Gunter Bischof – författare

The Russian Revolution excited men, and captured their imaginations. It seemed to herald the fulfillment of the nineteenth-century socialist movement. Socialists believed that with the proper use of technocracy they could scourge poverty and hunger from the earth. They felt that a social system based on equality and social justice could overcome the traditional division of each society into rich and poor. They were convinced that they could overcome social problems that, seething and bubbling beneath the surface, threatened to be as destructive as wars fought between great powers.These were the ideals and objectives of both 1917 revolutions. They were exciting and contagious. The Russians were seen by many as being on the threshold of a new and great experiment, one which would lead the world to peace, democracy, and security-the dream of ages. Support grew quickly. A worldwide movement committed to the extension of the ideological and moral principles of the Revolution and to the defense of the Soviet Union grew and became a significant factor in world politics. It did not turn out that way.Much of the story of this tragedy is to be found in labor struggles-the split between the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the workers. The labor movement, which had been pushing for a democratic alternative, turned against the Bolsheviks soon after 1917, and labor opposition left the Bolsheviks at the crossroads of history. The Bolsheviks had to choose between dictatorship or democracy. Under Lenin's guidance they opted for minority dictator ship, the outcome of which was tyranny over the very people in whose name they fought. This classic volume, originally published in 1969, has not been surpassed as a description of how and why this occurred.

On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the "Prague Spring" reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for "socialism with a human face." Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that "the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries" and that the Soviet Union had both a "right" and a "sacred duty" to "defend socialism" in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United S

On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the "Prague Spring" reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decide that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for "socialism with a human face." Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that "the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries" and that the Soviet Union had both a "right" and a "sacred duty" to "defend socialism" in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia. The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United S

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

The position of women in Austrian society, politics, and in the economy follows the familiar trajectory of Western societies. They were expected to accept their "proper place" in a male patriarchal world. Achieving equality in all spheres of life was a long struggle that is still not completed in spite of many advances. The chapters in Women in Austria attest to the growing interest and vibrancy in the area of women's studies in Austria and present a cross-section of new research in this field to an international audience. The volume includes with book reviews on Austrian business history, the Waldheim memoirs, Jews in postwar Austria, and political scandals in twentieth-century Austria. Women in Austria covers a plethora of significant social issues and will be essential to the work of women's studies scholars, sociologists, historians, and Austrian area specialists.

Franz Vranitzky, the banker turned politician, was chancellor during the ten years (1986-96) when the world dramatically changed in the aftermath of the cold war. Among postwar chancellors, only Bruno Kreisky held office longer. The Austrian Social Democratic Party has been in power since 1970. Such longevity is unique in postwar European politics. The dominance of Social Democracy in particular is noteworthy when compared to the general decline of traditional leftist politics in Europe. The chapters in this volume try to assess Vranitzky's central role in recent Austrian and European history.Richard Luther presents the general European political context in which Vranitzky operated. Eva Nowotny, Vranitzky's former principal foreign policy adviser and Austria's current ambassador to the United Kingdom, analyzes his struggle over joining the European Union as well as Austria's security dilemmas following the cold war. Fritz Plasser looks at the changing electoral behavior of Austrians and the ascendancy of new parties. Irene Etzerdorfer concentrates on the long hegemony of Austrian Social Democratic leadership by comparing Vranitzky's and Kreisky's leadership styles. Other contributors include Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, Brigitte Unger, Peter Rosner, Alexander van der Bellen, and George Winkler.A forum on postwar Austrian memory of World War II from a comparative perspective, which continues the theme of previous volumes in this series, is also included. Jonathan Petropoulos demonstrates how Swiss middlemen were in the center of dealing with stolen Nazi art during and after the war, while Olive Rathkolb describes the shameful legacy of the Austrian government's procrastination in resolving the issue of Jewish "heirless art." Peter Utgaard shows how in Austria's postwar high school textbooks the American bombing of Hiroshima often figured more prominently than the Holocaust. Review essays and book reviews complete the volume. The Vranitzky Era in Austria is a compelling work for political scientists, historians, and Austria studies scholars.Gnter Bischof is associate director of Center Austria and associate professor of history at the University of New Orleans, and former visiting professor at the University of Salzburg. Anton Pelinka is director of the Austrian Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna, professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck, and former visiting professor at Stanford University.Ferdinand Karlhofer is associate professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and former visiting professor at the University of New Orleans.

