Georg Vanberg – författare

Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world''s parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. Parliaments and Coalitions contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr

When negotiating the formation of governments in multiparty democracies, do party leaders consistently consider the policy preferences of their voters? Voter Sophistication and Coalition Politics introduces a theoretical framework that places voters-particularly their ideological sophistication-at the heart of coalition bargaining. It challenges existing approaches that portray elite bargaining as isolated from voter reactions, demonstrates that parties anticipate and respond to potential voter backlash during government formation, and traces the impact of these anticipations on government participation, the choice of coalition partners, and expected policy consequences.The book develops a unified empirical model of coalition negotiations, bridging two traditionally separate approaches in the study of government formation: one focused on coalition attributes and the other on party characteristics. This innovative framework sheds light on how party leaders navigate the dual pressures of coalition dynamics and voter expectations. By combining institutional analysis with behavioral insights, it provides new tools to explore the relationship between legislative bargaining, elite strategies, voter behavior, and democratic responsiveness.Based on an analysis of more than a thousand party bargaining decisions across 16 parliamentary democracies over the past 50 years, the book reveals that voter ideological sophistication profoundly shapes coalition outcomes. By offering a new perspective on the alignment-or misalignment-between coalition negotiations and voter expectations, this book deepens our understanding of democratic representation in multiparty systems.Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu .The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.

When negotiating the formation of governments in multiparty democracies, do party leaders consistently consider the policy preferences of their voters? Voter Sophistication and Coalition Politics introduces a theoretical framework that places voters-particularly their ideological sophistication-at the heart of coalition bargaining. It challenges existing approaches that portray elite bargaining as isolated from voter reactions, demonstrates that parties anticipate and respond to potential voter backlash during government formation, and traces the impact of these anticipations on government participation, the choice of coalition partners, and expected policy consequences.The book develops a unified empirical model of coalition negotiations, bridging two traditionally separate approaches in the study of government formation: one focused on coalition attributes and the other on party characteristics. This innovative framework sheds light on how party leaders navigate the dual pressures of coalition dynamics and voter expectations. By combining institutional analysis with behavioral insights, it provides new tools to explore the relationship between legislative bargaining, elite strategies, voter behavior, and democratic responsiveness.Based on an analysis of more than a thousand party bargaining decisions across 16 parliamentary democracies over the past 50 years, the book reveals that voter ideological sophistication profoundly shapes coalition outcomes. By offering a new perspective on the alignment-or misalignment-between coalition negotiations and voter expectations, this book deepens our understanding of democratic representation in multiparty systems.Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu .The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.

When negotiating the formation of governments in multiparty democracies, do party leaders consistently consider the policy preferences of their voters? Voter Sophistication and Coalition Politics introduces a theoretical framework that places voters-particularly their ideological sophistication-at the heart of coalition bargaining. It challenges existing approaches that portray elite bargaining as isolated from voter reactions, demonstrates that parties anticipate and respond to potential voter backlash during government formation, and traces the impact of these anticipations on government participation, the choice of coalition partners, and expected policy consequences.The book develops a unified empirical model of coalition negotiations, bridging two traditionally separate approaches in the study of government formation: one focused on coalition attributes and the other on party characteristics. This innovative framework sheds light on how party leaders navigate the dual pressures of coalition dynamics and voter expectations. By combining institutional analysis with behavioral insights, it provides new tools to explore the relationship between legislative bargaining, elite strategies, voter behavior, and democratic responsiveness.Based on an analysis of more than a thousand party bargaining decisions across 16 parliamentary democracies over the past 50 years, the book reveals that voter ideological sophistication profoundly shapes coalition outcomes. By offering a new perspective on the alignment-or misalignment-between coalition negotiations and voter expectations, this book deepens our understanding of democratic representation in multiparty systems.Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu .The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.

Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world's parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. Parliaments and Coalitions contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr

Coalition governments are the norm in most of the world's parliamentary democracies. Because these governments are comprised of multiple political parties, they are subject to tensions that are largely absent under single-party government. The pressures of electoral competition and the necessity of delegating substantial authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties threaten the compromise agreements that are at the heart of coalition governance. The central argument of this book is that strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with these tensions and to enforce coalition bargains. Based on an analysis of roughly 1,300 government bills across five democracies (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands), the book paints a detailed picture of the treatment of government legislation in contemporary parliaments. Two central contributions emerge. First, the book forces a reconsideration of the common perception that legislatures are largely irrelevant institutions in European democracies. The data presented here make a compelling case that parliaments that feature strong committee systems play an influential role in shaping policy. Second, the book contributes to the field of coalition governance. While scholars have developed detailed accounts of the birth and death of coalitions, much less is known about the manner in which coalitions govern between these bookend events. Parliaments and Coalitions contributes to a richer understanding of how multiparty governments make policy.Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu.

Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.

Constitutional courts have emerged as central institutions in many advanced democracies. This book investigates the sources and the limits of judicial authority, focusing on the central role of public support for judicial independence. The empirical sections of the book illustrate the theoretical argument in an in-depth study of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including statistical analysis of judicial decisions, case studies, and interviews with judges and legislators. The book's major finding is that the interests of governing majorities, prevailing public opinion, and the transparency of the political environment exert a powerful influence on judicial decisions. Judges are influenced not only by jurisprudential considerations and their policy preferences, but also by strategic concerns. By highlighting this dimension of constitutional review, the book challenges the contention that high court justices are largely unconstrained actors as well as the notion that constitutional courts lack democratic legitimacy.

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.