Einer R. Elhauge – författare

Why is our health care system so fragmented in the care it gives patients? Why is there little coordination amongst the many doctors who treat individual patients, who often even lack access to a common set of medical records? Why is fragmentation a problem even within a single hospital, where errors or miscommunications often seem to result from poor coordination amongst the myriad of professionals treating any one individual patient? Why is health care fragmented both over time, so that too little is spent on preventive care, and across patients, so that resources are often misallocated to the patients who need it least? The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions approaches these broad questions with a highly interdisciplinary approach. The articles included in the work address legal and regulatory issues, including laws that mandate separate payments for each provider, restrict hospitals or others from controlling or rewarding the set of providers treating a patient to assure coordinated care, and provide affirmative disincentives for coordinating care by paying more for uncoordinated care that requires more services. Business reasons for the current form of hospital organization are considered, and efficiency and design are examined and compared to other industries. The economics of current hospital organization are also taken into account. The authors examine and propose various reforms that make our health care system less fragmented, more efficient, and more medically effective.

One might mistakenly think that the long tradition of economic analysis in antitrust law would mean there is little new to say. Yet the field is surprisingly dynamic and changing. The specially commissioned chapters in this landmark volume offer a rigorous analysis of the field's most current and contentious issues. Focusing on those areas of antitrust economics that are most in flux, leading scholars discuss topics such as: mergers that create unilateral effects or eliminate potential competition; whether market definition is necessary; tying, bundled discounts, and loyalty discounts; a new theory of predatory pricing; assessing vertical price-fixing after Leegin; proving horizontal agreements after Twombly; modern analysis of monopsony power; the economics of antitrust enforcement; international antitrust issues; antitrust in regulated industries; the antitrust-patent intersection; and modern methods for measuring antitrust damages. Students and scholars of law and economics, law practitioners, regulators, and economists with an interest in industrial organization and consulting will find this seminal Handbook an essential and informative resource. Contributors: J.B. Baker, R.D. Blair, A. Bradford, N. Economides, A. Edlin, E. Elhauge, D.S. Evans, J.S. Haynes, B. Klein, A.K. Klevorick, I.B. Kohler-Hausmann, J. Kwoka, D. Reitman, D.L. Rubinfeld, H.A. Shelanski, C.J. Sprigman, A.L. Wickelgren