Michael D. Bordo – författare

Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources, thereby raising productivity. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and ’80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations, and which propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. In the decades since, the immediate cause of the period’s rise in inflation has been the subject of considerable debate. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Here, contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on the ways in which the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today’s global and increasingly complex economic environment.

Drawing on a trove of previously confidential data, Strained Relations reveals the evolution of US policy regarding currency market intervention, and its interaction with monetary policy. The authors consider how foreign-exchange intervention was affected by changing economic and institutional circumstances - most notably the abandonment of the international gold standard - and how political and bureaucratic factors affected this aspect of public policy.

During the twentieth century, foreign-exchange intervention was sometimes used in an attempt to solve the fundamental trilemma of international finance, which holds that countries cannot simultaneously pursue independent monetary policies, stabilize their exchange rates, and benefit from free cross-border financial flows. Drawing on a trove of previously confidential data, Strained Relations reveals the evolution of US policy regarding currency market intervention, and its interaction with monetary policy. The authors consider how foreign-exchange intervention was affected by changing economic and institutional circumstances—most notably the abandonment of the international gold standard—and how political and bureaucratic factors affected this aspect of public policy.

As awareness of the process of globalization grows and the study of its effects becomes increasingly important to governments and businesses (as well as to a sizable opposition), the need for historical understanding also increases. Despite the importance of the topic, few attempts have been made to present a long-term economic analysis of the phenomenon, one that frames the issue by examining its place in the long history of international integration. This volume collects eleven papers doing exactly that and more. The first group of essays explores how the process of globalization can be measured in terms of the long-term integration of different markets-from the markets for goods and commodities to those for labor and capital, and from the sixteenth century to the present. The second set of contributions places this knowledge in a wider context, examining some of the trends and questions that have emerged as markets converge and diverge: the roles of technology and geography are both considered, along with the controversial issues of globalization''s effects on inequality and social justice and the roles of political institutions in responding to them. The final group of essays addresses the international financial systems that play such a large part in guiding the process of globalization, considering the influence of exchange rate regimes, financial development, financial crises, and the architecture of the international financial system itself. This volume reveals a much larger picture of the process of globalization, one that stretches from the establishment of a global economic system during the nineteenth century through the disruptions of two world wars and the Great Depression into the present day. The keen analysis, insight, and wisdom in this volume will have something to offer a wide range of readers interested in this important issue.

As awareness of globalization grows, so too does our need to understand it historically. This volume is one of the few to consider globalization in the context of the history of international trade. Its eleven papers explore a synthesized variety of topics, including how the process of globalization can be measured by the long-term integration of markets, what trends and questions develop as markets converge and diverge, what roles technology and geography play, the effect of globalization on inequality and social justice, and the roles of political institutions in responding to such injustices. Ultimately this work provides a panoramic view of globalization, one that will offer much to readers interested in this crucial issue.

This volume provides a critical evaluation of Anna J. Schwartz''s work and probes various facets of the immense contribution of her scholarship—How well has it stood the test of time? What critiques have been leveled against it? How has monetary research developed over the years, and how has her influence been manifested? Bordo has collected five conference papers presented by leading monetary scholars, discussants'' comments, and closing remarks by Milton Friedman and Karl Brunner. Each of these insightful surveys extends Schwartz''s work and makes its own contribution to the fields of monetary history, theory, and policy. The volume also contains a foreword by Martin Feldstein and a selected bibliography of publications by Anna Schwartz.

At the close of the Second World War, when industrialized nations faced serious trade and financial imbalances, delegates from forty-four countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in order to reconstruct the international monetary system. In this volume, three generations of scholars and policy makers, some of whom participated in the 1944 conference, consider how the Bretton Woods System contributed to unprecedented economic stability and rapid growth for 25 years and discuss the problems that plagued the system and led to its eventual collapse in 1971. The contributors explore adjustment, liquidity, and transmission under the System; the way it affected developing countries; and the role of the International Monetary Fund in maintaining a stable rate. The authors examine the reasons for the System''s success and eventual collapse, compare it to subsequent monetary regimes, such as the European Monetary System, and address the possibility of a new fixed exchange rate for today''s world.

