Barry Eichengreen – författare

A 2,500-year history of international currencies that reveals new insights about the future of the U.S. dollar—as well as crypto and central bank digital currenciesDoubts about the international dominance of the dollar are only growing amid worries about tariffs, political dysfunction, and fraying international alliances. Will the dollar continue to reign supreme? In Money Beyond Borders, the leading authority on international currencies, Barry Eichengreen, puts the dollar’s prospects in deep historical perspective by chronicling the entire history of cross-border currencies, from the invention of coins in the seventh century BCE to the cryptocurrencies of today and the central bank digital currencies of tomorrow.Money Beyond Borders recounts how Greek and Roman coins became the first true international currencies. It tells how the Florentine gold florin became the “greenback of the Renaissance,” and how it was succeeded by Spanish silver and a Dutch fiat currency. The book explains why the British pound dominated the international economy in the nineteenth century, why the dollar rose to the top during World War II, and why the dollar has survived predictions of the imminent loss of its preeminence since the 1970s.The long history of international currencies shows that the same factors that encourage their widespread use eventually lead to their abandonment. Money Beyond Borders makes a powerful case that the dollar is now on the downside of this cycle, and it considers who the winners and losers will be when there is flight away from the greenback. Revealing important patterns in the life cycles of international currencies over the past 2,500 years, the book offers valuable lessons and insights about how currencies rise—and why they fall.

Populism, on both the right and the left, has spread like wildfire throughout Europe and the United States and is making inroads in other parts of the world. In simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies elites, minorities and foreigners while lionizing "the people." It reached its apogee in the U.S. with the election of Donald Trump but has been a force in Europe since the Great Recession and the refugee crisis. We now see the rise of leaders with populist tendencies everywhere from Brazil to Turkey.In The Populist Temptation, Barry Eichengreen places this global resurgence of populism in its historical context. Populists have always thrived, he observes, in times of poor economic performance. Populism feeds on rising inequality, which augments the ranks of those left behind and fans dissatisfaction with the economic status quo. It responds to rapid economic change that heightens insecurity. These economic developments, Eichengreen shows, give rise to populist reactions when they highlight the divergent interests of the people and the elite. Banking and financial crises are a case in point: the financiers who are the precipitating agents of such crises are card-carrying members of the elite, and are seen as profiting at the expense of the people.But populism is also a protest against the declining influence of the traditions, beliefs and community of once-dominant groups. It is a reaction against the challenge posed by immigrants and minorities to the people as a homogeneous, well-defined entity. Populists capitalizing on these feelings appeal to a glorious, mythologized past grounded in the collective traditions of that once-dominant majority. They invoke nationalism and criticize politicians who embrace diversity, open borders and equal rights. Populism has particular appeal, Eichengreen shows, when these identity politics and economic grievances come together.There is no magic solution to these concerns, but Eichengreen points to a starting place: strengthening welfare state policies that make for greater equality of opportunity and social cohesion. Comparing Europe with the United States, he shows that America's patchwork welfare state is less well equipped to deal with the fallout from globalization and technical change and the growing distance between social groups. This reality will be hard to change, since America's limited welfare state reflects the country's historically-rooted suspicion of big government. It is therefore in the United States, Eichengreen concludes, where the siren song of populism is most alluring--and dangerous.

The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe.Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.

In the last few years, populism -- of the right, left, and center varieties -- has spread like wildfire throughout the world. The impulse reached its apogee in the United States with the election of Trump, but it was a force in Europe ever since the Great Recession sent the European economy into a prolonged tailspin. In the simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies economic and political elites and instead lionizes 'the people.' The people, populists of all stripes contend, need to retake power from the unaccountable elites who have left them powerless. And typically, populists' distrust of elites shades into a catchall distrust of trained experts because of their perceived distance from and contempt for 'the people.' Another signature element of populist movements is faith in a savior who can not only speak directly to the people, but also serve as a vessel for the plain people's hopes and dreams. Going back to the 1890s, a series of such saviors have come and gone in the US alone, from William Jennings Bryan to Huey Long to -- finally -- Donald Trump.In The Populist Temptation, the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and 'bought' politicians are responsible for the mess, populists' own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control -- international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists -- populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to start: shoring up and improving the welfare state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America's patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump's victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.

