Karl Schafer – författare

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in ''the metaphysical Kant''. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly "leave metaphysics behind". The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant''s philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, tohow those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant''s critique of more "dogmatic" forms of metaphysical thought.The authors approach Kant''s thought from a wide variety of different perspectives - emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant''s metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant''s transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics,including Kant''s modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his "metaethical" views.

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in ''the metaphysical Kant''. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly "leave metaphysics behind". The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant''s philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, tohow those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant''s critique of more "dogmatic" forms of metaphysical thought.The authors approach Kant''s thought from a wide variety of different perspectives - emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant''s metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant''s transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics,including Kant''s modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his "metaethical" views.

Kant''s Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant''s conception of reason and its philosophical significance. Karl Schafer argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or "comprehension"). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, it enables us to see why the activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant''s Reason reads Kant as presenting a compelling picture of the role that reason, as a capacity or power, should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality as fundamental, but instead provides a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of rational constitutivism, which contrasts both with the forms of reasons fundamentalism that are currently fashionable and the forms of agency-first constitutivism that have dominated Kantian metaethics. In this sense, this volume aims to vindicate Kant''s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason''s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness.

Kant''s Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant''s conception of reason and its philosophical significance. Karl Schafer argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or "comprehension"). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, it enables us to see why the activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant''s Reason reads Kant as presenting a compelling picture of the role that reason, as a capacity or power, should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality as fundamental, but instead provides a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of rational constitutivism, which contrasts both with the forms of reasons fundamentalism that are currently fashionable and the forms of agency-first constitutivism that have dominated Kantian metaethics. In this sense, this volume aims to vindicate Kant''s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason''s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness.

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant's conception of reason and its philosophical significance. Karl Schafer argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or "comprehension"). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, it enables us to see why the activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason reads Kant as presenting a compelling picture of the role that reason, as a capacity or power, should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality as fundamental, but instead provides a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of rational constitutivism, which contrasts both with the forms of reasons fundamentalism that are currently fashionable and the forms of agency-first constitutivism that have dominated Kantian metaethics. In this sense, this volume aims to vindicate Kant's insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason's implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness.

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in 'the metaphysical Kant'. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly "leave metaphysics behind". The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant's philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, to how those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant's critique of more "dogmatic" forms of metaphysical thought. The authors approach Kant's thought from a wide variety of different perspectives - emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant's metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant's transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics, including Kant's modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his "metaethical" views.