Nuno Garoupa – författare

Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg show how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned.Transcending the conventional lenses of legal culture and tradition that are used to analyze this variation, Garoupa and Ginsburg approach the subject through their long-standing research on the economics of judiciary information and status, examining the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multi-court systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have on the reputations of judges in this era.

Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. In Judicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation.Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.

Economists advise that the law should seek efficiency. More recently, it has been suggested that common law systems are more conducive of economic growth than code-based civil law systems. This book argues that there is no theory to support such statements and provides evidence that rejects a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Both common law and civil law systems are reviewed to debunk the relationship between the efficiency of the common law hypothesis and the alleged inferiority of codified law systems. Legal Origins and the Efficiency Dilemma has six aims: explaining the efficiency hypothesis of the common law since Posner’s 1973 book; summarizing the legal origins theory in the context of economic growth; debunking their relationship; discussing the meaning of 'common law' and the problems with the efficiency hypothesis by comparing laws across English speaking jurisdictions; illustrating the shortcomings of the legal origins theory with a comparative law and economics analysis; and concluding there is no theory and evidence to support the economic superiority of common law systems. Based on previous pieces by the authors, this book expands their work by including new areas of analysis (such as trusts), detailing previous analysis (such as French law versus common law in the areas of contract, property and torts), and updating for recent developments in the academic discourse.This volume is of interest to academics and students who study microeconomics, comparative law and foundations of law, as well as legal policy analysts.

High courts around the world hold a revered place in the legal hierarchy. These courts are the presumed impartial final arbiters as individuals, institutions, and nations resolve their legal differences. But they also buttress and mitigate the influence of other political actors, protect minority rights, and set directions for policy. The comparative empirical analysis offered in this volume highlights important differences between constitutional courts but also clarifies the unity of procedure, process, and practice in the world’s highest judicial institutions.High Courts in Global Perspective pulls back the curtain on the interlocutors of court systems internationally. This book creates a framework for a comparative analysis that weaves together a collective narrative on high court behavior and the scholarship needed for a deeper understanding of cross-national contexts. From the U.S. federal courts to the constitutional courts of Africa, from the high courts in Latin America to the Court of Justice of the European Union, high courts perform different functions in different societies, and the contributors take us through particularities of regulation and legislative review as well as considering the legitimacy of the court to serve as an honest broker in times of political transition. Unique in its focus and groundbreaking in its access, this comparative study will help scholars better understand the roles that constitutional courts and judges play in deciding some of the most divisive issues facing societies across the globe. From Africa to Europe to Australia and continents and nations in between, we get an insider’s look into the construction and workings of the world’s courts while also receiving an object lesson on best practices in comparative quantitative scholarship today.

Marking fifty years since the democratic transitions in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, this book traces how three countries that broke free from authoritarian rule in the mid-1970s have navigated consolidation, crisis, and the enduring tension between structural constraints and political agency to become, and remain, democracies.Drawing on the latest comparative research, The Makeover of Southern Europe traces the full arc of Southern Europe's democratic experience: from the turbulent transitions of the mid-1970s, through the consolidation of the 1980s and the modernisation that followed EU membership, to the severe stress tests imposed by the 2008 financial crisis and the more recent rise of populism and far-right politics. Covering institutions, political parties, gender equality, national identity, political trust, and public attitudes towards European integration, the book shows that shared historical origins do not produce identical destinies. Structural conditions set the stage, but it is the choices of political leaders, parties, and citizens that ultimately determine whether democracies endure.This book will be an important tool for researchers studying Southern European politics and economics. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of South European Society and Politics.

Economists advise that the law should seek efficiency. More recently, it has been suggested that common law systems are more conducive of economic growth than code-based civil law systems. This book argues that there is no theory to support such statements and provides evidence that rejects a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Both common law and civil law systems are reviewed to debunk the relationship between the efficiency of the common law hypothesis and the alleged inferiority of codified law systems. Legal Origins and the Efficiency Dilemma has six aims: explaining the efficiency hypothesis of the common law since Posner’s 1973 book; summarizing the legal origins theory in the context of economic growth; debunking their relationship; discussing the meaning of 'common law' and the problems with the efficiency hypothesis by comparing laws across English speaking jurisdictions; illustrating the shortcomings of the legal origins theory with a comparative law and economics analysis; and concluding there is no theory and evidence to support the economic superiority of common law systems. Based on previous pieces by the authors, this book expands their work by including new areas of analysis (such as trusts), detailing previous analysis (such as French law versus common law in the areas of contract, property and torts), and updating for recent developments in the academic discourse.This volume is of interest to academics and students who study microeconomics, comparative law and foundations of law, as well as legal policy analysts.

The book is a short introduction to comparative law and economics, a growing field in the interaction between law, economics and comparative political science. It is a guide to economists, lawyers and political scientists looking for a brief overview. It includes both strands of the traditional literature, namely the role of legal families and microeconomic analysis of legal rules in a comparative perspective. The study of courts at the global level is complemented by comparative judicial politics.

The book is a short introduction to comparative law and economics, a growing field in the interaction between law, economics and comparative political science. It is a guide to economists, lawyers and political scientists looking for a brief overview. It includes both strands of the traditional literature, namely the role of legal families and microeconomic analysis of legal rules in a comparative perspective. The study of courts at the global level is complemented by comparative judicial politics.