Tom Ginsburg – författare

Comparative Constitutional Law and Politics: Analysis, Cases, and Materials is the first interdisciplinary casebook for the field, offering students an innovative and truly global approach to comparative constitutional law. Written by leading scholars, this pioneering resource integrates state-of-the-art literature and caselaw from constitutional law with insights from social science. Its coverage reaches far beyond the traditional canon to help students understand the full reach of the field, drawing on materials from around the world in a truly global approach.Recognizing that constitution-making and interpretation are increasingly transnational, the book includes cases from six continents, addressing historical gaps in coverage. It incorporates data on global trends, and excerpts from cutting-edge scholarship and key judicial decisions, along with detailed explanations by the casebook's editors. Each chapter is organized around a key concept, beginning with a bird's-eye view of the topic that introduces the current state of scholarly and legislative debate and encourages thoughtful student engagement.

Comparative Constitutional Law and Politics: Analysis, Cases, and Materials is the first comprehensive casebook for the field, offering students an innovative and truly global approach to comparative constitutional law. Written by leading scholars, this pioneering resource integrates state-of-the-art literature and caselaw from constitutional law with insights from social science. Its coverage reaches far beyond the traditional canon to help students understand the full reach of the field, drawing on materials from around the world in a truly global approach.Recognizing that constitution-making and interpretation are increasingly transnational, the book includes cases from six continents, addressing historical gaps in coverage. It incorporates data on global trends, and excerpts from cutting-edge scholarship and key judicial decisions, along with detailed explanations by the casebook's editors. Each chapter is organized around a key concept, beginning with a bird's-eye view of the topic that introduces the current state of scholarly and legislative debate and encourages thoughtful student engagement.

Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg show how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned.Transcending the conventional lenses of legal culture and tradition that are used to analyze this variation, Garoupa and Ginsburg approach the subject through their long-standing research on the economics of judiciary information and status, examining the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multi-court systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have on the reputations of judges in this era.

Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation.Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.

Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self-rule. In the United States, the tenure of Donald Trump has seemed decisive turning point for many. What kind of president intimidates jurors, calls the news media the "enemy of the American people," and seeks foreign assistance investigating domestic political rivals? Whatever one thinks of President Trump, many think the Constitution will safeguard us from lasting damage. But is that assumption justified? How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Drawing on a rich array of other countries' experiences with democratic backsliding, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can both hinder and hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights--such as those enshrined in the First Amendment--often fail as bulwarks against democratic decline. The sobering reality for the United States, Ginsburg and Huq contend, is that the Constitution's design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had unforeseen consequence--leaving the presidency weakly regulated and empowering the Supreme Court conjure up doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit rights violations. Even the bright spots in the Constitution--the First Amendment, for example--may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language banned in many other democracies. We--and the rest of the world--can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

A collection of texts that provide the foundation for the University of Chicago’s longstanding tradition of free expression, principles that are at the center of current debates within higher education and society more broadly.  Free inquiry and expression are hotly contested, both on campus and in social and political life. Since its founding in the late nineteenth century, the University of Chicago has been at the forefront of conversations around free speech and academic freedom in higher education. The University’s approach to free expression grew from a sterling reputation as a research university as well as a commitment to American pragmatism and democratic progress, all of which depended on what its first president referred to as the “complete freedom of speech on all subjects.” In 2015, more than 100 years later, then University provost and president J. D. Isaacs and Robert Zimmer echoed this commitment, releasing a statement by a faculty committee led by law professor Geoffrey R. Stone that has come to be known as the Chicago Principles, now adopted or endorsed by one hundred US colleges and universities. These principles are just a part of the long-standing dialogue at the University of Chicago around freedom of expression—its meaning and limits. The Chicago Canon on Free Inquiry and Expression brings together exemplary documents – some published for the first time here – that explain and situate this ongoing conversation with an introductory essay that brings the tradition to light.  Throughout waves of historical and societal challenges, this first principle of free expression has required rearticulation and new interpretations. The documents gathered here include, among others, William Rainey Harper’s “Freedom of Speech” (1900), the Kalven Committee’s report on the University’s role in political and social action (1967), and Geoffrey R. Stone’s “Free Speech on Campus: A Challenge of Our Times” (2016). Together, the writings of the canon reveal how the Chicago tradition is neither static nor stagnant, but a vibrant experiment; a lively struggle to understand, practice, and advance free inquiry and expression.  At a time of nationwide campus speech debates, engaging with these texts and the questions they raise is essential to sustaining an environment of broad intellectual and ideological diversity. This book offers a blueprint for the future of higher education’s vital work and points to the civic value of free expression.