Perhaps no country benefitted more from the Marshall Plan for assistance in reconstruction of Europe after World War II than Austria. On a per capita basis, each American taxpayer invested $80 per person in the Plan; each Austrian received $133 from the European recovery program, more than any other of the sixteen participating countries. Without the Marshall Plan, the Austrian economic miracle of the 1950s would have been unthinkable. Despite this, contemporary Austria seems to have forgotten this essential American contribution to its postwar reconstruction. This volume in the Contemporary Austrian Studies series examines how the plan affected Austria, and how it is perceived today.The political context of the Marshall Plan in Austria is addressed in essays by Jill Lewis and Matthew Berg. Dieter Stiefer describes the vast Soviet economic exploitation of their Austrian occupation zone. Andrea Komlosy shows how the Marshall Plan helped complete the division of Europe. Siegfried Beer suggests the secret involvement of the CIA in the Marshall Plan, while Hans J³rgen Schr÷der analyzes the effectiveness of Marshall Plan propaganda programs in Germany and Austria.The macroeconomic impact of Marshall Plan funds on Austrian economic policy is outlined by Hans Seidel. Kurt Tweraser, Georg Rigele and G³nter Bischof suggest the microeconomic importance of funds for the steel, electricity and tourist sectors of the Austrian economy. Wilhelm Kohler's sweeping analysis compares the American transfer of funds to postwar Europe with current debates about the cost of European Union enlargement. The legacy of the Marshall Plan is addressed by former Austrian Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina. Kurt Loffler and Hans Fubenegger summarize the activities of the Economic Recovery Program Fund. Coming on the heels of the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, this compelling overview of the Plan and its impact will be important for historians, those interested in international politics, and Austrian scholars.G³nter Bischof is professor of history and associate director of Center-Austria at the University of New Orleans; Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna; Dieter Stiefel is professor of social and economic history at the University of Vienna and executive secretary of the Schumpeter Society in Vienna.This volume offers a collection of articles, mostly by contemporary Austrian-born historians, touching on various phases of the Marshall Plan administered through the European Recovery Program (ERP) and its successors counterfunds' assistance to the present. A splendid introduction followed by the key thirteen articles on the plan is augmented by several nontopical essays and book reviews, along with a survey of Austrian politics in 1998. A number of articles emanated from a 1998 conference at the University of New Orleans. Both novice and specialist will appreciate this book."-The Historian

In American history the 1950s are remembered as an affluent and harmonious decade. Not so in Austria. That nation emerged out of World War II with tremendous war-related destruction and with a four-power occupation that would last for ten years until 1955. Massive American economic aid enabled the Austrian economy to start recovering in the 1950s and reorient it from East to West. Unlike the United States, however, general affluence did not set in until the 1960s and 1970s even though Austria's dramatic baby boom enabled it to recover from the demographic catastrophe resulting from manpower losses of World War II., This volume deals with these larger trends. Stephen E. Ambrose discusses American-European relations and sets the larger international context for the Austrian scene. Oilver Rathkolb retraces the changing importance of the Austrian question for the Eisenhower administration. Michael Gehler presents an in-depth analysis of the intriguing question of whether Austria's unification at the price of permanent neutrality might have been a model for Germany. Franz Mathis and Kurt Tweraser look at economic reconstruction and the roles played by both the Austrian public industrial sector and the American Marshall Plan. Karin Schmidlechner looks at the youth culture of the era. Franz Adlgasser shows how Herbert Hoover's food aid was instrumental in the containment of communism in Hungary. Beth Noveck analyzes Austrian political culture of the First Republic from the perspective of Hugo Bettauer. Rolf Steininger presents an insightful historical overview of how the Austro-Italian South Tyrol conflict was resolved after seventy-five years of tension.

