Jonathan Matheson – författare

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology.

While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice.

Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

This is the first book dedicated to the topic of epistemic autonomy. It features original essays from leading scholars that promise to significantly shape future debates in this emerging area of epistemology.

While the nature of and value of autonomy has long been discussed in ethics and social and political philosophy, it remains an underexplored area of epistemology. The essays in this collection take up several interesting questions and approaches related to epistemic autonomy. Topics include the nature of epistemic autonomy, whether epistemic paternalism can be justified, autonomy as an epistemic value and/or vice, and the relation of epistemic autonomy to social epistemology and epistemic injustice.

Epistemic Autonomy will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy.

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.

In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how ''expert testimony'' and ''the wisdom of crowds'' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that ''the unexamined life isn’t worth living,'' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep.

Key Features

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.

In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how ''expert testimony'' and ''the wisdom of crowds'' are tested and provides convincing ideas that make it rational to believe something simply because other people believe it. Matheson then takes on philosophy’s best arguments against his thesis, including the idea that non-self-thinkers are free-riding on the work of others, Socrates’ claim that ''the unexamined life isn’t worth living,'' and that outsourcing your intellectual labor makes you vulnerable to errors and manipulation. Matheson shows how these claims and others ultimately fail -- and that when it comes to thinking, we often need not be sheepish about being sheep.

Key Features

This volume brings together essays from several different perspectives on a topic in epistemology that is garnering increased attention: Inquiry. It is the first volume focused solely on philosophical issues related to inquiry.

Inquiry is a fundamental human practice. We have questions, and we want answers. These questions span numerous domains and range from the trivial to questions of the utmost importance. Without inquiry, and successful inquiry in particular, our fate is bleak. Inquiry is also familiar. Everyone engages in inquiry. In fact, inquiry (of some sort) is something that we engage in every day. However, while inquiry is both fundamental and familiar, only recently have epistemologists turned to focus explicitly on inquiry. The result is a growing literature concerning questions like the following:

Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives builds on the existing debates surrounding these questions, advancing them, and taking them in new directions. It will appeal primarily to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.

This volume brings together essays from several different perspectives on a topic in epistemology that is garnering increased attention: Inquiry. It is the first volume focused solely on philosophical issues related to inquiry.

Inquiry is a fundamental human practice. We have questions, and we want answers. These questions span numerous domains and range from the trivial to questions of the utmost importance. Without inquiry, and successful inquiry in particular, our fate is bleak. Inquiry is also familiar. Everyone engages in inquiry. In fact, inquiry (of some sort) is something that we engage in every day. However, while inquiry is both fundamental and familiar, only recently have epistemologists turned to focus explicitly on inquiry. The result is a growing literature concerning questions like the following:

Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives builds on the existing debates surrounding these questions, advancing them, and taking them in new directions. It will appeal primarily to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.