G.M. Dillon - Böcker

In 1982 Argentina seized the Falklands Islands in an attack which betrayed fundamental weaknesses at the centre of British decision-making. This book attempts to analyze the relationship between political judgement, bureaucratic adivce and miltary intelligence in the mismanagement of Britain's Falklands policy. Suggesting that all defence decision-making takes place at the interface between domestic and international politics, he argues that the Junta's responsibility for the invasion does not exonerate British decision-makers. The Falklands dispute was an intricate political problem trapped in a cycle of political deprivation. He argues that driven by military requirement as much as by political direction Britain's military adventure became a gamble which paid off, allowing Mrs Thatcher to reap the political dividends and emphasizes the importance of political judgement and leadership in the routine management of defence policy. G.M. Dillon is author of "Dependence and Deterrence" and "Comparative Defence Policy Making".