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Randall Calvert – författare & böcker | Bokus

Randall Calvert – författare

Visar alla böcker från författaren Randall Calvert. Handla med fri frakt och snabb leverans.

33 produkter

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33 produkter

A Theory of the State
Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State
AvYoram Barzel,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2001
459 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial 'state of nature' may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state. The state endows individuals with rights by delineating what it will protect. Enforcement, however, is never perfect. People use third parties such as firms to enforce agreements. As commodities become standardized, scale economies increase. In order to exploit the economies of within-state enforcement, the state will expand the contact enforcement territory by treaty or by conquest. The force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires.
Elbridge Gerry's Salamander
The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution
AvGary W. Cox,Jonathan N. Katzm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2002
445 kr
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The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in America's history. Moreover, they changed what would happen at law should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides a detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.
The Efficient Secret
The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England
AvGary W. Cox,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2005
557 kr
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The Efficient Secret is an analysis of the institutional changes in parliamentary government in nineteenth-century England, concentrating on the years between the first and third Reform Acts. Professor Gary W. Cox employs a rational choice model to analyze the problems of voter choice and to examine the emergence of party loyalty in the electorate, the development of cabinet government, and their legislative consequences. The introductory chapters provide the historical setting for this study and briefly survey nineteenth-century political and economic events. Professor Cox then focuses on the increases in party voting in Parliament and in the electorate. To support his argument concerning these parallel developments, he uses statistical evidence drawn from poll books and newspapers.
Appointing Central Bankers
The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union
AvKelly H. Chang,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2006
557 kr
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This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.
When Majorities Fail
The Russian Parliament, 1990-1993
AvJosephine T. Andrews,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2006
557 kr
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When Majorities Fail is a study of institutional failure in Russia's first democratic legislature. Inadequate rules and a chaotic party system combined to make it nearly impossible to pass a coherent legislative program, including a new constitution. The internal instability in Russia's parliament is known as cycling, one of the most important theoretical concepts in formal study of legislatures. There are few recorded cases of cycling in politically important settings. This book documents the presence of cyclical majorities in Russian Parliament with comprehensive case and statistical analysis, and demonstrates how the failure to adopt a new constitution led to the confrontation between parliament and president in the fall of 1993. Earlier research has shown that the design of a legislative institution is crucial in preventing cycling. The author shows how the institutional design of the parliament failed, underscoring the importance of institutional design in a democratic transition.
Managerial Dilemmas
The Political Economy of Hierarchy
AvGary J. Miller,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1992
1 085 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage.
The Fruits of Revolution
Property Rights, Litigation and French Agriculture, 1700-1860
AvJean-Laurent Rosenthal,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1992
1 263 kr
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In The Fruits of Revolution Jean-Laurent Rosenthal investigates two central questions in French economic history: To what extent did institutions hold back agricultural development under the Old Regime, and did reforms carried out during the French Revolution significantly improve the structure of property rights in agriculture? Both questions have been the subject of much debate. Historians have touched on them in a number of local studies, yet usually they have been more concerned with community conflict than with economic development. Economists generally have researched the performance of the French economy without paying much attention to the impact of institutions on specific areas of the economy. This book attempts to utilize the best of both approaches: It focuses on broad questions of economic change, yet it is based on detailed archival investigations of the impact of property rights on water control.
Institutions and Social Conflict
AvJack Knight,Randall Calvert
Häftad, Engelska, 1992
341 kr
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Many of the fundamental questions in social science entail an examination of the role played by social institutions. Why do we have so many social institutions? Why do they take one form in one society and quite different ones in others? In what ways do these institutions develop? When and why do they change? Institutions and Social Conflict addresses these questions in two ways. First it offers a thorough critique of a wide range of theories of institutional change, from the classical accounts of Smith, Hume, Marx and Weber to the contemporary approaches of evolutionary theory, the theory of social conventions and the new institutionalism. Secondly, it develops a new theory of institutional change that emphasises the distributional consequences of social institutions. The emergence of institutions is explained as a by-product of distributional conflict in which asymmetries of power in a society generate institutional solutions to conflicts.
Exposed to Innumerable Delusions
Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey
AvJohn Waterbury,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1993
1 249 kr
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The states of Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey have all developed extensive public enterprise sectors and have sought to regulate most economic activities outside the state sector. Their experiences have been typical of scores of developing countries that followed similar paths of industrialisation. This 1993 study examines the origins of these state sectors, the dynamics of their growth and crises, and the efforts to reform or liquidate them. It is argued that public ownership creates its own culture and pathology that are similar across otherwise different systems. The logic of principal-agent relations under public ownership is so powerful that it swamps culture and peculiar institutional histories. While public sectors accumulate powerful associated interests over time, against most predictions these prove relatively powerless to block the reform process.
Exposed to Innumerable Delusions
Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey
AvJohn Waterbury,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1993
448 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
The states of Egypt, India, Mexico and Turkey have all developed extensive public enterprise sectors and have sought to regulate most economic activities outside the state sector. Their experiences have been typical of scores of developing countries that followed similar paths of industrialisation. This 1993 study examines the origins of these state sectors, the dynamics of their growth and crises, and the efforts to reform or liquidate them. It is argued that public ownership creates its own culture and pathology that are similar across otherwise different systems. The logic of principal-agent relations under public ownership is so powerful that it swamps culture and peculiar institutional histories. While public sectors accumulate powerful associated interests over time, against most predictions these prove relatively powerless to block the reform process.
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
AvAlberto Alesina,Howard Rosenthalm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1995
468 kr
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This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarised preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recessions, and Democratic ones with expansions, and the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the midterm congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage.
Contracting for Property Rights
AvGary D. Libecap,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1994
482 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In this book the author examines the problems encountered in negotiations among claimants and the political and economic considerations that influence property rights arrangements. The histories of mineral rights, rights to range and timber land, as well as fishery and crude oil production rights in the United States are examined and reveal a surprising variety of contractual negotiations and economic outcomes. The author concludes that in addition to an analysis of distributional outcomes, an examination of the details of the political bargaining underlying property rights contracts is essential to an understanding of why rights emerge as they do. The book is an important contribution to both property rights theory and to American economic history.
Managerial Dilemmas
The Political Economy of Hierarchy
AvGary J. Miller,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1993
448 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage.
The Politics of Oligarchy
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
AvJ. Mark Ramseyer,Frances McCall Rosenbluthm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1995
649 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In the latter-half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, Japan underwent two major shifts in political control. In the 1910s, the power of the oligarchy was eclipsed by that of a larger group of professional politicians; in the 1930s, the focus of power shifted again, this time to a set of independent military leaders. In this book, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth examine a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control - a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Institutional Choice in the Public Sector
AvMurray J. Horn,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1995
477 kr
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This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.
Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa
AvDaniel N. Posner,Randall Calvert
Häftad, Engelska, 2005
557 kr
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This book presents a theory to account for why and when politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another. It does so by examining the case of Zambia, where people identify themselves either as members of one of the country's seventy-three tribes or as members of one of its four principal language groups. The book accounts for the conditions under which Zambian political competition revolves around tribal differences and under which it revolves around language group differences. Drawing on a simple model of identity choice, it shows that the answer depends on whether the country operates under single-party or multi-party rule. During periods of single-party rule, tribal identities serve as the axis of electoral mobilization and self-identification; during periods of multi-party rule, broader language group identities play this role. The book thus demonstrates how formal institutional rules determine the kinds of social cleavages that matter in politics.
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
AvC. Mantzavinos,Chrysostomos Mantzavinosm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2004
557 kr
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Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.
Odd Markets in Japanese History
Law and Economic Growth
AvJ. Mark Ramseyer,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1996
1 641 kr
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Employing a rational-choice approach, Professor Ramseyer studies the impact of Japanese law on economic growth in Japan. Toward that end, the author investigates the way law governed various markets and the way that people negotiated contracts within those markets. For much of the period at stake, the Japanese government was an oligarchy rather than a democracy; the judges operated a civil rather than common law regime; the economy grew modestly but erratically; and social customs changed rapidly and radically. As a result, this study applies an economic logic, but to markets in a vastly different world, in a different historical period, and with a different political regime and legal system. Findings reveal that the legal system generally promoted mutually advantageous deals, and that people generally negotiated in ways that shrewdly promoted their private best interests. Whether in the markets for indentured servants, prostitutes, or marriage partners, Odd Markets in Japanese History reports little evidence of either age- or gender- related exploitation.
Making a Market
The Institutional Transformation of an African Society
AvJean Ensminger,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1996
5,0 utav 5 stjärnor. Totalt antal röster:(1)
574 kr
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Economists have devoted considerable effort to explaining how a market economy functions, but they have given a good deal less attention to explaining how a market economy is formed. In Making a Market, Jean Ensminger analyses the process by which the market was introduced into the economy of a group of Kenyan pastoralists. Professor Ensminger employs new institutional economic analysis to assess the impact of new market institutions on production and distribution, with particular emphasis on the effect of institutions on decreasing transaction costs over time. This 1993 study traces the effects of increasing commercialisation on the economic well-being of individual households, rich and poor alike, over considerable time and analyses the process by which institutions themselves are transformed as a market economy develops.
Making Votes Count
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
AvGary W. Cox,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1997
1 753 kr