In 2005, Austria celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its liberation from the Nazi regime and the fiftieth anniversary of the State Treaty that ended the occupation and returned full sovereignty to the country. This volume of Contemporary Austrian Studies covers foreign policy in the twentieth century. It offers an up-to-date status report of Austria's foreign policy trajectories and diplomatic options.Eva Nowotny, the current Austrian ambassador to the United States, introduces the volume with an analysis of the art and practice of Austrian diplomacy in historical perspective. Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch analyzes recent Balkans diplomacy as an EU emissary in the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Historians Günther Kronenbitter, Alexander Lassner, Günter Bischof, Joanna Granville, and Martin Kofler provide historical case studies of pre-and post-World War I and World War II Austrian diplomacy, Austria's dealings with the Hungarian crisis of 1956, and its mediation between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the early 1960s. Political scientists Romain Kirt, Stefan Mayer, and Gunther Hauser analyze small states' foreign policymaking in a globalizing world, Austrian federal states' separate regional policy initiatives abroad and Austria's role vis-à-vis current European security initiatives. Michael Gehler periodizes post-World War II Austrian foreign policy regimes and provides a valuable summary of both the available archival and printed diplomatic source collections. A "Historiography Roundtable" is dedicated to the Austrian Occupation decade. Günter Bischof reports on the state of occupation historiography; Oliver Rathkolb on the historical memory of the occupation; Michael Gehler on the context of the German question; and Wolfgang Mueller and Norman Naimark on Stalin's Cold War and Soviet policies towards Austria during those years. Review essays and book reviews on art theft, anti-Semitism, the Hungarian crisis of 1956, among other topics, complete the volume.

When the Hapsburg monarchy disintegrated after World War I, Austria was not considered to be a viable entity. In a vacuum of national identity the hapless country drifted toward a larger Germany. After World War II, Austrian elites constructed a new identity based on being a "victim" of Nazi Germany. Cold war Austria, however, envisioned herself as a neutral "island of the blessed" between and separate from both superpower blocs. Now, with her membership in the European Union secured, Austria is reconstructing her painful historical memory and national identity. In 1996 she celebrates her 1000-year anniversary.In this volume of Contemporary Austrian Studies, Franz Mathis and Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig argue that regional identities in Austria have deeper historical roots than the many artificial and ineffective attempts to construct a national identity. Heidemarie Uhl, Anton Pelinka, and Brigitte Bailer discuss the post-World War II construction of the victim mythology. Robert Herzstein analyses the crucial impact of the 1986 Waldheim election imploding Austria's comforting historical memory as a "nation of victims." Wolfram Kaiser shows Austria's difficult adjustments to the European Union and the larger challenges of constructing a new "European identity." Chad Berry's analysis of American World War II memory establishes a useful counterpoint to construction of historical memory in a different national context.A special forum on Austrian intelligence studies presents a fascinating reconstruction by Timothy Naftali of the investigation by Anglo-American counterintelligence into the retreat of Hitler's troops into the Alps during World War II. Rudiger Overmans' "research note" presents statistics on lower death rates of Austrian soldiers in the German army. Review essays by Gunther Kronenbitter and Gunter Bischof, book reviews, and a 1995 survey of Austrian politics round out the volume. Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity will be of intense interest to foreign policy analysts, historians, and scholars concerned with the unique elements of identity and nationality in Central European politics.

Corporatism was unpopular in the Europe of the past decade. During a time of neo-conservative resurgence in both the United States and the United Kingdom, macroeconomic steering and statist centralism and regulation were in disfavor. However, Austria's unique Sozialpartnerschaft, its famed system of tripartite informal and formal labor, business, and state cooperation, continued to prosper in spite of such powerful Anglo-American trends. Austro-Corporatism is the fourth volume in the interdisciplinary Contemporary Austrian Studies series. This effort in particular reflects the uniqueness of Austrian corporatism, and looks at its deep historical roots from a comparative continental European perspective.The contributors include specialists on Austria from all parts of the world, making this a truly international effort. Andrei Markovits provides the larger European context for this analysis of Austrian corporatism. Emmerich Talos and Bernhard Kittel review the historical development of Austrian corporatism, going back to its nineteenth-century roots. Randall Kindley studies the institutional framework of Austrian corporatism, particularly its post-World War II reincarnation. Hans Seidel looks at the subject from a neo-Keynesian economic perspective, and Ferdinand Karlhofer at the chances of its survival in a changing international environment.Jonathan Petropoulos presents a fascinating biographical study of Nazi art plunderer Kajetan Muhlmann, and David McIntosh compares Eisenhower's policy vis-a-vis the small friendly countries of Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Austria. A special forum looks at the model character and appeal of tripartite Austrian cooperation among its new eastern democratic neighbors: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. A number of reviews of Austrian politics in 1994 complete the volume. Austro-Corporatism will be of intense interest to foreign policy analysts, historians, and scholars concerned with the unique elements in Central European politics.