Updated to take stock of recent developments, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq’s prescient and insightful book shows how constitutional rules both hinder and hasten democratic decline.Around the world, autocratic leaders threaten the core structures of democratic self-rule. But democratic constitutions are not fail-proof safeguards. By looking at how such leaders exploit legal mechanisms to advance their aims, we can see how democratic constitutions can sometimes abet—and even accelerate—democratic decline. In this new edition of How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, constitutional law experts Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq offer a powerful analysis of today’s challenges while arguing that the time has come for meaningful, actionable change.This new edition takes up the torch of its predecessor, canvasing developments in the United States and other countries that have transpired since 2018. Drawing lessons from countries around the world and reflecting on the prospects for American democracy, the authors show how constitutional design can, in fact, either undermine or support democratic institutions. The sobering reality for the United States is that the Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion eminently feasible. But Ginsburg and Huq do not stop there. They suggest practical ways that law and constitutional design can better manage these mounting threats, analyzing constitutional and legal questions that are consequential yet poorly understood, all while cautioning against an overreliance on technocratic fixes.Even more urgent and salient in its new edition, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy reflects on why autocrats tend to pose even greater danger the second time they come to power and asks how we can begin to repair a democracy that has failed.

Law in Korea has historically been viewed as merely a tool of authoritarian rule, but since the transition to democracy in 1987 it has served a more important and visible role as a force for social change. With contributions from leading US and Korean scholars, Legal Reform in Korea explores this response to domestic and international pressures, applying a socio-legal perspective to both legal practices and the legal institutions themselves, which have become a major political issue throughout the developing world. An invaluable resource for students of Asian law and Korean studies.

Law in Korea has historically been viewed as merely a tool of authoritarian rule, but since the transition to democracy in 1987 it has served a more important and visible role as a force for social change. With contributions from leading US and Korean scholars, Legal Reform in Korea explores this response to domestic and international pressures, applying a socio-legal perspective to both legal practices and the legal institutions themselves, which have become a major political issue throughout the developing world. An invaluable resource for students of Asian law and Korean studies.

This book examines administrative law in Asia, exploring the profound changes in the legal regimes of many Asian states that have taken place in recent years. Political democratization in some countries, economic change more broadly and the forces of globalization have put pressure on the developmental state model, wherein bureaucrats governed in a kind of managed capitalism and public-private partnerships were central. In their stead, a more market-oriented regulatory state model seems to be emerging in many jurisdictions, with emphases on transparency, publicity, and constrained discretion. This book analyses the causes and consequences of this shift from a socio-legal perspective, showing clearly how decisions about the scope of administrative law and judicial review have an important effect on the shape and style of government regulation. Taking a comparative approach, individual chapters trace the key developments in the legal regimes of major states across Asia, including China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. They demonstrate that, in many cases, Asian states have shifted away from traditional systems in which judges were limited in terms of their influence over social and economic policy, towards regulatory models of the state involving a greater role for judges and law-like processes. The book also considers whether judiciaries are capable of performing the tasks they are being given, and assesses the profound consequences the judicialization of governance is starting to have on state policy-making in Asia.