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Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
Making Votes Count
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
AvGary W. Cox,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1997
475 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
Bicameralism
AvGeorge Tsebelis,Jeannette Moneym. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1997
541 kr
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This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
AvMargaret Levi,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 1997
1 322 kr
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Democratic governments are able to elicit, legally and legitimately, both money and men from their populations. Certainly there is tax evasion, draft evasion, and even outright resistance; yet to a remarkable extent citizens acquiesce and even actively consent to the demands of governments, well beyond the point explicable by coercion. This is a puzzle for social scientists, particularly those who believe that individuals are self-interested, rational actors who calculate only the private egoistic costs and benefits of possible choices. The provisions of collective good should never justify a quasi-voluntary tax payment and the benefits of a war could not possibly exceed the cost of dying. This book explains the institutionalization of policy in response to anticipated and actual citizen behaviour and the conditions under which citizens give, refuse and withdraw their consent. Professor Levi claims that citizens' consent is contingent upon the perceived fairness of both the government and of other citizens. Most citizens of democracies, most of the time, are more likely to give their consent if they believe that government actors and other citizens are behaving fairly toward them.
Votes without Leverage
Women in American Electoral Politics, 1920-1970
AvAnna L. Harvey,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1998
477 kr
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Votes without Leverage re-examines a long-standing puzzle in women's electoral politics. Namely why the increasing importance of women's votes throughout the 1920s did not imply increasing success for the lobbying efforts of women's organizations during the same period. Applying recent theoretical developments in the political economy of institutions and electoral behavior, Professor Harvey argues that female disenfranchisement prior to 1920 created incentives for leaders of women's organizations to invest in the pursuit of suffrage as a first step to achieving other policy benefits for women. When the battle over the right to vote was finally won, those leaders then required time to adapt their organizations to pursue a broader legislative agenda through conventional electoral politics. During this time, however, the major party organizations were able to initiate their own electoral mobilization of women, giving the parties significant advantages in imperfectly competitive markets for women's electoral mobilization. Without women's votes, those organizations ceased to be able to win policy concessions from vote-minded legislators, a state of affairs that would not significantly change until the accelerated decline of the parties as mobilization organizations in the 1960s.
Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
AvMargaret Levi,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1997
477 kr
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Democratic governments are able to elicit, legally and legitimately, both money and men from their populations. Certainly there is tax evasion, draft evasion, and even outright resistance; yet to a remarkable extent citizens acquiesce and even actively consent to the demands of governments, well beyond the point explicable by coercion. This is a puzzle for social scientists, particularly those who believe that individuals are self-interested, rational actors who calculate only the private egoistic costs and benefits of possible choices. The provisions of collective good should never justify a quasi-voluntary tax payment and the benefits of a war could not possibly exceed the cost of dying. This book explains the institutionalization of policy in response to anticipated and actual citizen behaviour and the conditions under which citizens give, refuse and withdraw their consent. Professor Levi claims that citizens' consent is contingent upon the perceived fairness of both the government and of other citizens. Most citizens of democracies, most of the time, are more likely to give their consent if they believe that government actors and other citizens are behaving fairly toward them.
Veto Bargaining
Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power
AvCharles M. Cameron,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 2000
477 kr
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The late-twentieth century has given rise to the most concentrated period of divided party government in American history. With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining offers a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
The Politics of Oligarchy
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
AvJ. Mark Ramseyer,Frances McCall Rosenbluthm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1998
459 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
In the latter-half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, Japan underwent two major shifts in political control. In the 1910s, the power of the oligarchy was eclipsed by that of a larger group of professional politicians; in the 1930s, the focus of power shifted again, this time to a set of independent military leaders. In this book, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth examine a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control - a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world.
Delegating Powers
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
AvDavid Epstein,Sharyn O'Halloranm. fl.
Häftad, Engelska, 1999
557 kr
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David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.
Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
AvC. Mantzavinos,Randall Calvert
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
738 kr
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Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes.
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999
AvNicolas Van de Walle,Randall Calvertm. fl.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2001
1 362 kr
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This 2001 book explains why African countries have remained mired in a disastrous economic crisis since the late 1970s. It shows that dynamics internal to African state structures largely explain this failure to overcome economic difficulties rather than external pressures on these same structures as is often argued. Far from being prevented from undertaking reforms by societal interest and pressure groups, clientelism within the state elite, ideological factors and low state capacity have resulted in some limited reform, but much prevarication and manipulation of the reform process, by governments which do not really believe that reform will be effective, which often oppose reforms because they would undercut the patronage and rent-seeking practices which undergird political authority, and which lack the administrative and technical capacity to implement much reform. Over time, state decay has increased.