Michael Herman – författare

Intelligence was a major part of the Cold War, waged by both sides with an almost warlike intensity. Yet the question 'What difference did it all make?' remains unanswered. Did it help to contain the Cold War, or fuel it and keep it going? Did it make it hotter or colder? Did these large intelligence bureaucracies tell truth to power, or give their governments what they expected to hear?These questions have not previously been addressed systematically, and seven writers tackle them here on Cold War aspects that include intelligence as warning, threat assessment, assessing military balances, Third World activities, and providing reassurance. Their conclusions are as relevant to understanding what governments can expect from their big, secret organizations today as they are to those of historians analysing the Cold War motivations of East and West. This book is valuable not only for intelligence, international relations and Cold War specialists but also for all those concerned with intelligence's modern cost-effectiveness and accountability.This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the 'intelligence community' and assessing its value. The author, a former senior British intelligence officer, describes intelligence activities, the purposes which the system serves, and the causes and effects of its secrecy. He considers 'intelligence failure' and how organisation and management can improve the chances of success. Using parallels with the information society and the current search for efficiency in public administration as a whole, the book explores the issues involved in deciding how much intelligence is needed and discusses the kinds of management necessary. In his conclusions Michael Herman discusses intelligence's national value in the post-Cold War world. He also argues that it has important contributions to make to international security, but that its threat-inducing activities should be kept in check.

Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the 'intelligence community' and assessing its value. The author, a former senior British intelligence officer, describes intelligence activities, the purposes which the system serves, and the causes and effects of its secrecy. He considers 'intelligence failure' and how organisation and management can improve the chances of success. Using parallels with the information society and the current search for efficiency in public administration as a whole, the book explores the issues involved in deciding how much intelligence is needed and discusses the kinds of management necessary. In his conclusions Michael Herman discusses intelligence's national value in the post-Cold War world. He also argues that it has important contributions to make to international security, but that its threat-inducing activities should be kept in check.

Intelligence was a central element of the Cold War and the need for it was expected to diminish after the USSR's collapse, yet in recent years it has been in greater demand than ever. The atrocities of 11 September and the subsequent "war on terrorism" now call for an even more intensive effort. Important questions arise on how intelligence fits into the world of increased threats, globalization and expanded international action. This volume contains the recent work on this subject by Michael Herman, British intelligence professional for 35 years and Oxford University academic. It compares intelligence with other government information services, and discusses the British intelligence system and the case for its reform. It also addresses the ethical issues raised by intelligence's methods and results: "do they on balance make for a better world or a worse one?". Other chapters explore a wide range of intelligence topics past and present, including the transatlantic relationship, the alliance strategies of Norway and New Zealand, Mrs Thatcher's "de-unionization" of British Sigint, and personal memories of the British Cabinet Office in the 1970s.Michael Herman argues for intelligence professionalism as a contribution to international security and for its encouragement as a world standard. The modern challenge is for intelligence to support international cooperation in ways originally developed to advance national interests, while at the same time developing some restraint and international "rules of the game", in the use of intrusive and covert methods on its traditional targets. The effects of 11 September on this challenge are discussed in a thoughtful afterword.

Intelligence was a major part of the Cold War, waged by both sides with an almost warlike intensity. Yet the question 'What difference did it all make?' remains unanswered. Did it help to contain the Cold War, or fuel it and keep it going? Did it make it hotter or colder? Did these large intelligence bureaucracies tell truth to power, or give their governments what they expected to hear?These questions have not previously been addressed systematically, and seven writers tackle them here on Cold War aspects that include intelligence as warning, threat assessment, assessing military balances, Third World activities, and providing reassurance. Their conclusions are as relevant to understanding what governments can expect from their big, secret organizations today as they are to those of historians analysing the Cold War motivations of East and West. This book is valuable not only for intelligence, international relations and Cold War specialists but also for all those concerned with intelligence's modern cost-effectiveness and accountability.This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

Michael Herman (1929 2021) was the world's leading intelligence practitioner academic. Among his senior roles during a thirty-five year career in Her Majesty's Civil Service, he was Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1972 75, and Head of several GCHQ Divisions in the 1970s 80s. After his professional retirement, he was a Gwilym Gibbon Research Fellow at Nuffield College Oxford and founding director of the Oxford Intelligence Group.This volume draws on Herman's professional experience and personal recollections to examine the past and present British intelligence. In twenty-one chapters he offers an insider's perspective on the Cold War intelligence contest against the Soviet Union and its continuing legacy today. This includes proposals for intelligence ethics and reform in the twenty-first century, and the declassified copy of his evidence to the 2004 Butler Review. Herman also discusses the role of personalities in the British intelligence community, producing sketches of Cold War contemporaries on the JIC and several Directors of GCHQ. The combination of operational experience and academic reflection makes this volume a unique contribution to intelligence scholarship.

This volume draws on Herman's professional experience and personal recollections to examine the past and present of British intelligence. In twenty-one chapters he offers an insider's perspective on the Cold War intelligence contest against the Soviet Union and its continuing legacy today. This includes proposals for intelligence ethics and reform in the twenty-first century, and the declassified copy of his evidence to the 2004 Butler Review. Herman also discusses the role of personalities in the British intelligence community, producing sketches of Cold War contemporaries on the JIC and several Directors of GCHQ. The combination of operational experience and academic reflection makes this volume a unique contribution to intelligence scholarship.Michael Herman (1929-2021) was the world's leading intelligence practitioner-academic. Among his senior roles during a thirty-five year career in Her Majesty's Civil Service, he was Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1972-75, and Head of several GCHQ Divisions in the 1970s-80s. After his professional retirement, he was a Gwilym Gibbon Research Fellow at Nuffield College Oxford and founding director of the Oxford Intelligence Group.