This book examines administrative law in Asia, exploring the profound changes in the legal regimes of many Asian states that have taken place in recent years. Political democratization in some countries, economic change more broadly and the forces of globalization have put pressure on the developmental state model, wherein bureaucrats governed in a kind of managed capitalism and public-private partnerships were central. In their stead, a more market-oriented regulatory state model seems to be emerging in many jurisdictions, with emphases on transparency, publicity, and constrained discretion. This book analyses the causes and consequences of this shift from a socio-legal perspective, showing clearly how decisions about the scope of administrative law and judicial review have an important effect on the shape and style of government regulation. Taking a comparative approach, individual chapters trace the key developments in the legal regimes of major states across Asia, including China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. They demonstrate that, in many cases, Asian states have shifted away from traditional systems in which judges were limited in terms of their influence over social and economic policy, towards regulatory models of the state involving a greater role for judges and law-like processes. The book also considers whether judiciaries are capable of performing the tasks they are being given, and assesses the profound consequences the judicialization of governance is starting to have on state policy-making in Asia.

Constitutions are supposed to provide an enduring structure for politics. Yet only half live more than nine years. Why is it that some constitutions endure while others do not? In The Endurance of National Constitutions Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton examine the causes of constitutional endurance from an institutional perspective. Supported by an original set of cross-national historical data, theirs is the first comprehensive study of constitutional mortality. They show that whereas constitutions are imperilled by social and political crises, certain aspects of a constitution's design can lower the risk of death substantially. Thus, to the extent that endurance is desirable - a question that the authors also subject to scrutiny - the decisions of founders take on added importance.

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing 'insurance' to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

Scholars have generally assumed that courts in authoritarian states are pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and frustrating the efforts of their opponents. As a result, nearly all studies in comparative judicial politics have focused on democratic and democratizing countries. This volume brings together leading scholars in comparative judicial politics to consider the causes and consequences of judicial empowerment in authoritarian states. It demonstrates the wide range of governance tasks that courts perform, as well as the way in which courts can serve as critical sites of contention both among the ruling elite and between regimes and their citizens. Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, this volume advances our understanding of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes.

Constitutions are supposed to provide an enduring structure for politics. Yet only half live more than nine years. Why is it that some constitutions endure while others do not? In The Endurance of National Constitutions Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton examine the causes of constitutional endurance from an institutional perspective. Supported by an original set of cross-national historical data, theirs is the first comprehensive study of constitutional mortality. They show that whereas constitutions are imperilled by social and political crises, certain aspects of a constitution's design can lower the risk of death substantially. Thus, to the extent that endurance is desirable - a question that the authors also subject to scrutiny - the decisions of founders take on added importance.

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing 'insurance' to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

Scholars have generally assumed that courts in authoritarian states are pawns of their regimes, upholding the interests of governing elites and frustrating the efforts of their opponents. As a result, nearly all studies in comparative judicial politics have focused on democratic and democratizing countries. This volume brings together leading scholars in comparative judicial politics to consider the causes and consequences of judicial empowerment in authoritarian states. It demonstrates the wide range of governance tasks that courts perform, as well as the way in which courts can serve as critical sites of contention both among the ruling elite and between regimes and their citizens. Drawing on empirical and theoretical insights from every major region of the world, this volume advances our understanding of judicial politics in authoritarian regimes.

Public Law in East Asia is a collection of the leading English-language articles on constitutional and administrative law in the Asian region, written by many of the leading scholars from this area. The region has its own distinct legal and political traditions, and its systems of government have facilitated dynamic economic growth, but the role of public law has not been well understood. Covering a wide range of jurisdictions in a single volume, this collection provides insights into the ways in which institutions of Western origin have been integrated into Asian political and legal cultures, producing new syntheses.