After Stalin's death, during a respite in Cold War tensions in 1955, Austria managed to rid itself of a quadripartite occupation regime and become a neutral state. As the Cold War continued, Austria's policy of neutrality helped make this small country into an important mediator of East-West differences, and neutrality became a crucial part of Austria's postwar identity. In the post-Cold War era Austrian neutrality seems to demand redefinition. The work addresses such issues as what neutrality means when Austria's neighbors are joining NATO? What is the difference between Austrian neutrality in 1955 and 2000? In remaining apart from NATO, do Austrian elites risk their nation's national security? Is Austria a "free rider," too stingy to contribute to Western defense? Has the neutralist mentalit become such a crucial part of Austrian postwar identity that its abandonment will threaten civil society? These questions are addressed in this latest in the prestigious Contemporary Austrian Studies series.The volume emerged from the Wittgenstein Research Center project on "Discourse, Politics, and Identity," an interdisciplinary investigation of the meaning of Austrian neutrality. The first two chapters analyze the current meaning of Austrian neutrality. Karin Liebhart records narrative interviews with former presidents Rudolf Kirchschlger and Kurt Waldheim, both central political actors present at the creation and implementation of Austria's postwar neutrality. Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak provide in-depth analysis of a debate on Austrian National Television on "NATO and Neutrality," a microcosm of Austrian popular opinion that exposed all positions and ideological preferences on neutrality. The historian Oliver Rathkolb surveys international perceptions of Austrian neutrality over the past half-century. For comparative contrast David Irwin and John Wilson apply Foucault's theoretical framework to the history and debates on neutrality in Ireland. Political scientists Heinz Grtner and Paul Luif provide examples of how Austrian neutrality has been handled in the past and today. Michael Gehler analyzes Austria's response to the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and Klaus Eisterer reviews the Austrian legation's handling of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Gnter Bischof is professor of history and executive director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans. Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna. Ruth Wodak is professor in the linguistics department at the University of Vienna and director of the research center "Discourse, Politics, Identity" at the Austrian Academy of Science.

The Russian Revolution excited men, and captured their imaginations. It seemed to herald the fulfillment of the nineteenth-century socialist movement. Socialists believed that with the proper use of technocracy they could scourge poverty and hunger from the earth. They felt that a social system based on equality and social justice could overcome the traditional division of each society into rich and poor. They were convinced that they could overcome social problems that, seething and bubbling beneath the surface, threatened to be as destructive as wars fought between great powers.These were the ideals and objectives of both 1917 revolutions. They were exciting and contagious. The Russians were seen by many as being on the threshold of a new and great experiment, one which would lead the world to peace, democracy, and security-the dream of ages. Support grew quickly. A worldwide movement committed to the extension of the ideological and moral principles of the Revolution and to the defense of the Soviet Union grew and became a significant factor in world politics. It did not turn out that way.Much of the story of this tragedy is to be found in labor struggles-the split between the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the workers. The labor movement, which had been pushing for a democratic alternative, turned against the Bolsheviks soon after 1917, and labor opposition left the Bolsheviks at the crossroads of history. The Bolsheviks had to choose between dictatorship or democracy. Under Lenin's guidance they opted for minority dictator ship, the outcome of which was tyranny over the very people in whose name they fought. This classic volume, originally published in 1969, has not been surpassed as a description of how and why this occurred.