Populism of the right and left has spread like wildfire throughout the world. The impulse reached its apogee in the United States with the election of Trump, but it was a force in Europe ever since the Great Recession sent the European economy into a prolonged tailspin. In the simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies economic and political elites and instead lionizes ''the people.'' The people, populists of all stripes contend, need to retake power from the unaccountable elites who have left them powerless. And typically, populists'' distrust of elites shades into a catchall distrust of trained experts because of their perceived distance from and contempt for ''the people.'' Another signature element of populist movements is faith in a savior who can not only speak directly to the people, but also serve as a vessel for the plain people''s hopes and dreams. Going back to the 1890s, a series of such saviors have come and gone in the US alone, from William Jennings Bryan to Huey Long to--finally--Donald Trump.In The Populist Temptation, the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and ''bought'' politicians are responsible for the mess, populists'' own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control--international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists--populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to start: shoring up and improving the welfare state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America''s patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump''s victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.

Populism of the right and left has spread like wildfire throughout the world. The impulse reached its apogee in the United States with the election of Trump, but it was a force in Europe ever since the Great Recession sent the European economy into a prolonged tailspin. In the simplest terms, populism is a political ideology that vilifies economic and political elites and instead lionizes ''the people.'' The people, populists of all stripes contend, need to retake power from the unaccountable elites who have left them powerless. And typically, populists'' distrust of elites shades into a catchall distrust of trained experts because of their perceived distance from and contempt for ''the people.'' Another signature element of populist movements is faith in a savior who can not only speak directly to the people, but also serve as a vessel for the plain people''s hopes and dreams. Going back to the 1890s, a series of such saviors have come and gone in the US alone, from William Jennings Bryan to Huey Long to--finally--Donald Trump.In The Populist Temptation, the eminent economic historian Barry Eichengreen focuses on the global resurgence of populism today and places it in a deep context. Alternating between the present and earlier populist waves from modern history, he argues that populists tend to thrive most in the wake of economic downturns, when it is easy to convince the masses of elite malfeasance. Yet while there is more than a grain of truth that bankers, financiers, and ''bought'' politicians are responsible for the mess, populists'' own solutions tend to be simplistic and economically counterproductive. Moreover, by arguing that the ordinary people are at the mercy of extra-national forces beyond their control--international capital, immigrants, cosmopolitan globalists--populists often degenerate into demagoguery and xenophobia. There is no one solution to addressing the concerns that populists raise, but Eichengreen argues that there is an obvious place to start: shoring up and improving the welfare state so that it is better able to act as a buffer for those who suffer most during economic slumps. For example, America''s patchwork welfare state was not well equipped to deal with the economic fallout that attended globalization and the decline of manufacturing in America, and that played no small part in Trump''s victory. Lucidly explaining both the appeals and dangers of populism across history, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand not just the populist phenomenon, but more generally the lasting political fallout that follows in the wake of major economic crises.

The rise of Asia, and China specifically, is the single most important force reshaping the world economy at the beginning of the 21st century. From a low of 20 per cent in 1950, Asia''s share of global GDP has now risen to 33 per cent and will exceed 40 per cent within a generation if current forecasts are realized. Asia''s growing weight in the world economy is elevating it to a central position in global economic and financial affairs. The potential global impact of this astonishing growth is far reaching, from oil markets and the environment to a reshaping of trade relations in the current multilateral system dominated by the WTO.This collection of original essays written by leading economists explores the likely impact of the rapid growth in the East Asian economies, and in particular China, on the world economy in the coming decades and the consequent challenges for the development of trade, macroeconomic, and environmental policy.

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world and now also two of the fastest growing. By sheer virtue of the fact that China and India are home to 2.4 billion people - two-fifths of the world''s population - the rapid growth of their economies has far-reaching implications not just for global living standards and poverty reduction but also for competitiveness and distribution of income in the rest of the world. Commensurate with their economicprogress, there has been a surge of interest in the nature and implications of China and India''s economic growth.There are several apparent similarities in the development process of China and India: both are home to ancient civilizations that have bequeathed distinctive attitudes, institutions, and traditions. Both have very large populations. Both have performed well economically for more than two decades. However there are important differences that can be seen beneath the surface. China started the current reform process in 1978 - that is, almost fifteen years before India. The two countries havevery different political systems. Their development models differ fundamentally as well. China has opened up much more than India to foreign trade and foreign direct investment, while India has a better developed banking system. Growth in the two countries has been driven by different sectors -Chinese growth by manufacturing and Indian growth by services.This volume brings together some of the best research on issues related to the growth experience of China and India and places these issues in a comparative perspective. It contains papers written by some of the leading academic and experts in the world on issues ranging from the roles of China and India in the world economy, contrasts in their development experience, and challenges to sustaining growth.