In contemporary American political discourse, issues related to the scope, authority, and the cost of the federal government are perennially at the center of discussion. Any historical analysis of this topic points directly to the Great Depression, the "moment" to which most historians and economists connect the origins of the fiscal, monetary, and social policies that have characterized American government in the second half of the twentieth century. In the most comprehensive collection of essays available on these topics, The Defining Moment poses the question directly: to what extent, if any, was the Depression a watershed period in the history of the American economy? This volume organizes twelve scholars'' responses into four categories: fiscal and monetary policies, the economic expansion of government, the innovation and extension of social programs, and the changing international economy. The central focus across the chapters is the well-known alternations to national government during the 1930s. The Defining Moment attempts to evaluate the significance of the past half-century to the American economy, while not omitting reference to the 1930s. The essays consider whether New Deal-style legislation continues to operate today as originally envisioned, whether it altered government and the economy as substantially as did policies inaugurated during World War II, the 1950s, and the 1960s, and whether the legislation had important precedents before the Depression, specifically during World War I. Some chapters find that, surprisingly, in certain areas such as labor organization, the 1930s responses to the Depression contributed less to lasting change in the economy than a traditional view of the time would suggest. On the whole, however, these essays offer testimony to the Depression''s legacy as a "defining moment." The large role of today''s government and its methods of intervention—from the pursuit of a more active monetary policy to the maintenance and extension of a wide range of insurance for labor and business—derive from the crisis years of the 1930s.

This is a timely review of the gold standard covering the 110 years of its operation until 1931, when Britain abandoned it in the midst of the Depression. Current dissatisfaction with floating rates of exchange has spurred interest in a return to a commodity standard. The studies in this volume were designed to gain a better understanding of the historical gold standard, but they also throw light on the question of whether restoring it today could help cure inflation, high interest rates, and low productivity growth. The volume includes a review of the literature on the classical gold standard; studies the experience with gold in England, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Canada; and perspectives on international linkages and the stability of price-level trends under the gold standard. The articles and commentaries reflect strong, conflicting views among hte participants on issues of central bank behavior, purchasing-power an interest-rate parity, independent monetary policies, economic growth, the "Atlantic economy," and trends in commodity prices and long-term interest rates. This is a thoughtful and provocative book.

Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and '80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations and propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. Ever since, the immediate cause of the period's rise in inflation has been extensively debated. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on how the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today's global and increasingly complex economic environment.

Competition among central banks in a monetary union is thought to result in an over issue problem, which has its roots in the view that moneys produced by competitive central banks are perfect substitutes for each other. In the conventional set-up over issue can be overcome by granting a central bank exclusive rights to conduct monetary policy. In this book Mark Toma explores the workings of the early Federal Reserve System as a basis for challenging the conventional wisdom. He is able to show that competition among reserve banks in the 1920s did not result in an issue of Fed money. Rather the main effect of competitive structure was to cause reserve banks to make substantial interest payments to the private banking system in place of transfers to the US government. The book emphasizes the evolution of the Federal Reserve from a competitive to a monopolistic structure.

How did the Japanese achieve their unrivalled position in world banking? This book, first published in 1995, provides a full account in English of the banking industry in Japan for the century following the opening of the country to the outside world in 1859. Professor Tamaki begins by considering the period of experimentation during the Meiji Restoration which resulted in the adoption of the Gold Standard in 1891. He then offers a detailed examination of the highly profitable years up to the end of the First World War and of the subsequent crisis which was hastened by the earthquake that devastated Tokyo and Yokohama in 1923 and sealed by the financial collapse of 1927. New light is thrown on the extraordinary role played by the banking industry during the period of military expansionism which culminated with defeat in the Second World War. The book ends with an assessment of the post-war financial system which developed out of the Macarthur directives and the subsequent American 'democratisation' programme.

This book contains a collection of Michael D. Bordo's essays, written singly and with colleagues, on the classical gold standard and related regimes based directly or indirectly on gold convertibility. The gold standard (and its variants) was the basis for both international and domestic monetary arrangements from the third quarter of the nineteenth century until 1971 when President Nixon closed the US gold window, effectively ending the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. Although the gold standard and its variants are now history, it still has great appeal for policymakers and scholars. Several desirable features of the gold standard have resources for the ongoing issue of international monetary reform. They include its record as a stable nominal anchor; its automaticity; and its role as a credible commitment mechanism. The essays in this collection are organized around several themes: gold and the international monetary system; the commodity theory of money; the gold standard as a rule; variants of the gold standard including the interwar gold standard and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System.

This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.