Perhaps no country benefitted more from the Marshall Plan for assistance in reconstruction of Europe after World War II than Austria. On a per capita basis, each American taxpayer invested $80 per person in the Plan; each Austrian received $133 from the European recovery program, more than any other of the sixteen participating countries. Without the Marshall Plan, the Austrian economic miracle of the 1950s would have been unthinkable. Despite this, contemporary Austria seems to have forgotten this essential American contribution to its postwar reconstruction. This volume in the Contemporary Austrian Studies series examines how the plan affected Austria, and how it is perceived today.The political context of the Marshall Plan in Austria is addressed in essays by Jill Lewis and Matthew Berg. Dieter Stiefer describes the vast Soviet economic exploitation of their Austrian occupation zone. Andrea Komlosy shows how the Marshall Plan helped complete the division of Europe. Siegfried Beer suggests the secret involvement of the CIA in the Marshall Plan, while Hans J³rgen Schr÷der analyzes the effectiveness of Marshall Plan propaganda programs in Germany and Austria.The macroeconomic impact of Marshall Plan funds on Austrian economic policy is outlined by Hans Seidel. Kurt Tweraser, Georg Rigele and G³nter Bischof suggest the microeconomic importance of funds for the steel, electricity and tourist sectors of the Austrian economy. Wilhelm Kohler's sweeping analysis compares the American transfer of funds to postwar Europe with current debates about the cost of European Union enlargement. The legacy of the Marshall Plan is addressed by former Austrian Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina. Kurt Loffler and Hans Fubenegger summarize the activities of the Economic Recovery Program Fund. Coming on the heels of the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, this compelling overview of the Plan and its impact will be important for historians, those interested in international politics, and Austrian scholars.G³nter Bischof is professor of history and associate director of Center-Austria at the University of New Orleans; Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna; Dieter Stiefel is professor of social and economic history at the University of Vienna and executive secretary of the Schumpeter Society in Vienna.This volume offers a collection of articles, mostly by contemporary Austrian-born historians, touching on various phases of the Marshall Plan administered through the European Recovery Program (ERP) and its successors counterfunds' assistance to the present. A splendid introduction followed by the key thirteen articles on the plan is augmented by several nontopical essays and book reviews, along with a survey of Austrian politics in 1998. A number of articles emanated from a 1998 conference at the University of New Orleans. Both novice and specialist will appreciate this book."-The Historian

Franz Vranitzky, the banker turned politician, was chancellor during the ten years (1986-96) when the world dramatically changed in the aftermath of the cold war. Among postwar chancellors, only Bruno Kreisky held office longer. The Austrian Social Democratic Party has been in power since 1970. Such longevity is unique in postwar European politics. The dominance of Social Democracy in particular is noteworthy when compared to the general decline of traditional leftist politics in Europe. The chapters in this volume try to assess Vranitzky's central role in recent Austrian and European history.Richard Luther presents the general European political context in which Vranitzky operated. Eva Nowotny, Vranitzky's former principal foreign policy adviser and Austria's current ambassador to the United Kingdom, analyzes his struggle over joining the European Union as well as Austria's security dilemmas following the cold war. Fritz Plasser looks at the changing electoral behavior of Austrians and the ascendancy of new parties. Irene Etzerdorfer concentrates on the long hegemony of Austrian Social Democratic leadership by comparing Vranitzky's and Kreisky's leadership styles. Other contributors include Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, Brigitte Unger, Peter Rosner, Alexander van der Bellen, and George Winkler.A forum on postwar Austrian memory of World War II from a comparative perspective, which continues the theme of previous volumes in this series, is also included. Jonathan Petropoulos demonstrates how Swiss middlemen were in the center of dealing with stolen Nazi art during and after the war, while Olive Rathkolb describes the shameful legacy of the Austrian government's procrastination in resolving the issue of Jewish "heirless art." Peter Utgaard shows how in Austria's postwar high school textbooks the American bombing of Hiroshima often figured more prominently than the Holocaust. Review essays and book reviews complete the volume. The Vranitzky Era in Austria is a compelling work for political scientists, historians, and Austria studies scholars.Gnter Bischof is associate director of Center Austria and associate professor of history at the University of New Orleans, and former visiting professor at the University of Salzburg. Anton Pelinka is director of the Austrian Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna, professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck, and former visiting professor at Stanford University.Ferdinand Karlhofer is associate professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and former visiting professor at the University of New Orleans.

