Ken Perszyk – författare

Molinism, named after the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re-emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga''s Free Will Defence against the Logical Argument from Evil. The Molinist notion of middle knowledge--and especially its main objects, so-called counterfactuals of (creaturely) freedom--have been the subject of vigorous debate in analytical philosophy of religion ever since. Is middle knowledge logically coherent? Is it a benefit or a liability overall for a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this collection examine the status, defensibility, and application of Molinism. Friends and foes of Molinism are well represented, and there are some lively exchanges between them. The collection provides a snap-shot of the current state of the Molinism Wars, along with some discussion of where we''ve been and where we might go in the future. More battles surely lie ahead; the essays and ideas in this collection are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line-up of established and respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.

What must reality be like if the God of Abrahamic theism exists? How could the worldview of Abrahamic theism be understood if not in terms of the existence of a supremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good personal being? John Bishop and Ken Perszyk argue that it is reasonable to reject what many analytic philosophers take to be the standard conception of God as the ''personal omniGod''. They argue that a version of a ''logical'' Argument from Evil is still very much in play, contrary to the widely held view that this line of argument is bankrupt.This book provides a new presentation and defence of the alternative that Bishop and Perszyk have called euteleology. Its core claims are that reality is inherently purposive, and that the Universe exists ultimately because its overall end (telos), which is the supreme good, is made concretely real within it. There is no supreme agent (''standing by'' while horrors take place); God is ''no-thing'' in euteleology''s basic ontology. Rather, talk of God-as-a-personal-being is a cognitive construction, treating ultimate reality by analogy with our ordinary ways of experiencing and talking about the world. But euteleological theism is also emphatically realist. Analogizing God-talk enables humans to align themselves with reality and is aptly deployed in prayer and worship-practices whose broad function is a human contribution to, and enjoyment of, the fulfilment of reality''s inherent ultimate purpose.

What must reality be like if the God of Abrahamic theism exists? How could the worldview of Abrahamic theism be understood if not in terms of the existence of a supremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good personal being? John Bishop and Ken Perszyk argue that it is reasonable to reject what many analytic philosophers take to be the standard conception of God as the ''personal omniGod''. They argue that a version of a ''logical'' Argument from Evil is still very much in play, contrary to the widely held view that this line of argument is bankrupt.This book provides a new presentation and defence of the alternative that Bishop and Perszyk have called euteleology. Its core claims are that reality is inherently purposive, and that the Universe exists ultimately because its overall end (telos), which is the supreme good, is made concretely real within it. There is no supreme agent (''standing by'' while horrors take place); God is ''no-thing'' in euteleology''s basic ontology. Rather, talk of God-as-a-personal-being is a cognitive construction, treating ultimate reality by analogy with our ordinary ways of experiencing and talking about the world. But euteleological theism is also emphatically realist. Analogizing God-talk enables humans to align themselves with reality and is aptly deployed in prayer and worship-practices whose broad function is a human contribution to, and enjoyment of, the fulfilment of reality''s inherent ultimate purpose.

What must reality be like if the God of Abrahamic theism exists? How could the worldview of Abrahamic theism be understood if not in terms of the existence of a supremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good personal being? John Bishop and Ken Perszyk argue that it is reasonable to reject what many analytic philosophers take to be the standard conception of God as the 'personal omniGod'. They argue that a version of a 'logical' Argument from Evil is still very much in play, contrary to the widely held view that this line of argument is bankrupt.This book provides a new presentation and defence of the alternative that Bishop and Perszyk have called euteleology. Its core claims are that reality is inherently purposive, and that the Universe exists ultimately because its overall end (telos), which is the supreme good, is made concretely real within it. There is no supreme agent ('standing by' while horrors take place); God is 'no-thing' in euteleology's basic ontology. Rather, talk of God-as-a-personal-being is a cognitive construction, treating ultimate reality by analogy with our ordinary ways of experiencing and talking about the world. But euteleological theism is also emphatically realist. Analogizing God-talk enables humans to align themselves with reality and is aptly deployed in prayer and worship-practices whose broad function is a human contribution to, and enjoyment of, the fulfilment of reality's inherent ultimate purpose.

Molinism, named after the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, re-emerged in the 1970s after it was unwittingly assumed in versions of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defence against the Logical Argument from Evil. The Molinist notion of middle knowledge--and especially its main objects, so-called counterfactuals of (creaturely) freedom--have been the subject of vigorous debate in analytical philosophy of religion ever since. Is middle knowledge logically coherent? Is it a benefit or a liability overall for a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this collection examine the status, defensibility, and application of Molinism. Friends and foes of Molinism are well represented, and there are some lively exchanges between them. The collection provides a snap-shot of the current state of the Molinism Wars, along with some discussion of where we've been and where we might go in the future. More battles surely lie ahead; the essays and ideas in this collection are likely to have a major impact on future directions. The essays are specially written by a line-up of established and respected philosophers of religion, metaphysicians, and logicians. There is a substantive Introduction and an extensive Bibliography to assist both students and professionals.

Is a religious naturalism possible? 'Scientific' naturalism accommodates only 'thin' religiousness. A more robust religious naturalism posits an ultimate reality that supports the ideals of eco-morality and the hope that human fulfilment may be achieved by following those ideals. Such an account may yet be 'expansively' naturalist in taking the natural world to be the only (concrete) reality, and in not going against, only beyond, well-confirmed science. For the core content of an expansive religious naturalism, this Element proposes the idea of an inherent integrative cosmic purpose. The authors reflect both on Indigenous worldviews and on theist traditions in pursuing this proposal. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.