Mathieu Marion - Böcker

Mathieu Marion offers a careful, historically informed study of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. This area of his work has frequently been undervalued by Wittgenstein specialists and by philosophers of mathematics alike; but the surprising fact that he wrote more on this subject than on any other indicates its centrality in his thought. Marion traces the development of Wittgenstein's thinking in the context of the mathematical and philosophical work of the times, to make coherent sense of ideas that have too often been misunderstood because they have been presented in a disjointed and incomplete way. In particular, he illuminates the work of the neglected 'transitional period' between the Tractatus and the Investigations. Marion shows that study of Wittgenstein's writings on mathematics is essential to a proper understanding of his philosophy; and he also demonstrates that it has much to contribute to current debates about the foundations of mathematics.

Mathieu Marion offers a careful, historically informed study of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. This area of his work has frequently been undervalued by Wittgenstein specialists and by philosophers of mathematics alike; but the surprising fact that he wrote more on this subject than on any other indicates its centrality in his thought. Marion traces the development of Wittgenstein's thinking in the context of the mathematical and philosophical work of the times, to make coherent sense of ideas that have too often been misunderstood because they have been presented in a disjointed and incomplete way. In particular, he illuminates the work of the neglected 'transitional period' between the Tractatus and the Investigations. Marion shows that study of Wittgenstein's writings on mathematics is essential to a proper understanding of his philosophy; and he also demonstrates that it has much to contribute to current debates about the foundations of mathematics.

This volume brings into focus the unique philosophical and historical importance of Wittgenstein's pre-Tractatus writings.

Jan Wolenski ´ and Sandra Lapointe Polish philosophy goes back to the 13th century, when Witelo, famous for his works in optics and the metaphysics of light, lived and worked in Silesia. Yet, Poland’s academic life only really began after the University of Cracow was founded in 1364 – its development was interrupted by the sudden death of King Kazimierz III, but it was re-established in 1400. The main currents of classical scholastic thought like Thomism, Scottism or Ockhamism had been late – about a century – to come to Poland and they had a considerable impact on the budding Polish philosophical scene. The controversy between the via antiqua and the via moderna was hotly 1 debated. Intellectuals deliberated on the issues of concilliarism (whether the C- mon Council has priority over the Pope) and curialism (whether the Bishop of Rome has priority over the Common Council). On the whole, the situation had at least two remarkable features. Firstly, Polish philosophy was pluralistic, and remained so, since its very beginning. But it was also eclectic, which might explain why it aimed to a large extent at achieving a compromise between rival views. Secondly, given the shortcomings of the political system of the time as well as external pr- sure by an increasingly hegemonic Germany, thinkers were very much interested in political matters. Poland was a stronghold of political thought (mostly inclined towards concilliarism) and Polish political thought distinguished itself in Europe J.

Jan Wolenski ´ and Sandra Lapointe Polish philosophy goes back to the 13th century, when Witelo, famous for his works in optics and the metaphysics of light, lived and worked in Silesia. Yet, Poland’s academic life only really began after the University of Cracow was founded in 1364 – its development was interrupted by the sudden death of King Kazimierz III, but it was re-established in 1400. The main currents of classical scholastic thought like Thomism, Scottism or Ockhamism had been late – about a century – to come to Poland and they had a considerable impact on the budding Polish philosophical scene. The controversy between the via antiqua and the via moderna was hotly 1 debated. Intellectuals deliberated on the issues of concilliarism (whether the C- mon Council has priority over the Pope) and curialism (whether the Bishop of Rome has priority over the Common Council). On the whole, the situation had at least two remarkable features. Firstly, Polish philosophy was pluralistic, and remained so, since its very beginning. But it was also eclectic, which might explain why it aimed to a large extent at achieving a compromise between rival views. Secondly, given the shortcomings of the political system of the time as well as external pr- sure by an increasingly hegemonic Germany, thinkers were very much interested in political matters. Poland was a stronghold of political thought (mostly inclined towards concilliarism) and Polish political thought distinguished itself in Europe J.

This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call “dynamic epistemology”. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and rationality, in a number of central axes in dynamic epistemology: temporal, social, probabilistic and even deontic dynamics.

The relation between logic and knowledge has been at the heart of a lively debate since the 1960s. On the one hand, the epistemic approaches based their formal arguments in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. Following Michael Dummett, they started to call themselves `antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to unify both traditions by means of what is now known as `explicit epistemic logic'. Under this view, epistemic contents are introduced into the object language as operators yielding propositions from propositions, rather than as metalogical constraints on the notion of inference.The Realism-Antirealism debate has thus had three players: classical logicians, intuitionists and explicit epistemic logicians. The editors of the present volume believe that in the age of Alternative Logics, where manifold developments in logic happen at a breathtaking pace, this debate should be revisited. Contributors to this volume happily took on this challenge and responded with new approaches to the debate from both the explicit and the implicit epistemic point of view.

This volume is a collation of original contributions from the key actors of a new trend in the contemporary theory of knowledge and belief, that we call “dynamic epistemology”. It brings the works of these researchers under a single umbrella by highlighting the coherence of their current themes, and by establishing connections between topics that, up until now, have been investigated independently. It also illustrates how the new analytical toolbox unveils questions about the theory of knowledge, belief, preference, action, and rationality, in a number of central axes in dynamic epistemology: temporal, social, probabilistic and even deontic dynamics.

The relation between logic and knowledge has been at the heart of a lively debate since the 1960s. On the one hand, the epistemic approaches based their formal arguments in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. Following Michael Dummett, they started to call themselves `antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to unify both traditions by means of what is now known as `explicit epistemic logic'. Under this view, epistemic contents are introduced into the object language as operators yielding propositions from propositions, rather than as metalogical constraints on the notion of inference.The Realism-Antirealism debate has thus had three players: classical logicians, intuitionists and explicit epistemic logicians. The editors of the present volume believe that in the age of Alternative Logics, where manifold developments in logic happen at a breathtaking pace, this debate should be revisited. Contributors to this volume happily took on this challenge and responded with new approaches to the debate from both the explicit and the implicit epistemic point of view.

By North-American standards, philosophy is not new in Quebec: the first men­ tion of philosophy lectures given by a Jesuit in the College de Quebec (founded 1635) dates from 1665, and the oldest logic manuscript dates from 1679. In English-speaking universities such as McGill (founded 1829), philosophy began to be taught later, during the second half of the 19th century. The major influence on English-speaking philosophers was, at least initially, that of Scottish Empiricism. On the other hand, the strong influence of the Catholic Church on French-Canadian society meant that the staff of the facultes of the French-speaking universities consisted, until recently, almost entirely of Thomist philosophers. There was accordingly little or no work in modern Formal Logic and Philosophy of Science and precious few contacts between the philosophical communities. In the late forties, Hugues Leblanc was a young student wanting to learn Formal Logic. He could not find anyone in Quebec to teach him and he went to study at Harvard University under the supervision of W. V. Quine. His best friend Maurice L' Abbe had left, a year earlier, for Princeton to study with Alonzo Church. After receiving his Ph. D from Harvard in 1948, Leblanc started his profes­ sional career at Bryn Mawr College, where he stayed until 1967. He then went to Temple University, where he taught until his retirement in 1992, serving as Chair of the Department of Philosophy from 1973 until 1979.