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world and now also two of the fastest growing. By sheer virtue of the fact that China and India are home to 2.4 billion people - two-fifths of the world''s population - the rapid growth of their economies has far-reaching implications not just for global living standards and poverty reduction but also for competitiveness and distribution of income in the rest of the world. Commensurate with their economicprogress, there has been a surge of interest in the nature and implications of China and India''s economic growth.There are several apparent similarities in the development process of China and India: both are home to ancient civilizations that have bequeathed distinctive attitudes, institutions, and traditions. Both have very large populations. Both have performed well economically for more than two decades. However there are important differences that can be seen beneath the surface. China started the current reform process in 1978 - that is, almost fifteen years before India. The two countries havevery different political systems. Their development models differ fundamentally as well. China has opened up much more than India to foreign trade and foreign direct investment, while India has a better developed banking system. Growth in the two countries has been driven by different sectors -Chinese growth by manufacturing and Indian growth by services.This volume brings together some of the best research on issues related to the growth experience of China and India and places these issues in a comparative perspective. It contains papers written by some of the leading academic and experts in the world on issues ranging from the roles of China and India in the world economy, contrasts in their development experience, and challenges to sustaining growth.

For more than half a century, the dollar has been not just America''s currency but the world''s. It is used globally by importers, exporters, investors, governments and central banks alike. This singular role of the dollar is a source of strength for the United States. It is, as a critic of U.S. policies once put it, America''s "exorbitant privilege." But now, with U.S. budget deficits extending as far as the eye can see, holding dollars is viewed as a losingproposition. Some say that the dollar may soon cease to be the world''s standard currency, which would depress U.S. living standards and weaken the country''s international influence.In Exorbitant Privilege, one of our foremost economists, Barry Eichengreen, traces the rise of the dollar to international prominence. He shows how the greenback dominated internationally in the second half of the 20th century for the same reasons that the United States dominated the global economy. But now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies, America no longer towers over the global economy. It follows, Eichengreen argues, that the dollar will not beas dominant. But this does not mean that coming changes need be sudden and dire DL or that the dollar is doomed to lose its international status. Challenging the presumption that there is room for only one true global currency, Eichengreen shows that several currencies have regularly shared this role. What wastrue in the distant past will be true, once again, in the not-too-distant future. The dollar will lose its international currency status, Eichengreen warns, only if the United States repeats the mistakes that led to the financial crisis and only if it fails to put its fiscal and financial house in order.Incisive, challenging and iconoclastic, Exorbitant Privilege, is a fascinating analysis of the changes that lie ahead. It is a challenge, equally, to those who warn that the dollar is doomed and to those who regard its continuing dominance as inevitable.

For more than half a century, the dollar has been not just America''s currency but the world''s. It is used globally by importers, exporters, investors, governments and central banks alike. This singular role of the dollar is a source of strength for the United States. It is, as a critic of U.S. policies once put it, America''s "exorbitant privilege." But now, with U.S. budget deficits extending as far as the eye can see, holding dollars is viewed as a losingproposition. Some say that the dollar may soon cease to be the world''s standard currency, which would depress U.S. living standards and weaken the country''s international influence.In Exorbitant Privilege, one of our foremost economists, Barry Eichengreen, traces the rise of the dollar to international prominence. He shows how the greenback dominated internationally in the second half of the 20th century for the same reasons that the United States dominated the global economy. But now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies, America no longer towers over the global economy. It follows, Eichengreen argues, that the dollar will not beas dominant. But this does not mean that coming changes need be sudden and dire DL or that the dollar is doomed to lose its international status. Challenging the presumption that there is room for only one true global currency, Eichengreen shows that several currencies have regularly shared this role. What wastrue in the distant past will be true, once again, in the not-too-distant future. The dollar will lose its international currency status, Eichengreen warns, only if the United States repeats the mistakes that led to the financial crisis and only if it fails to put its fiscal and financial house in order.Incisive, challenging and iconoclastic, Exorbitant Privilege, is a fascinating analysis of the changes that lie ahead. It is a challenge, equally, to those who warn that the dollar is doomed and to those who regard its continuing dominance as inevitable.

