John H. Wood – författare

This book examines the controlling influences that drive macroeconomic policies in the United States. It addresses the history of the interests, ideas, and practices of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States.

Central banks in Great Britain and the United States arose early in the financial revolution. The Bank of England was created in 1694 while the first Banks of the United States appeared in 1791-1811 and 1816-36, and were followed by the Independent Treasury, 1846-1914. These institutions, together with the Suffolk Bank and the New York Clearing House, exercised important central banking function before the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. In this 2005 book, significant monetary changes in the lives of these British and American institutions are examined within a framework that deals with the knowledge and behavior of central bankers and their interactions with economists and politicians. Central bankers' behavior has shown considerable continuity in the influence of incentives and their interest in the stability of the financial markets.

Central banks in Great Britain and the United States arose early in the financial revolution. The Bank of England was created in 1694 while the first Banks of the United States appeared in 1791-1811 and 1816-36, and were followed by the Independent Treasury, 1846-1914. These institutions, together with the Suffolk Bank and the New York Clearing House, exercised important central banking function before the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. In this 2005 book, significant monetary changes in the lives of these British and American institutions are examined within a framework that deals with the knowledge and behavior of central bankers and their interactions with economists and politicians. Central bankers' behavior has shown considerable continuity in the influence of incentives and their interest in the stability of the financial markets.

One of the major financial market events of the 1980s was the precipitous rise of depository institution failures including banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Not since the 1930s has there been a similar period of turmoil in these industries. The events of the 1980s have inspired a renewed interest in the causes and cost of financial institution failure and several questions that had seldom been asked in the post-World War II economics literature have resurfaced Why do financial institutions fail? What are the costs of their failure? How do they differ from other firms and industries? What are the implications for financial market regulation? The Causes and Costs of Depository Institution Failures critically surveys and extends previous analyses of these questions. Audience: Scholars and researchers in the areas of money and banking, financial institutions, and financial markets, as well as regulators and policymakers.

This book examines the controlling influences that drive macroeconomic policies in the United States. It addresses the history of the interests, ideas, and practices of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States.

This book examines the controlling influences that drive macroeconomic policies in the United States. It addresses the history of the interests, ideas, and practices of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States.

Keynes asked whether his ‘visionary’ ideas would overcome the interests opposed to change. However, an examination of the histories of monetary and fiscal policies suggests that this is a false distinction. The interests and ideas associated with government policies are seldom opposed. The suspicion that the latter more often follows than confronts the former is supported by the experiences documented in this book.Professor Wood’s new title examines the controlling influences that drive macroeconomic policies in the United States. The book addresses the history of the interests, ideas, and practices of monetary and fiscal policies in the U.S., although it also examines macro-policies in other countries, particularly the UK. Professor Wood argues that economic policies in the United States have been relatively predictable and stable historically, through a detailed examination of conflicts over taxes and monetary policy such as the whiskey rebellion, Magna Carta, the Stamp Act, the Banks of the U.S., and the Federal Reserve. Issues covered also include property, economists’ theories of stabilization, taxes, deficits, and monetary policy.

It is widely believed that central banks have grown (the Bank of England) or were established (the Federal Reserve) to pursue the twin objectives of monetary and price stability. But why should they? Central bankers are people, too, whose behavior is presumably determined, like the rest of us, by their incentives and the information available to them. The author explores this question.Two sets of data confirm the reservations. Central banks have often worsened, even initiated, monetary instabilities by bailing out the risk-takers and their effects on prices, which depending on the quantities of money created by central banks, have often been catastrophic. The evidence suggests that central bankers have really been in business to support the politically powerful upon whose favors they depend, particularly high-spending governments and needy financial institutions. The book consists of several examples of this behavior and its consistency during wars and financial crises in the UK and US over the course of the last two centuries.Professors and students of finance will find A Comparative History of Central Bank Behavior to be a compelling and thoughtful exploration of how central banks have historically responded to and influenced financial markets.

It is widely believed that central banks have grown (the Bank of England) or were established (the Federal Reserve) to pursue the twin objectives of monetary and price stability. But why should they? Central bankers are people, too, whose behavior is presumably determined, like the rest of us, by their incentives and the information available to them. The author explores this question.

