages initiative from below. The result is a nimble organization inclined toward change.The IDF has fostered significant technological advances, from the first wartime use of drones to the famed Iron Dome missile defense system, and now the first laser weapon, Iron Beam. Less-heralded innovations in training, logistics, and human resources have been equally important. Sharing rich insights and compelling stories, Luttwak and Shamir reveal just what makes the IDF so agile and effective.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2023
305 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
A world-leading military strategist and an IDF insider explain the improbable success of the Israeli armed forces.When the Israel Defense Forces was established in May 1948, it was small, poorly equipped, and already at war. Lacking sufficient weaponry or the domestic industrial base to produce it, the newborn military was forced to make do with whatever it could get its hands on. That spirit of improvisation carried the IDF to a decisive victory in the First Arab-Israeli War.Today the same spirit has made the IDF the most powerful military in the Middle East and among the most capable in the world. In The Art of Military Innovation, Edward N. Luttwak and Eitan Shamir trace the roots of this astounding success. What sets the IDF apart, they argue, is its singular organizational structure. From its inception, it has been the world’s only one-service military, encompassing air, naval, and land forces in a single institutional body. This unique structure, coupled with a young officer corps, allows for initiative from below. The result is a nimble organization inclined toward change rather than beholden to tradition.The IDF has fostered some of the most significant advances in military technology of the past seventy years, from the first wartime use of drones to the famed Iron Dome missile defense system, and now the first laser weapon, Iron Beam. Less-heralded innovations in training, logistics, and human resources have been equally important. Sharing rich insights and compelling stories, Luttwak and Shamir reveal just what makes the IDF so agile and effective.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 19841 116 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
E-bok
Engelska, 2017858 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This is Edward Luttwak''s third and arguably fi nest collection of essays. In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, Luttwak''s view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political confl icts and lead to peace."
Luttwak articulates positions shared by military fi gures and political heroes who have their feet on the ground rather than in the sand. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium. Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Th ough his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial.
Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fi res and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers. As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. Th is volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics.
E-bok
PDF, Engelska, 2017858 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This is Edward Luttwak''s third and arguably fi nest collection of essays. In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, Luttwak''s view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political confl icts and lead to peace."
Luttwak articulates positions shared by military fi gures and political heroes who have their feet on the ground rather than in the sand. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium. Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Th ough his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial.
Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fi res and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers. As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. Th is volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2009
2 798 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This is Edward Luttwak's third and arguably fi nest collection of essays. In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, Luttwak's view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political confl icts and lead to peace."Luttwak articulates positions shared by military fi gures and political heroes who have their feet on the ground rather than in the sand. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium. Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Th ough his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial.Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fi res and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers. As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. Th is volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics.
Häftad, Engelska, 2009
884 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
This is Edward Luttwak's third and arguably fi nest collection of essays. In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, Luttwak's view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political confl icts and lead to peace."Luttwak articulates positions shared by military fi gures and political heroes who have their feet on the ground rather than in the sand. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium. Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Th ough his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial.Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fi res and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers. As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. Th is volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2016
806 kr
Skickas
At the height of its power, the Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE.Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome filed large armies in a strategy of "defense-in-depth," allowing invaders to pierce Rome's borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.
Häftad, Engelska, 2016
371 kr
Skickas
At the height of its power, the Roman Empire encompassed the entire Mediterranean basin, extending much beyond it from Britain to Mesopotamia, from the Rhine to the Black Sea. Rome prospered for centuries while successfully resisting attack, fending off everything from overnight robbery raids to full-scale invasion attempts by entire nations on the move. How were troops able to defend the Empire's vast territories from constant attacks? And how did they do so at such moderate cost that their treasury could pay for an immensity of highways, aqueducts, amphitheaters, city baths, and magnificent temples? In The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, seasoned defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak reveals how the Romans were able to combine military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to effectively respond to changing threats. Rome's secret was not ceaseless fighting, but comprehensive strategies that unified force, diplomacy, and an immense infrastructure of roads, forts, walls, and barriers. Initially relying on client states to buffer attacks, Rome moved to a permanent frontier defense around 117 CE.Finally, as barbarians began to penetrate the empire, Rome filed large armies in a strategy of "defense-in-depth," allowing invaders to pierce Rome's borders. This updated edition has been extensively revised to incorporate recent scholarship and archeological findings. A new preface explores Roman imperial statecraft. This illuminating book remains essential to both ancient historians and students of modern strategy.
E-bok
Engelska, 2010208 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
One of America''s most thoughtful and provocative strategists exposes the economic and cultural assumptions that have driven the U.S. to the brink of social and financial collapse. Edward Luttwak reveals a forceful new policy that can reverse America''s decline.