The rise of Asia, and China specifically, is the single most important force reshaping the world economy at the beginning of the 21st century. From a low of 20 per cent in 1950, Asia''s share of global GDP has now risen to 33 per cent and will exceed 40 per cent within a generation if current forecasts are realized. Asia''s growing weight in the world economy is elevating it to a central position in global economic and financial affairs. The potential global impact of this astonishing growth is far reaching, from oil markets and the environment to a reshaping of trade relations in the current multilateral system dominated by the WTO.This collection of original essays written by leading economists explores the likely impact of the rapid growth in the East Asian economies, and in particular China, on the world economy in the coming decades and the consequent challenges for the development of trade, macroeconomic, and environmental policy.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.Rising inequality and widespread poverty, social unrest and polarization, gender and ethnic disparities, declining social mobility, economic fragility, unbalanced growth due to technology and globalization, and existential danger from climate change are urgent global concerns of our day. These issues are intertwined. They therefore require a holistic framework to examine their interplay and bring the various strands together. Leading academic economists have partnered with experts from several international institutions to explain the sources and scale of these challenges. They gather a wide array of empirical evidence and country experiences to lay out practical policy solutions and to devise a comprehensive and unified plan of action for combatting these economic and social disparities. This authoritative book is accessible to policy makers, students, and the general public interested in how to craft a brighter future by building a sustainable, green, and inclusive society in the years ahead.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.Rising inequality and widespread poverty, social unrest and polarization, gender and ethnic disparities, declining social mobility, economic fragility, unbalanced growth due to technology and globalization, and existential danger from climate change are urgent global concerns of our day. These issues are intertwined. They therefore require a holistic framework to examine their interplay and bring the various strands together. Leading academic economists have partnered with experts from several international institutions to explain the sources and scale of these challenges. They gather a wide array of empirical evidence and country experiences to lay out practical policy solutions and to devise a comprehensive and unified plan of action for combatting these economic and social disparities. This authoritative book is accessible to policy makers, students, and the general public interested in how to craft a brighter future by building a sustainable, green, and inclusive society in the years ahead.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.Rising inequality and widespread poverty, social unrest and polarization, gender and ethnic disparities, declining social mobility, economic fragility, unbalanced growth due to technology and globalization, and existential danger from climate change are urgent global concerns of our day. These issues are intertwined. They therefore require a holistic framework to examine their interplay and bring the various strands together. Leading academic economists have partnered with experts from several international institutions to explain the sources and scale of these challenges. They gather a wide array of empirical evidence and country experiences to lay out practical policy solutions and to devise a comprehensive and unified plan of action for combatting these economic and social disparities. This authoritative book is accessible to policy makers, students, and the general public interested in how to craft a brighter future by building a sustainable, green, and inclusive society in the years ahead.

This reassessment of the international monetary crisis that led to the Great Depression also analyses the responses of the world economic powers to the Depression and examines how new monetary policies set the stage for Bretton Woods. It offers new theories of what effect the Great Depression and the collapse of the world monetary system had on one another. The events of this period of crisis have striking parallels with recent events, such as nations defaulting on their debts, a stock market crash, and an agricultural crisis.

This book is a reassessment of the international monetary crises of the post-World War I period that led to the Great Depression of the 1930s. It also analyses the responses of the world economic powers to the Depression and how new monetary policies set the stage for the watershed post-World War II system established at Bretton Woods. It offers new theories of what effect the Great Depression had on the collapse of the world monetary system, and what effect the collapse had on deepening and prolonging the Depression, by exploring the link between global economic crisis and the the gold standard (the framework for international monetary affairs until 1931). The events described had a profound effect upon twentieth-century history: the Depression abetted the rise of Hitler and the demise of the gold standard is a historical cause of inflation.