The position of women in Austrian society, politics, and in the economy follows the familiar trajectory of Western societies. They were expected to accept their "proper place" in a male patriarchal world. Achieving equality in all spheres of life was a long struggle that is still not completed in spite of many advances. The chapters in Women in Austria attest to the growing interest and vibrancy in the area of women's studies in Austria and present a cross-section of new research in this field to an international audience. The volume includes with book reviews on Austrian business history, the Waldheim memoirs, Jews in postwar Austria, and political scandals in twentieth-century Austria. Women in Austria covers a plethora of significant social issues and will be essential to the work of women's studies scholars, sociologists, historians, and Austrian area specialists.

In 2005, Austria celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its liberation from the Nazi regime and the fiftieth anniversary of the State Treaty that ended the occupation and returned full sovereignty to the country. This volume of Contemporary Austrian Studies covers foreign policy in the twentieth century. It offers an up-to-date status report of Austria's foreign policy trajectories and diplomatic options.Eva Nowotny, the current Austrian ambassador to the United States, introduces the volume with an analysis of the art and practice of Austrian diplomacy in historical perspective. Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch analyzes recent Balkans diplomacy as an EU emissary in the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Historians Günther Kronenbitter, Alexander Lassner, Günter Bischof, Joanna Granville, and Martin Kofler provide historical case studies of pre-and post-World War I and World War II Austrian diplomacy, Austria's dealings with the Hungarian crisis of 1956, and its mediation between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the early 1960s. Political scientists Romain Kirt, Stefan Mayer, and Gunther Hauser analyze small states' foreign policymaking in a globalizing world, Austrian federal states' separate regional policy initiatives abroad and Austria's role vis-à-vis current European security initiatives. Michael Gehler periodizes post-World War II Austrian foreign policy regimes and provides a valuable summary of both the available archival and printed diplomatic source collections. A "Historiography Roundtable" is dedicated to the Austrian Occupation decade. Günter Bischof reports on the state of occupation historiography; Oliver Rathkolb on the historical memory of the occupation; Michael Gehler on the context of the German question; and Wolfgang Mueller and Norman Naimark on Stalin's Cold War and Soviet policies towards Austria during those years. Review essays and book reviews on art theft, anti-Semitism, the Hungarian crisis of 1956, among other topics, complete the volume.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

Contributors discuss demographic, economic, and cultural trends in Austria in the post-war era, and issues involved in the study of contemporary history. Topical and nontopical essays and book reviews address foreign relations, Austrian industry, youth culture, and the Marshall Plan. Six of the 17 e

Corporatism was unpopular in the Europe of the past decade. During a time of neo-conservative resurgence in both the United States and the United Kingdom, macroeconomic steering and statist centralism and regulation were in disfavor. However, Austria's unique Sozialpartnerschaft, its famed system of tripartite informal and formal labor, business, and state cooperation, continued to prosper in spite of such powerful Anglo-American trends. Austro-Corporatism is the fourth volume in the interdisciplinary Contemporary Austrian Studies series. This effort in particular reflects the uniqueness of Austrian corporatism, and looks at its deep historical roots from a comparative continental European perspective.The contributors include specialists on Austria from all parts of the world, making this a truly international effort. Andrei Markovits provides the larger European context for this analysis of Austrian corporatism. Emmerich Talos and Bernhard Kittel review the historical development of Austrian corporatism, going back to its nineteenth-century roots. Randall Kindley studies the institutional framework of Austrian corporatism, particularly its post-World War II reincarnation. Hans Seidel looks at the subject from a neo-Keynesian economic perspective, and Ferdinand Karlhofer at the chances of its survival in a changing international environment.Jonathan Petropoulos presents a fascinating biographical study of Nazi art plunderer Kajetan Muhlmann, and David McIntosh compares Eisenhower's policy vis-a-vis the small friendly countries of Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Austria. A special forum looks at the model character and appeal of tripartite Austrian cooperation among its new eastern democratic neighbors: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. A number of reviews of Austrian politics in 1994 complete the volume. Austro-Corporatism will be of intense interest to foreign policy analysts, historians, and scholars concerned with the unique elements in Central European politics.

