This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.

This is the first full-length study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the Depression have approached the banking panics from a macroeconomic viewpoint; Professor Wicker fills a lacuna in current knowledge by reconstructing a close historical narrative of each of the panics, investigating their origins, magnitude, and effects. He makes a detailed analysis of the geographical incidence of the disturbances using the Federal Reserve District as the basic unit, and reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, for example the belief that the increase in the discount rate in October 1931 initiated a wave of bank suspensions and hoarding. This meticulous account will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial economists and macroeconomists.

This is the first full-length study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the Depression have approached the banking panics from a macroeconomic viewpoint; Professor Wicker fills a lacuna in current knowledge by reconstructing a close historical narrative of each of the panics, investigating their origins, magnitude, and effects. He makes a detailed analysis of the geographical incidence of the disturbances using the Federal Reserve District as the basic unit, and reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, for example the belief that the increase in the discount rate in October 1931 initiated a wave of bank suspensions and hoarding. This meticulous account will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial economists and macroeconomists.

This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.

This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.

This is the first full-length study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the Depression have approached the banking panics from a macroeconomic viewpoint; Professor Wicker fills a lacuna in current knowledge by reconstructing a close historical narrative of each of the panics, investigating their origins, magnitude, and effects. He makes a detailed analysis of the geographical incidence of the disturbances using the Federal Reserve District as the basic unit, and reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, for example the belief that the increase in the discount rate in October 1931 initiated a wave of bank suspensions and hoarding. This meticulous account will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial economists and macroeconomists.

This is the first full-length study of five US banking panics of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the Depression have approached the banking panics from a macroeconomic viewpoint; Professor Wicker fills a lacuna in current knowledge by reconstructing a close historical narrative of each of the panics, investigating their origins, magnitude, and effects. He makes a detailed analysis of the geographical incidence of the disturbances using the Federal Reserve District as the basic unit, and reappraises the role of Federal Reserve officials in the panics. His findings challenge many of the commonly held assumptions about the events of 1930 and 1931, for example the belief that the increase in the discount rate in October 1931 initiated a wave of bank suspensions and hoarding. This meticulous account will be of wide interest to students of the Great Depression, monetary and financial historians, financial economists and macroeconomists.

This was the first major study of post-Civil War banking panics in almost a century. The author has constructed estimates of bank closures and their incidence in each of the five separate banking disturbances. The book takes a novel approach by reconstructing the course of banking panics in the interior, where suspension of cash payment, not bank closures, was the primary effect of banking panics on the average person. The author also re-evaluates the role of the New York Clearing House in forestalling several panics and explains why it failed to do so in 1893 and 1907, concluding that structural defects of the National Banking Act were not the primary cause of the panics.