A dive into the origins, management, and uses and misuses of sovereign debt through the ages.Public debts have exploded to levels unprecedented in modern history as governments responded to the Covid-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis. Their dramatic rise has prompted apocalyptic warnings about the dangers of heavy debts—about the drag they will place on economic growth and the burden they represent for future generations. In Defense of Public Debt offers a sharp rejoinder to this view, marshaling the entire history of state-issued public debt to demonstrate its usefulness. Authors Barry Eichengreen, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener argue that the ability of governments to issue debt has played a critical role in addressing emergencies—from wars and pandemics to economic and financial crises, as well as in funding essential public goods and services such as transportation, education, and healthcare. In these ways, the capacity to issue debt has been integral to state building and state survival. Transactions in public debt securities have also contributed to the development of private financial markets and, through this channel, to modern economic growth.None of this is to deny that debt problems, debt crises, and debt defaults occur. But these dramatic events, which attract much attention, are not the entire story. In Defense of Public Debt redresses the balance. The authors develop their arguments historically, recounting two millennia of public debt experience. They deploy a comprehensive database to identify the factors behind rising public debts and the circumstances under which high debts are successfully stabilized and brought down. Finally, they bring the story up to date, describing the role of public debt in managing the Covid-19 pandemic and recession, suggesting a way forward once governments—now more heavily indebted than before—finally emerge from the crisis.

A dive into the origins, management, and uses and misuses of sovereign debt through the ages.Public debts have exploded to levels unprecedented in modern history as governments responded to the Covid-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis. Their dramatic rise has prompted apocalyptic warnings about the dangers of heavy debts?about the drag they will place on economic growth and the burden they represent for future generations. In Defense of Public Debt offers a sharp rejoinder to this view, marshaling the entire history of state-issued public debt to demonstrate its usefulness. Authors Barry Eichengreen, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener argue that the ability of governments to issue debt has played a critical role in addressing emergencies?from wars and pandemics to economic and financial crises, as well as in funding essential public goods and services such as transportation, education, and healthcare. In these ways, the capacity to issue debt has been integral to state building and state survival. Transactions in public debt securities have also contributed to the development of private financial markets and, through this channel, to modern economic growth.None of this is to deny that debt problems, debt crises, and debt defaults occur. But these dramatic events, which attract much attention, are not the entire story. In Defense of Public Debt redresses the balance. The authors develop their arguments historically, recounting two millennia of public debt experience. They deploy a comprehensive database to identify the factors behind rising public debts and the circumstances under which high debts are successfully stabilized and brought down. Finally, they bring the story up to date, describing the role of public debt in managing the Covid-19 pandemic and recession, suggesting a way forward once governments?now more heavily indebted than before?finally emerge from the crisis.

A dive into the origins, management, and uses and misuses of sovereign debt through the ages.Public debts have exploded to levels unprecedented in modern history as governments responded to the Covid-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis. Their dramatic rise has prompted apocalyptic warnings about the dangers of heavy debts?about the drag they will place on economic growth and the burden they represent for future generations. In Defense of Public Debt offers a sharp rejoinder to this view, marshaling the entire history of state-issued public debt to demonstrate its usefulness. Authors Barry Eichengreen, Asmaa El-Ganainy, Rui Esteves, and Kris James Mitchener argue that the ability of governments to issue debt has played a critical role in addressing emergencies?from wars and pandemics to economic and financial crises, as well as in funding essential public goods and services such as transportation, education, and healthcare. In these ways, the capacity to issue debt has been integral to state building and state survival. Transactions in public debt securities have also contributed to the development of private financial markets and, through this channel, to modern economic growth.None of this is to deny that debt problems, debt crises, and debt defaults occur. But these dramatic events, which attract much attention, are not the entire story. In Defense of Public Debt redresses the balance. The authors develop their arguments historically, recounting two millennia of public debt experience. They deploy a comprehensive database to identify the factors behind rising public debts and the circumstances under which high debts are successfully stabilized and brought down. Finally, they bring the story up to date, describing the role of public debt in managing the Covid-19 pandemic and recession, suggesting a way forward once governments?now more heavily indebted than before?finally emerge from the crisis.

