John Paley – författare

Concept analysis is an established genre of inquiry in nursing, introduced in the 1970s. Currently, over 100 concept studies are published annually, yet the methods used within this field have rarely been questioned. In Concept Analysis in Nursing: A New Approach, Paley provides a critical analysis of the philosophical assumptions that underpin nursing’s concept analysis methods. He argues, provocatively, that there are no such things as concepts, as traditionally conceived. Drawing on Wittgenstein and Construction Grammar, the book first makes a case for dispensing with the traditional concept of a ‘concept’, and then provides two examples of a new approach, examining the use of ‘hope’ and ‘moral distress’. Casting doubt on the assumption that ‘hope’ always stands for an ‘inner’ state of the person, the book shows that the word’s function varies with the grammatical construction it appears in. Similarly, it argues that ‘moral distress’ is not the name of a mental state, but a normative classification used to bolster a narrative concerning nursing’s identity. Concept Analysis in Nursing is a fresh and challenging book written by a philosopher interested in nursing. It will appeal to researchers and postgraduate students in the areas of nursing, health, philosophy and linguistics. It will also interest those familiar with the author’s previous book, Phenomenology as Qualitative Research.

Concept analysis is an established genre of inquiry in nursing, introduced in the 1970s. Currently, over 100 concept studies are published annually, yet the methods used within this field have rarely been questioned. In Concept Analysis in Nursing: A New Approach, Paley provides a critical analysis of the philosophical assumptions that underpin nursing’s concept analysis methods. He argues, provocatively, that there are no such things as concepts, as traditionally conceived. Drawing on Wittgenstein and Construction Grammar, the book first makes a case for dispensing with the traditional concept of a ‘concept’, and then provides two examples of a new approach, examining the use of ‘hope’ and ‘moral distress’. Casting doubt on the assumption that ‘hope’ always stands for an ‘inner’ state of the person, the book shows that the word’s function varies with the grammatical construction it appears in. Similarly, it argues that ‘moral distress’ is not the name of a mental state, but a normative classification used to bolster a narrative concerning nursing’s identity. Concept Analysis in Nursing is a fresh and challenging book written by a philosopher interested in nursing. It will appeal to researchers and postgraduate students in the areas of nursing, health, philosophy and linguistics. It will also interest those familiar with the author’s previous book, Phenomenology as Qualitative Research.

Phenomenology originated as a novel way of doing philosophy early in the twentieth century. In the writings of Husserl and Heidegger, regarded as its founders, it was a non-empirical kind of philosophical enquiry. Although this tradition has continued in a variety of forms, ‘phenomenology’ is now also used to denote an empirical form of qualitative research (PQR), especially in health, psychology and education. However, the methods adopted by researchers in these disciplines have never been subject to detailed critical analysis; nor have the methods advocated by methodological writers who are regularly cited in the research literature.This book examines these methods closely, offering a detailed analysis of worked-through examples in three influential textbooks by Giorgi, van Manen, and Smith, Flowers and Larkin. Paley argues that the methods described in these texts are radically under-specified, and suggests alternatives to PQR as an approach to qualitative research, particularly the use of interview data in the construction of models designed to explain phenomena rather than merely describe or interpret them. This book also analyses, and aims to develop, the implicit theory of ‘meaning’ found in PQR writings. The author establishes an account of ‘meaning’ as an inference marker, and explores the methodological implications of this view.This book evaluates the methods used in phenomenology-as-qualitative-research, and formulates a more fully theorised alternative. It will appeal to researchers and students in the areas of health, nursing, psychology, education, public health, sociology, anthropology, political science, philosophy and logic.

This book challenges the widespread assumption that a necessary preliminary to qualitative research is the formulation of ontological and epistemological beliefs. It argues that the metaphysical claims which supposedly underpin different approaches to social research do not make sense. Literally. Sentences such as ‘There is a single objective reality’ and ‘There are multiple constructed realities’ fail to make information-providing statements. They do not refer or describe. Despite appearances, they say nothing about reality (or realities) at a fundamental level, so they cannot be used to justify, ground, or align with, methodological decisions. The ‘necessary preliminary’ turns out not to be necessary at all; and we can dispense with, not just ‘paradigms’, but metaphysical underpinnings in general, whether structured as paradigms or not.Drawing on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Carnap’s metametaphysics, and contemporary linguistics, the book suggests that the metaphysical claims of qualitative texts can be reinterpreted as performative. Ontological and epistemological beliefs are resolutions and proposals, recommendations for the use of language. They form part of a creed by means of which researchers enact the joining of an academic community. Written in Paley’s trademark clear, accessible and conversational style, the book points to a revolution in our understanding of the relation between metaphysics and social research. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in qualitative research and its philosophical foundations.

This book challenges the widespread assumption that a necessary preliminary to qualitative research is the formulation of ontological and epistemological beliefs. It argues that the metaphysical claims which supposedly underpin different approaches to social research do not make sense. Literally. Sentences such as ‘There is a single objective reality’ and ‘There are multiple constructed realities’ fail to make information-providing statements. They do not refer or describe. Despite appearances, they say nothing about reality (or realities) at a fundamental level, so they cannot be used to justify, ground, or align with, methodological decisions. The ‘necessary preliminary’ turns out not to be necessary at all; and we can dispense with, not just ‘paradigms’, but metaphysical underpinnings in general, whether structured as paradigms or not.Drawing on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Carnap’s metametaphysics, and contemporary linguistics, the book suggests that the metaphysical claims of qualitative texts can be reinterpreted as performative. Ontological and epistemological beliefs are resolutions and proposals, recommendations for the use of language. They form part of a creed by means of which researchers enact the joining of an academic community. Written in Paley’s trademark clear, accessible and conversational style, the book points to a revolution in our understanding of the relation between metaphysics and social research. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in qualitative research and its philosophical foundations.