This book contains a collection of essays comparing the evolution of the fiscal and monetary regimes of the Old World colonial powers - England, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands - from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries with the experiences of several of their former colonies in the New World of the Americas: the United States, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. The objective is to see how such fiscal and monetary institutions were modified or replaced by new ones. The case studies in the collection consider the experience of the colonies after they became independent countries; they examine the factors that allowed efficient fiscal institutions to develop in some countries, while in others such development turned out to be unsuccessful; and they consider why some governments were able to live within their means and provide public goods, while for others expenditures frequently exceeded revenue, often leading to fiscal crises.

This book, first published in 2000, presents a history of Western monetary systems and explains why bimetallism was preferred to a gold standard before 1800. Professor Redish argues that the technological ability to issue fiduciary monies, and a commitment mechanism to prevent opportunistic governments changing the ratio between the currency and a unit of gold, were (frequently overlooked) prerequisites for the emergence of the Classical gold standard. The simplicity of the gold standard, a monetary system where there is a fixed ratio between a weight of gold and a unit of currency, makes it an obvious focus for discussion of commodity money systems, and for contrasting with today's fiat money regimes.

Austria played a prominent role in the worldwide events of 1931 as the largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe, the Viennese Credit-Anstalt, collapsed and led Europe into a financial panic that spread to other parts of the world. The events in Austria were pivotal to the economic developments of the 1930s, yet the literature about them has been sparse. In this book, Schubert analyses the crisis using theories of financial crises, identifies the causes of the crisis, examines the market's efficiency in predicting events, analyses how the crisis was transmitted to the real sector, and studies the behaviour of the Austrian as well as international authorities as lenders of last resort. His main conclusion is that even decades after the crisis, many of its lessons are still valid. Managerial and regulatory deficiencies led to the collapse of the bank; the subsequent currency crisis was not an irrational and unexplainable panic by a confused public, but rather a rational response to inconsistencies in policy; and the reactions of the largely unprepared authorities - in Austria as well as abroad - did not help to resolve the crisis quickly.

This important contribution to comparative economic history examines different countries' experiences with different monetary regimes, laying particular emphasis on how the regimes fared when placed under stress such as wars or other changes in the economic environment. Covering the experience of ten countries over the period 1700-1990, the contributors employ the latest techniques of economic analysis in their studies. Several papers are concerned with the transformation from bimetallism to gold monometallism in the nineteenth century and the determinants of monetary regimes transformation in the core countries of Britain, France and the United States. Others focus on the successful and unsuccessful gold standard experiences of Canada, Australia, and Spain, while yet others examine the experience of wartime and postwar stabilizations surrounding the two World Wars and the Napoleonic War.

Central banks have emerged as the key players in national and international policy making. This book explores their evolution since World War II in 20 industrial countries. The study considers the mix of economic, political and institutional forces that have affected central bank behaviour and its relationship with government. The analysis reconciles vastly different views about the role of central banks in the making of economic policies. One finding is that monetary policy is an evolutionary process.

Austria played a prominent role in the worldwide events of 1931 as the largest bank in Central and Eastern Europe, the Viennese Credit-Anstalt, collapsed and led Europe into a financial panic that spread to other parts of the world. The events in Austria were pivotal to the economic developments of the 1930s, yet the literature about them has been sparse. In this book, Schubert analyses the crisis using theories of financial crises, identifies the causes of the crisis, examines the market's efficiency in predicting events, analyses how the crisis was transmitted to the real sector, and studies the behaviour of the Austrian as well as international authorities as lenders of last resort. His main conclusion is that even decades after the crisis, many of its lessons are still valid. Managerial and regulatory deficiencies led to the collapse of the bank; the subsequent currency crisis was not an irrational and unexplainable panic by a confused public, but rather a rational response to inconsistencies in policy; and the reactions of the largely unprepared authorities - in Austria as well as abroad - did not help to resolve the crisis quickly.

This important contribution to comparative economic history examines different countries' experiences with different monetary regimes, laying particular emphasis on how the regimes fared when placed under stress such as wars or other changes in the economic environment. Covering the experience of ten countries over the period 1700-1990, the contributors employ the latest techniques of economic analysis in their studies. Several papers are concerned with the transformation from bimetallism to gold monometallism in the nineteenth century and the determinants of monetary regimes transformation in the core countries of Britain, France and the United States. Others focus on the successful and unsuccessful gold standard experiences of Canada, Australia, and Spain, while yet others examine the experience of wartime and postwar stabilizations surrounding the two World Wars and the Napoleonic War.

This volume provides a new interpretation of the operation and macroeconomic repercussions of the international monetary system during the interwar years. Each of the eleven essays is explicitly concerned with the role of exchange rates in macroeconomic fluctuations from the American and European perspective. The final essay examines the interwar experience from a long-term perspective.