The rise of Asia, and China specifically, is the single most important force reshaping the world economy at the beginning of the 21st century. From a low of 20 per cent in 1950, Asia's share of global GDP has now risen to 33 per cent and will exceed 40 per cent within a generation if current forecasts are realized. Asia's growing weight in the world economy is elevating it to a central position in global economic and financial affairs. The potential global impact of this astonishing growth is far reaching, from oil markets and the environment to a reshaping of trade relations in the current multilateral system dominated by the WTO.This collection of original essays written by leading economists explores the likely impact of the rapid growth in the East Asian economies, and in particular China, on the world economy in the coming decades and the consequent challenges for the development of trade, macroeconomic, and environmental policy.

In this accessible study, the author provides a critical assessment of the official sector's efforts to more effectively manage financial crises in emerging markets. Professor Eichengreen reviews international initiatives on both the crisis prevention and crisis resolution fronts. While crises will always be with us, he concludes that good progress has been made in limiting their spread and strengthening the international financial system. Ironically, however, official-sector initiatives in this area may in fact have made life more difficult for the poorest countries. Initiatives to limit the incidence of crises and threats to the stability of the international financial system should therefore be linked to an increase in development assistance designed to offset the extra burdens on the poorest countries. The other place where official efforts have fallen short is in creating new ways of resolving crises. The author argues that the old way - the official sector financing through the International Monetary Fund - is part of the problem, not part of the solution.

In this accessible book, a leading expert provides a critical assessment of the official sector's efforts to more effectively manage financial crises in emerging markets. Professor Eichengreen reviews international initiatives on both the crisis prevention and crisis resolution fronts. While crises will always be with us, he concludes that good progress has been made in limiting their spread and strengthening the international financial system. Ironically, however, official-sector initiatives in this area may in fact have made life more difficult for the poorest countries. Initiatives to limit the incidence of crises and threats to the stability of the international financial system should therefore be linked to an increase in development assistance designed to offset the extra burdens on the poorest countries. The other place where official efforts have fallen short is in creating new ways of resolving crises. The author argues that the old way-official sector financing through the International Monetary Fund-is part of the problem, not part of the solution. The Fund's financial operations allow investors to escape without significant losses, which in turn encourages them to lend without regard to the risks, weakening market discipline. Moreover, bailouts are inequitable. Because investors are allowed to exit and the IMF ultimately gets paid back, the residents of the crisis country end up footing the bill. This is one reason why IMF programs have come to be regarded with such animus in the developing world.Imagining that the solution is for the official community to simply show the resolve to resist bailouts is too easy. That the International Monetary Fund has repeatedly come under pressure to extend financial assistance reflects more than a lack of political will; it reflects the inadequacy of the alternatives. At the same time, seeking to create radical new alternatives like an international bankruptcy court is too hard. It would do more to increase the efficiency of resource allocation and the stability of financial markets, the author concludes, to concentrate on more modest changes, namely the introduction of restructuring-friendly provisions into loan agreements, enhancing the capacity of creditors and debtors to resolve debt problems on their own.

The Great Depression and the Great Recession are the two great economic crises of the past hundred years. While there are accounts of both episodes, no one has yet attempted a sustained comparative analysis. In Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen draws on his unparalleled expertise for a brilliantly conceived dual-track account of the two crises and their consequences. Rather than telling the stories of the two crises in sequence, instead he weaves them together. He describes the two bubble-fuelled build-ups, then the onset of crisis, the subsequent financial and economic and collapse, the policy response, and finally the recovery.A theme of Eichengreen's narrative is that while the policy response to the Great Recession was importantly shaped by perceptions of the Great Depression -- contemporary policymakers did in fact learn lessons from the Depression that enabled them, this time, to prevent the worst -- they could have done better. Their failure to do so reflected a tendency to take the lessons of the Depression too literally, leading to an inability to recognize important respects in which circumstances, and specifically the structure of financial markets, had changed -- precisely in response to the policies put in place due to the Depression. In addition, success was the mother of failure: the success of the policy response took the wind out of reformers' sails. It diminished support for the kind of far-reaching social and financial reforms adopted in the 1930s. It allowed policy makers and society to prematurely indulge their desire for a return to normal policies before a normal economy had been restored. To be sure, this more recent crisis was better managed than the earlier one, which resulted in widespread social distress and, in the worst case, the rise of fascism. But a wiser collective response after 2008 would have staved off the painfully slow growth that subsequently plagued the United States and Europe.

