Hugh Nicholson – författare

In The Spirit of Contradiction in Christianity and Buddhism, Hugh Nicholson examines the role of social identity processes in the development of two religious concepts: the Christian doctrine of Consubstantiality and the Buddhist doctrine of No-self. Consubstantiality, the claim that the Son is of the same substance as the Father, forms the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity, while No-self, the claim that the personality is reducible to its impersonal physical and psychological constituents, is a defining tenet of Theravada Buddhism. Both doctrines are massively counterintuitive in that they violate our basic assumptions and understandings about the world. While cognitive approaches to the study of religion have explained why these doctrines have difficulty taking root in popular religious thought, they are largely silent on the question of why these concepts have developed in the first place. Nicholson aims to fill this gap by examining the historical development of these two concepts. Nicholson argues that both of these doctrines were the products of hegemonic struggles in which one faction tried to get the upper hand over the other by maximizing the contrast with the dominant subgroup. Thus the "pro-Nicene" theologians of the fourth century developed the concept of Consubstantiality in an effort to maximize, against their "Arian" rivals, the contrast with Christianity's archetypal "other," Judaism. Similarly, the No-self doctrine stemmed from an effort to maximize, against the so-called Personalist schools of Buddhism, the contrast with Brahmanical Hinduism, symbolized by its doctrine of the deathless self. In this way, Nicholson demonstrates how, to the extent that religious traditions are driven by social identity processes, they back themselves into doctrinal positions that they must then retrospectively justify.

In theological discourse, argues Hugh Nicholson, the political goes "all the way down." One never reaches a bedrock level of politically neutral religious facts, because all theological discourse - even the most sublime, edifying, and "spiritual"--is shot through with polemical elements. Liberal theologies, from the Christian fulfillment theology of the nineteenth century to the pluralist theology of the twentieth, have assumed that religious writings attain spiritual truth and sublimity despite any polemical elements they might contain. Through his analysis and comparison of the Christian mystical theologian Meister Eckhart and his Hindu counterpart ÍaSkara, Nicholson arrives at a very different conclusion. Polemical elements may in fact constitute the creative source of the expressive power of religious discourses. Wayne Proudfoot has argued that mystical discourses embody a set of rules that repel any determinate understanding of the ineffable object or experience they purport to describe. In Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry, Nicholson suggests that this principle of negation is connected, perhaps through a process of abstraction and sublimation, with the need to distinguish oneself from one's intra- and/or inter-religious adversaries.Nicholson proposes a new model of comparative theology that recognizes and confronts one of the most urgent cultural and political issues of our time: namely, the "return of the political" in the form of anti-secular and fundamentalist movements around the world. This model acknowledges the ineradicable nature of an oppositional dimension of religious discourse, while honoring and even advancing the liberal project of curtailing intolerance and prejudice in the sphere of religion.

This book examines the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and scientific psychology by focusing on the doctrine of No-self. The hypothesis is that No-self can function as an instrument of counter-induction, that is, an alternative conceptual scheme that exposes by contrast the intuitive or "folk" theoretical presuppositions sedimented in our perception of ourselves and others. When incorporated into regimens of meditative and ritual practice, the No-self doctrine works to challenge and disrupt our naïve folk psychology. The author argues that there is a fruitful parallel between the No-self doctrine and anti-Cartesian trends in the cognitive sciences. The No-self doctrine was the product of philosophical speculation undertaken in the context of hegemonic struggles with both Buddhist and non-Buddhist rivals, and the classic No-self doctrine, accordingly, is a somewhat schematic and largely accidental anticipation of the current scientific understanding of the mind and consciousness. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it challenges and unsettles the seemingly self-evident certitudes of folk psychology, it prepares the ground for the revolution in our self-conception promised by the emerging cognitive scientific concept of mind. A novel contribution to the study of Buddhist Philosophy, the book will also be of interest to scholars of Buddhist Studies and Asian Religions.