Two sets of data confirm the reservations. Central banks have often worsened, even initiated, monetary instabilities by bailing out the risk-takers and their effects on prices, which depending on the quantities of money created by central banks, have often been catastrophic. The evidence suggests that central bankers have really been in business to support the politically powerful upon whose favors they depend, particularly high-spending governments and needy financial institutions. The book consists of several examples of this behavior and its consistency during wars and financial crises in the UK and US over the course of the last two centuries.

Professors and students of finance will find A Comparative History of Central Bank Behavior to be a compelling and thoughtful exploration of how central banks have historically responded to and influenced financial markets.

When we start to perceive that there is a problem in the market (such as monopoly, fraud or speculation), the legislature passes a law to correct it, a bureaucracy is created to interpret and enforce the new law, firms and other market participants comply, and the problem is solved. But is it?  Are politicians’ promises and textbooks’ stories to be believed?  This book examines US economic history to demonstrate how the applications of laws are uncertain, affected by changing political and economic conditions as well as by legislators’ perceptions and the ability or willingness of bureaucracies to enforce laws. The two cases developed in this book revolve around William McChesney Martin, Jr., who helped apply (i) the 1930s Securities Acts as president of the New York Stock Exchange and (ii) the Federal Reserve Act in the Keynesian era unforeseen by that Act. As chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Martin served as private regulator of firms listed on the Exchange—itself a publicly regulated entity. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, he then served as a public regulator. This book thus offers an innovative approach to understanding and examining the various issues and incentives facing each of the three parties: regulated, private regulator, and public regulator.

When we start to perceive that there is a problem in the market (such as monopoly, fraud or speculation), the legislature passes a law to correct it, a bureaucracy is created to interpret and enforce the new law, firms and other market participants comply, and the problem is solved. But is it?  Are politicians’ promises and textbooks’ stories to be believed? 

This book examines US economic history to demonstrate how the applications of laws are uncertain, affected by changing political and economic conditions as well as by legislators’ perceptions and the ability or willingness of bureaucracies to enforce laws. The two cases developed in this book revolve around William McChesney Martin, Jr., who helped apply (i) the 1930s Securities Acts as president of the New York Stock Exchange and (ii) the Federal Reserve Act in the Keynesian era unforeseen by that Act. As chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Martin served as private regulator of firms listed on the Exchange—itself a publicly regulated entity. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, he then served as a public regulator. This book thus offers an innovative approach to understanding and examining the various issues and incentives facing each of the three parties: regulated, private regulator, and public regulator.

When we start to perceive that there is a problem in the market (such as monopoly, fraud or speculation), the legislature passes a law to correct it, a bureaucracy is created to interpret and enforce the new law, firms and other market participants comply, and the problem is solved. But is it?  Are politicians’ promises and textbooks’ stories to be believed?  This book examines US economic history to demonstrate how the applications of laws are uncertain, affected by changing political and economic conditions as well as by legislators’ perceptions and the ability or willingness of bureaucracies to enforce laws. The two cases developed in this book revolve around William McChesney Martin, Jr., who helped apply (i) the 1930s Securities Acts as president of the New York Stock Exchange and (ii) the Federal Reserve Act in the Keynesian era unforeseen by that Act. As chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Martin served as private regulator of firms listed on the Exchange—itself a publicly regulated entity. As chairman of the Federal Reserve, he then served as a public regulator. This book thus offers an innovative approach to understanding and examining the various issues and incentives facing each of the three parties: regulated, private regulator, and public regulator.

One of the major financial market events of the 1980s was the precipitous rise of depository institution failures including banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Not since the 1930s has there been a similar period of turmoil in these industries. The events of the 1980s have inspired a renewed interest in the causes and cost of financial institution failure and several questions that had seldom been asked in the post-World War II economics literature have resurfaced Why do financial institutions fail? What are the costs of their failure? How do they differ from other firms and industries? What are the implications for financial market regulation? The Causes and Costs of Depository Institution Failures critically surveys and extends previous analyses of these questions. Audience: Scholars and researchers in the areas of money and banking, financial institutions, and financial markets, as well as regulators and policymakers.