E-bok
Franska, 2002202 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
" Si tu veux la paix, prépare la guerre ", " la meilleure défense, c’est l’attaque " : la sagesse populaire reconnaît la nature paradoxale de la stratégie. À la guerre, le mieux est souvent l’ennemi du bien ; un affaiblissement délibéré peut conduire à la victoire et l’excès dans la victoire peut conduire à la défaite ; la supériorité matérielle est parfois un handicap et l’infériorité numérique un avantage. " On pourrait croire que chaque expérience d’un conflit est unique en son genre. Pourtant, au fil des ans, j’ai découvert que la stratégie est faite de paradoxes, d’ironie, de contradictions. Qui plus est, elle se développe dans deux directions : les affrontements horizontaux entre adversaires et l’interaction verticale des différents niveaux — technique, tactique, opérationnel, etc. — sur lesquels se déroule le conflit. Ce livre est donc la carte d’une exploration. " E. L. Riche d’exemples classiques ou plus récents, il met au jour la logique universelle qui gouverne toutes les formes de guerre autant que les tractations entre nations opposées en temps de paix. Edward N. Luttwak est l’un des spécialistes en stratégie et en géopolitique les plus respectés à l’échelle internationale. Il travaille notamment au Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales de Washington et a publié Coup d’État, mode d’emploi, Le Rêve américain en danger et Le Turbo-capitalisme.
Häftad, Franska, 2010
789 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
Häftad, Franska, 2012
591 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
E-bok
Franska, 2012202 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Si elle poursuit toujours plus dans la voie du développement économique, on peut craindre que la Chine n’en vienne aussi à se doter d’une puissance militaire réellement mondiale et ne cherche à peser davantage sur l’échiquier international. Ce scénario d’une Chine hégémonique déclenchant par réaction un vaste conflit est-il vraiment probable ? La logique même de la stratégie n’impose-t-elle pas aux dirigeants chinois d’opter pour une autre voie ? Sauront-ils le comprendre ? Et que faire, partout, pour endiguer cette dangereuse montée en puissance qui pourrait de nouveau faire basculer le monde dans le chaos et la guerre ? Stratège hors pair autant qu’historien, grand connaisseur du monde asiatique, Edward N. Luttwak analyse en profondeur ce qui inspire la politique récente de la Chine, ainsi que ses biais culturels, ses limites, ses erreurs, ses maladresses, ses tromperies aussi. Il en met au jour tous les dangers, si nous ne prenons pas soin, dès aujourd’hui, de réagir vigoureusement et adéquatement. Décryptant tous les enjeux au cœur des relations qu’entretient la République populaire avec les États-Unis aussi bien qu’avec l’Australie, le Japon autant qu’avec la Corée du Sud ou le Vietnam, la Mongolie ou encore la Russie, il souligne les échecs et les réussites des uns et des autres. Un ouvrage essentiel pour mieux comprendre l’impact de la Chine sur le monde. Auteur notamment du Grand Livre de la stratégie, de La Grande Stratégie de l’Empire romain et de La Grande Stratégie de l’Empire byzantin, Edward N. Luttwak est l’un des spécialistes en stratégie et en géopolitique les plus respectés à l’échelle internationale. Il travaille notamment au Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales de Washington.
E-bok
Franska, 2010263 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
Pourquoi donc Byzance a-t-elle survécu deux fois plus longtemps que Rome, son équivalent d’Occident ? Cette endurance extraordinaire est d’autant plus remarquable qu’elle n’était favorisée ni par la géographie ni par une prépondérance militaire. Selon Edward Luttwak, cette performance est due à l’habileté de ses souverains qui ont su s’adapter aux circonstances et inventer de nouveaux moyens de faire face à leurs ennemis successifs. La stratégie reposait donc moins sur la force militaire que sur la persuasion. Et, même au combat, les Byzantins étaient moins portés à détruire leurs adversaires qu’à les contenir. Apparue au ve siècle face à la formidable menace représentée par les Huns d’Attila, vaincus avec un minimum de forces, cette méthode a continué à s’affiner au fil des siècles. Edward Luttwak analyse avec une extraordinaire précision tous les aspects de cet incomparable art de la guerre, étudiant aussi bien la religion et le pouvoir à Byzance que sa diplomatie, ses pratiques dynastiques, ses armes, sa tactique, son système fiscal ou encore ses méthodes d’espionnage. La « résilience » de Byzance : une leçon pour les grandes puissances de demain ?Auteur notamment du Grand Livre de la stratégie et de La Grande Stratégie de l’Empire romain, Edward Luttwak est l’un des spécialistes de stratégie et de géopolitique les plus respectés à l’échelle internationale. Il travaille notamment au Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales de Washington.