When the Hapsburg monarchy disintegrated after World War I, Austria was not considered to be a viable entity. In a vacuum of national identity the hapless country drifted toward a larger Germany. After World War II, Austrian elites constructed a new identity based on being a "victim" of Nazi Germany. Cold war Austria, however, envisioned herself as a neutral "island of the blessed" between and separate from both superpower blocs. Now, with her membership in the European Union secured, Austria is reconstructing her painful historical memory and national identity. In 1996 she celebrates her 1000-year anniversary.In this volume of Contemporary Austrian Studies, Franz Mathis and Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig argue that regional identities in Austria have deeper historical roots than the many artificial and ineffective attempts to construct a national identity. Heidemarie Uhl, Anton Pelinka, and Brigitte Bailer discuss the post-World War II construction of the victim mythology. Robert Herzstein analyses the crucial impact of the 1986 Waldheim election imploding Austria's comforting historical memory as a "nation of victims." Wolfram Kaiser shows Austria's difficult adjustments to the European Union and the larger challenges of constructing a new "European identity." Chad Berry's analysis of American World War II memory establishes a useful counterpoint to construction of historical memory in a different national context.A special forum on Austrian intelligence studies presents a fascinating reconstruction by Timothy Naftali of the investigation by Anglo-American counterintelligence into the retreat of Hitler's troops into the Alps during World War II. Rudiger Overmans' "research note" presents statistics on lower death rates of Austrian soldiers in the German army. Review essays by Gunther Kronenbitter and Gunter Bischof, book reviews, and a 1995 survey of Austrian politics round out the volume. Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity will be of intense interest to foreign policy analysts, historians, and scholars concerned with the unique elements of identity and nationality in Central European politics.

Despite his significance, the role of Austrian politician Bruno Kreisky remains under-represented in Anglo-American Cold War scholarship. Serving as foreign minister from 1959 to 1966 and chancellor from 1970 to 1983, his political career oversaw seismic developments in both Austria’s postwar recovery and broader international relations with the Middle East, the Communist Bloc, and the United States. In this enlightening and geographically wide-ranging reappraisal of his life and legacy, Bruno Kreisky’s Foreign Policy: A Reassessment seeks to reinstate the global repercussions of Kreisky’s work. Ranging from his involvement in the Marshall Plan to his role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this volume highlights how Kreisky profoundly reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the modern era.

After Stalin's death, during a respite in Cold War tensions in 1955, Austria managed to rid itself of a quadripartite occupation regime and become a neutral state. As the Cold War continued, Austria's policy of neutrality helped make this small country into an important mediator of East-West differences, and neutrality became a crucial part of Austria's postwar identity. In the post-Cold War era Austrian neutrality seems to demand redefinition. The work addresses such issues as what neutrality means when Austria's neighbors are joining NATO? What is the difference between Austrian neutrality in 1955 and 2000? In remaining apart from NATO, do Austrian elites risk their nation's national security? Is Austria a "free rider," too stingy to contribute to Western defense? Has the neutralist mentalit become such a crucial part of Austrian postwar identity that its abandonment will threaten civil society? These questions are addressed in this latest in the prestigious Contemporary Austrian Studies series.The volume emerged from the Wittgenstein Research Center project on "Discourse, Politics, and Identity," an interdisciplinary investigation of the meaning of Austrian neutrality. The first two chapters analyze the current meaning of Austrian neutrality. Karin Liebhart records narrative interviews with former presidents Rudolf Kirchschlger and Kurt Waldheim, both central political actors present at the creation and implementation of Austria's postwar neutrality. Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak provide in-depth analysis of a debate on Austrian National Television on "NATO and Neutrality," a microcosm of Austrian popular opinion that exposed all positions and ideological preferences on neutrality. The historian Oliver Rathkolb surveys international perceptions of Austrian neutrality over the past half-century. For comparative contrast David Irwin and John Wilson apply Foucault's theoretical framework to the history and debates on neutrality in Ireland. Political scientists Heinz Grtner and Paul Luif provide examples of how Austrian neutrality has been handled in the past and today. Michael Gehler analyzes Austria's response to the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and Klaus Eisterer reviews the Austrian legation's handling of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Gnter Bischof is professor of history and executive director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans. Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna. Ruth Wodak is professor in the linguistics department at the University of Vienna and director of the research center "Discourse, Politics, Identity" at the Austrian Academy of Science.