This landmark volume of specially commissioned, original contributions by top international scholars organizes the issues and controversies of the rich and rapidly maturing field of comparative constitutional law. Divided into sections on constitutional design and redesign, identity, structure, individual rights and state duties, courts and constitutional interpretation, this comprehensive volume covers dozens of countries as well as a range of approaches to the boundaries of constitutional law. While some chapters reference the text of legal instruments expressly labeled constitutional, others focus on the idea of entrenchment or take a more functional approach. Challenging the current boundaries of the field, the contributors offer diverse perspectives - cultural, historical and institutional - as well as suggestions for future research. A unique and enlightening volume, Comparative Constitutional Law is an essential resource for students and scholars of the subject.Contributors: Z. Al-Ali, T. Allen, N. Bamforth, J. Blount, P.G. Carozza, C. Charters, J.A. Cheibub, S. Choudhry, D.M. Davis, R. Dixon, V. Ferreres Comella, D. Fontana, N. Friedman, S. Gardbaum, T. Ginsburg. J. Greene, O. Gross, J.L. Hiebert, R. Hirschl, N. Hume, H. Irving, V.C. Jackson, G.J. Jacobsohn, D.P. Kommers, R.J. Krotoszynski, Jr, N. Lenagh-Maguire, F. Limongi, F.I. Michelman, K. O Regan, R.H. Pildes, K. Roach, K. Rubenstein, C. Saunders, D. Schneiderman, A. Stone, R. Teitel, M. Tushnet

Buddhism and Comparative Constitutional Law offers the first comprehensive account of the entanglements of Buddhism and constitutional law in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Tibet, Bhutan, China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan. Bringing together an interdisciplinary team of experts, the volume offers a complex portrait of "the Buddhist-constitutional complex," demonstrating the intricate and powerful ways in which Buddhist and constitutional ideas merged, interacted and co-evolved. The authors also highlight the important ways in which Buddhist actors have (re)conceived Western liberal ideals such as constitutionalism, rule of law, and secularism. Available Open Access on Cambridge Core, this trans-disciplinary volume is written to be accessible to a non-specialist audience.

This volume of essays brings together a group of leading political scientists, legal scholars, and political theorists to describe and analyze the body of constitutional law and practice within and upon democratic institutions, in particular examining how constitutional law shapes electoral democracy. Constitutional law and practice on this question are complex and varied. This volume therefore takes a thematic and regional approach: it selects a range of key theoretical questions related to democratic constitutional design and offers a series of chapters featuring a diverse range of voices, as well as a blend of theory, qualitative studies, and quantitative methods. Readers will gain a multifaceted understanding of a phenomenon of growing importance. The volume will also be useful to students of comparative constitutionalism, who will gain a rich array of empirical evidence to stimulate further work. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

In 1960, there were 101 middle-income countries. By 2008, only thirteen of these had become high-income countries. Why do so many middle-income countries fail to develop after a promising start, becoming mired in the so-called middle-income trap? This interdisciplinary volume addresses the special challenges that middle-income countries confront from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. It is the first volume that addresses law and development issues in middle-income countries from the perspective of political, administrative and legal institutions and policies. The goal is to provide international development agencies and domestic policy makers with feasible recommendations to address the wide range of technically, politically and socially complex issues that middle-income countries face.

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases, representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally.

From London to Libya, from Istanbul to Iceland, there is great interest among comparative constitutional scholars and practitioners about when a proposed constitution is likely to succeed. But what does it mean for a constitution to succeed? Are there universal criteria of success, and which apply across the board? Or, is the choice of criteria entirely idiosyncratic? This edited volume takes on the idea of constitutional success and shows the manifold ways in which it can be understood. It collects essays from philosophers, political scientists, empiricists and legal scholars, that approach the definition of constitutional success from many different angles. It also brings together case studies from Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. By exploring a varied array of constitutional histories, this book shows how complex ideas of constitutional success play out differently in different contexts and provides examples of how success can be differently defined under different circumstances.

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases, representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally.

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

Since the rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth century, constitutions have been seen as an embodiment of national values and identity. However, individuals, ideas, and institutions from abroad have always influenced constitutions, and so the process is better described as transnational. As cross-border interaction is increasing in intensity, a dominant transnational legal order for constitutions has emerged, with its own norms, guidelines and shared ideas. Yet both the process and substance of constitution-making are being contested in divergent and insurgent constitutional orders. Bringing together leading scholars from the United States, Europe, Latin America, and Asia, this volume addresses the actors, networks, norms and processes involved in constitution-making, as well as the related challenges, from a transnational and comparative perspective. Drawing from the research on transnational legal orders, this work explores and examines constitution-making in every region of the world.