Jonathan Matheson – författare

How do people form beliefs, and how should they do so? This book presents seventeen new essays on these questions, drawing together perspectives from philosophy and psychology. The first section explores the ethics of belief from an individualistic framework. It begins by examining the question of doxastic voluntarism-i.e., the extent to which people have control over their beliefs. It then shifts to focusing on the kinds of character that epistemic agents should cultivate, what their epistemic ends ought to be, and the way in which these issues are related to other traditional questions in epistemology. The section concludes by examining questions of epistemic value, of whether knowledge is in some sense primary, and of whether the ethics of belief falls within the domain of epistemology or ethics.The second section extends this traditional debate to issues concerning the social dimensions of belief formation. It begins with essays by social psychologists discussing the past three decades of research in 'lay epistemics'. It continues by examining Humean, Kantian, and feminist insights into the social aspects of belief formation, as well as questions concerning the ethics of assertion. The section concludes with a series of essays examining a topic that is currently of great interest to epistemologists: namely, the significance of peer disagreement.

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology.While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice.Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology.While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice.Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the wisdom of crowds' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that 'the unexamined life isn’t worth living,' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep.Key FeaturesDiscusses the idea of not thinking for yourself in the context of contemporary issues like climate change and vaccinationsEngages in numerous contemporary debates in social epistemologyExamines what can be valuable about thinking for yourself and argues that these are insufficient to require you to do soOutlines the key, practical takeaways from the argument in an epilogue

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the wisdom of crowds' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that 'the unexamined life isn’t worth living,' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep.Key FeaturesDiscusses the idea of not thinking for yourself in the context of contemporary issues like climate change and vaccinationsEngages in numerous contemporary debates in social epistemologyExamines what can be valuable about thinking for yourself and argues that these are insufficient to require you to do soOutlines the key, practical takeaways from the argument in an epilogue

This volume brings together essays from several different perspectives on a topic in epistemology that is garnering increased attention: Inquiry. It is the first volume focused solely on philosophical issues related to inquiry.Inquiry is a fundamental human practice. We have questions, and we want answers. These questions span numerous domains and range from the trivial to questions of the utmost importance. Without inquiry, and successful inquiry in particular, our fate is bleak. Inquiry is also familiar. Everyone engages in inquiry. In fact, inquiry (of some sort) is something that we engage in every day. However, while inquiry is both fundamental and familiar, only recently have epistemologists turned to focus explicitly on inquiry. The result is a growing literature concerning questions like the following:Does inquiry have an aim?If so, what is the aim of inquiry?What norms govern inquiry?How are epistemic norms and norms of inquiry related?What does inquiry look like with an epistemic division of labor?Is it ever permissible to interfere with the inquiry of another person?What is the relationship between inquiry and belief? Knowledge? Wisdom?How do bias and prejudice affect inquiry?What is the nature and role of attitudes like curiosity and wonder?Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives builds on the existing debates surrounding these questions, advancing them, and taking them in new directions. It will appeal primarily to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.

Up-to-date and comprehensive, A Critical Introduction to Justification provides a new way of understanding and thinking about a wide range of different justified belief theories. Covering key issues in classical and contemporary theory, this unique introduction employs a series of case studies throughout, allowing the reader to think about theories, not just in the abstract, but as they apply to particular test case. Drawing attention to the traditional role attributed to justification in the theory of knowledge, this critical introduction takes up the traditional discussion of how justification is structured, how justified beliefs are related to one another and to whatever justifies them. It provides a detailed examination of key issues in the contemporary(and emerging) theory of evidence, discusses how justification transmits from one state to another, considers skepticism about justification and presents a series of arguments for the thesis that justification is worth seeking and thinking about. By reflecting on a number of cases - both standard and creative - and connecting the most classic material on justification with the most contemporary, the reader emerges solidly grounded in theories of justified belief and ready to engage with contemporary works of epistemology.