This work establishes the existence of a sophisticated and smoothly functioning system of financial markets in the mercantile states of northwestern Europe throughout the 1700s. Based on computer analysis of thousands of price quotes from the financial press of the eighteenth century, the results should force both historians and economists to re-evaluate their understanding of the evolution of financial markets and their importance for the economic developments of that era.

How did the Japanese achieve their unrivalled position in world banking? This book, first published in 1995, provides a full account in English of the banking industry in Japan for the century following the opening of the country to the outside world in 1859. Professor Tamaki begins by considering the period of experimentation during the Meiji Restoration which resulted in the adoption of the Gold Standard in 1891. He then offers a detailed examination of the highly profitable years up to the end of the First World War and of the subsequent crisis which was hastened by the earthquake that devastated Tokyo and Yokohama in 1923 and sealed by the financial collapse of 1927. New light is thrown on the extraordinary role played by the banking industry during the period of military expansionism which culminated with defeat in the Second World War. The book ends with an assessment of the post-war financial system which developed out of the Macarthur directives and the subsequent American 'democratisation' programme.

Today, most scholars agree that mismanaged monetary policy contributed to the length and severity of the Great Depression in the USA. There is little agreement, however, about the causes of the Federal Reserve's mistakes. This book examines the policy strategy developed by the Federal Reserve during the 1920s and considers whether its continued use could explain the Federal Reserve's failure to respond vigorously to the depression. It also studies the effects on policy of the institutional changes occurring prior to the depression. While these changes enhanced the authority of officials who opposed open-market purchases and also caused some upward bias in discount rates, Wheelock concludes that monetary policy during the depression was in fact largely a continuation of the previous policy. The apparent contrast in the institution's responsiveness to economic conditions between the 1920s and early 1930s resulted from the consistent use of a procyclical policy strategy that caused it to respond more vigorously to minor recessions than to severe depressions.

This book contains a collection of Michael D. Bordo's essays, written singly and with colleagues, on the classical gold standard and related regimes based directly or indirectly on gold convertibility. The gold standard (and its variants) was the basis for both international and domestic monetary arrangements from the third quarter of the nineteenth century until 1971 when President Nixon closed the US gold window, effectively ending the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. Although the gold standard and its variants are now history, it still has great appeal for policymakers and scholars. Several desirable features of the gold standard have resources for the ongoing issue of international monetary reform. They include its record as a stable nominal anchor; its automaticity; and its role as a credible commitment mechanism. The essays in this collection are organized around several themes: gold and the international monetary system; the commodity theory of money; the gold standard as a rule; variants of the gold standard including the interwar gold standard and the Bretton Woods International Monetary System.

This is the first full-length study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the Depression have approached the banking panics from a macroeconomic viewpoint; Professor Wicker fills a lacuna in current knowledge by reconstructing a close historical narrative of each of the panics, investigating their origins, magnitude, and effects. He makes a detailed analysis of the geographical incidence of the disturbances using the Federal Reserve District as the basic unit, and reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, for example the belief that the increase in the discount rate in October 1931 initiated a wave of bank suspensions and hoarding. This meticulous account will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial economists and macroeconomists.

This book, first published in 2000, presents a history of Western monetary systems and explains why bimetallism was preferred to a gold standard before 1800. Professor Redish argues that the technological ability to issue fiduciary monies, and a commitment mechanism to prevent opportunistic governments changing the ratio between the currency and a unit of gold, were (frequently overlooked) prerequisites for the emergence of the Classical gold standard. The simplicity of the gold standard, a monetary system where there is a fixed ratio between a weight of gold and a unit of currency, makes it an obvious focus for discussion of commodity money systems, and for contrasting with today's fiat money regimes.

Previous banking histories have focused on the money supply function of early American banks and its connection to the recurrent boom-bust cycle of the antebellum era. This history focuses on the credit generating function of American banks It demonstrates that banks aggressively promoted development rather than passively followed its course. Using previously unexploited data, Professor Bodenhorn shows that banks helped to advance the development of incipient industrialization. Additionally, he shows that banks formed long-distance relationships that promoted geographic capital mobility, thereby assuring that short-term capital was directed in socially desirable directions, that is, where it was most in demand. He then traces those institutional and legal developments that allowed for this capital mobility. The result was that America was served by an efficient system of financial intermediaries by the mid-nineteenth century.