The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn''t policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen''s monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe.Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society''s response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.

The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread. The question, given this, is why didn''t policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen''s monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe.Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society''s response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world and now also two of the fastest growing. By sheer virtue of the fact that China and India are home to 2.4 billion people - two-fifths of the world's population - the rapid growth of their economies has far-reaching implications not just for global living standards and poverty reduction but also for competitiveness and distribution of income in the rest of the world. Commensurate with their economic progress, there has been a surge of interest in the nature and implications of China and India's economic growth. There are several apparent similarities in the development process of China and India: both are home to ancient civilizations that have bequeathed distinctive attitudes, institutions, and traditions. Both have very large populations. Both have performed well economically for more than two decades. However there are important differences that can be seen beneath the surface. China started the current reform process in 1978 - that is, almost fifteen years before India. The two countries have very different political systems. Their development models differ fundamentally as well. China has opened up much more than India to foreign trade and foreign direct investment, while India has a better developed banking system. Growth in the two countries has been driven by different sectors - Chinese growth by manufacturing and Indian growth by services. This volume brings together some of the best research on issues related to the growth experience of China and India and places these issues in a comparative perspective. It contains papers written by some of the leading academic and experts in the world on issues ranging from the roles of China and India in the world economy, contrasts in their development experience, and challenges to sustaining growth.

For more than half a century, the dollar has been not just America's currency but the world's. It is used globally by importers, exporters, investors, governments and central banks alike. This singular role of the dollar is a source of strength for the United States. It is, as a critic of U.S. policies once put it, America's "exorbitant privilege." But now, with U.S. budget deficits extending as far as the eye can see, holding dollars is viewed as a losing proposition. Some say that the dollar may soon cease to be the world's standard currency, which would depress U.S. living standards and weaken the country's international influence.In Exorbitant Privilege, one of our foremost economists, Barry Eichengreen, traces the rise of the dollar to international prominence. He shows how the greenback dominated internationally in the second half of the 20th century for the same reasons that the United States dominated the global economy. But now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies, America no longer towers over the global economy. It follows, Eichengreen argues, that the dollar will not be as dominant. But this does not mean that coming changes need be sudden and dire or that the dollar is doomed to lose its international status. Challenging the presumption that there is room for only one true global currency, Eichengreen shows that several currencies have regularly shared this role. What was true in the distant past will be true, once again, in the not-too-distant future. The dollar will lose its international currency status, Eichengreen warns, only if the United States repeats the mistakes that led to the financial crisis and only if it fails to put its fiscal and financial house in order. Incisive, challenging and iconoclastic, Exorbitant Privilege, is a fascinating analysis of the changes that lie ahead. It is a challenge, equally, to those who warn that the dollar is doomed and to those who regard its continuing dominance as inevitable.

For more than half a century, the dollar has been not just America's currency but the world's. It is used globally by importers, exporters, investors, governments and central banks alike. This singular role of the dollar is a source of strength for the United States. It is, as a critic of U.S. policies once put it, America's "exorbitant privilege." But now, with U.S. budget deficits extending as far as the eye can see, holding dollars is viewed as a losing proposition. Some say that the dollar may soon cease to be the world's standard currency, which would depress U.S. living standards and weaken the country's international influence. In Exorbitant Privilege, one of our foremost economists, Barry Eichengreen, traces the rise of the dollar to international prominence. He shows how the greenback dominated internationally in the second half of the 20th century for the same reasons that the United States dominated the global economy. But now, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies, America no longer towers over the global economy. It follows, Eichengreen argues, that the dollar will not be as dominant. But this does not mean that coming changes need be sudden and dire DL or that the dollar is doomed to lose its international status. Challenging the presumption that there is room for only one true global currency, Eichengreen shows that several currencies have regularly shared this role. What was true in the distant past will be true, once again, in the not-too-distant future. The dollar will lose its international currency status, Eichengreen warns, only if the United States repeats the mistakes that led to the financial crisis and only if it fails to put its fiscal and financial house in order. Incisive, challenging and iconoclastic, Exorbitant Privilege, is a fascinating analysis of the changes that lie ahead. It is a challenge, equally, to those who warn that the dollar is doomed and to those who regard its continuing dominance as inevitable.