Melinda Bonnie Fagan – författare

What things count as individuals, and how do we individuate them? It is a classic philosophical question often tackled from the perspective of analytic metaphysics. This volume proposes that there is another channel by which to approach individuation -- from that of scientific practices. From this perspective, the question then becomes: How do scientists individuate things and, therefore, count them as individuals? This volume collects the work of philosophers of science to engage with this central philosophical conundrum from a new angle, highlighting the crucial topic of experimental individuation and building upon recent, pioneering work in the philosophy of science. An introductory chapter foregrounds the problem of individuation, arguing it should be considered prior to the topic of individuality. The following chapters address individuation and individuality from a variety of perspectives, with prominent themes being the importance of experimentation, individuation as a process, and pluralism in individuation's criteria. Contributions examine individuation in a wide range of sciences, including stem cell biology, particle physics, and community ecology. Other chapters examine the metaphysics of individuation, its bearing on realism/antirealism debates, and interrogate epistemic aspects of individuation in scientific practice.In exploring individuation from the philosophy of biology, physics, and other scientific subjects, this volume ultimately argues for the possibility of several criteria of individuation, upending the tenets of traditional metaphysics. It provides insights for philosophers of science, but also for scientists interested in the conceptual foundations of their work.

Explanatory Particularism in Scientific Practice offers a novel community-centric account of scientific explanation. On this view, explanations are products of collaborative activity in particular communities. Philosophers of science studying explanation have traditionally seen their task as analyzing the common or fundamental core of explanations across the sciences. Melinda Bonnie Fagan takes the opposite view: diversity of explanations across the sciences is a basic feature of scientific practice. A scientific community produces explanations that advance understanding of some target of interest, but just what features advance understanding, and what understanding amounts to in practice, varies widely over time and across scientific communities. This particularist approach brings new problems and questions to the fore, especially concerning interdisciplinarity: how (if at all) do explanation and understanding get beyond the boundary of a particular community? The particularist account also has implications bearing on the nature of understanding, the unity of science, objectivity, and science-society relations. The argument is elaborated using detailed case studies of explanatory model connection, or lack thereof: immunology and epidemiology models in the COVID-19 pandemic and the explanatory ambitions of systems biology, using the example of stem cell development. The argument concludes with an open-ended list of potential future case studies.