Nicholas C. Yannelis – författare

This book presents the state-of-the-art in non-linear dynamics and sunspots. These two topics have been the core of an international conference on instability and public policies in a globalized world, organized at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and GREQAM in honor of Jean-Michel Grandmont. He has made significant contributions on general equilibrium theory, monetary theory, learning, aggregation, non-linear dynamics and sunspots. This book assembles contributions by Jean-Michel Grandmont's colleagues, students and friends that have been influenced by his works and that are at the frontier of research in this domain today.

This book presents the state-of-the-art in non-linear dynamics and sunspots. These two topics have been the core of an international conference on instability and public policies in a globalized world, organized at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and GREQAM in honor of Jean-Michel Grandmont. He has made significant contributions on general equilibrium theory, monetary theory, learning, aggregation, non-linear dynamics and sunspots. This book assembles contributions by Jean-Michel Grandmont''s colleagues, students and friends that have been influenced by his works and that are at the frontier of research in this domain today.

This book presents the state-of-the-art in non-linear dynamics and sunspots. These two topics have been the core of an international conference on instability and public policies in a globalized world, organized at Aix-Marseille School of Economics and GREQAM in honor of Jean-Michel Grandmont. He has made significant contributions on general equilibrium theory, monetary theory, learning, aggregation, non-linear dynamics and sunspots. This book assembles contributions by Jean-Michel Grandmont's colleagues, students and friends that have been influenced by his works and that are at the frontier of research in this domain today.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Apart from the underlying theme that all the contributions to this volume pertain to models set in an infinite dimensional space, they differ on many counts. Some were written in the early seventies while others are reports of ongoing research done especially with this volume in mind. Some are surveys of material that can, at least at this point in time, be deemed to have attained a satisfactory solution of the problem, while oth­ ers represent initial forays into an original and novel formulation. Some furnish alternative proofs of known, and by now, classical results, while others can be seen as groping towards and exploring formulations that have not yet reached a definitive form. The subject matter also has a wide leeway, ranging from solution concepts for economies to those for games and also including representation of preferences and discussion of purely mathematical problems, all within the rubric of choice variables belonging to an infinite dimensional space, interpreted as a commodity space or as a strategy space. Thus, this is a collective enterprise in a fairly wide sense of the term and one with the diversity of which we have interfered as little as possible. Our motivation for bringing all of this work under one set of covers was severalfold.

The twenty-nine papers selected for this volume cover topics in cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism design, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial organization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. They reflect the diversity and depth of thought and method in economic theory and applications, as shown in the meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET).

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Apart from the underlying theme that all the contributions to this volume pertain to models set in an infinite dimensional space, they differ on many counts. Some were written in the early seventies while others are reports of ongoing research done especially with this volume in mind. Some are surveys of material that can, at least at this point in time, be deemed to have attained a satisfactory solution of the problem, while oth­ ers represent initial forays into an original and novel formulation. Some furnish alternative proofs of known, and by now, classical results, while others can be seen as groping towards and exploring formulations that have not yet reached a definitive form. The subject matter also has a wide leeway, ranging from solution concepts for economies to those for games and also including representation of preferences and discussion of purely mathematical problems, all within the rubric of choice variables belonging to an infinite dimensional space, interpreted as a commodity space or as a strategy space. Thus, this is a collective enterprise in a fairly wide sense of the term and one with the diversity of which we have interfered as little as possible. Our motivation for bringing all of this work under one set of covers was severalfold.

In 1990, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) was founded with the main purpose to advance our knowledge in theoretical economics and to facilitate communication among researchers in economics, mathematics, game theory and any other field which is po­ tentially useful to economic theory. To achieve these goals, SAET sponsors the research journal Economic Theory published by Springer-Verlag and holds international conferences every other year. The first two conferences SAET took place in the island of Cephalonia, Greece, in the summers of of 1993 and 1995. In the summer of 1997, the conference was held in Antalya, Turkey. The twenty-nine papers in this volume are mostly by participants in the Antalya meeting of SAET and form a broad sample of the 150 papers pre­ sented there. Topics covered include cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism de­ sign, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial or­ ganization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. We have chosen to present the papers according to the alphabetical order of first author names instead of grouping them by topic or theme. We have appended a complete listing of the sessions in the conference together with a list of program committee members and of sponsors at the end of the volume.

In July of 1996, the conference Nonlinear Analysis and its Applications in Engineering and Economics took place on the Greek island of Samos, the birthplace of Pythagoras. During this conference, a special session was held on th the occasion of the 50 birthday of the well known mathematician and math­ ematical economist Professor Charalambos Aliprantis, who, by his numerous friends, is usually called Roko. The story behind this nickname is not quite clear yet; it will be investigated further and will be made public prior to his th 60 birthday. (At this moment we have already found out that it has nothing to do with the famous movie Rocco and his Brothers even though Roko does have two brothers. ) Roko was born on the Greek island of Cephalonia on May 12,1946, and his elementary and secondary school education took place there. At 18 he entered the Mathematics Department at the University of Athens. Upon graduation from the University of Athens he proceeded with his graduate studies at Cal­ tech, where in 1973 he completed his Ph. D. degree in Mathematics under the supervision of Professor W. A. J. Luxemburg. His research career can be divided into two periods. The first one, till 1981, was devoted entirely to pure mathematics. The other one, after 1981, has been subdivided between pure mathematics and mathematical economics. The main objects of Roko''s work in pure mathematics are spaces with order structure (Riesz spaces) and operators acting on them.

In July of 1996, the conference Nonlinear Analysis and its Applications in Engineering and Economics took place on the Greek island of Samos, the birthplace of Pythagoras. During this conference, a special session was held on th the occasion of the 50 birthday of the well known mathematician and math­ ematical economist Professor Charalambos Aliprantis, who, by his numerous friends, is usually called Roko. The story behind this nickname is not quite clear yet; it will be investigated further and will be made public prior to his th 60 birthday. (At this moment we have already found out that it has nothing to do with the famous movie Rocco and his Brothers even though Roko does have two brothers. ) Roko was born on the Greek island of Cephalonia on May 12,1946, and his elementary and secondary school education took place there. At 18 he entered the Mathematics Department at the University of Athens. Upon graduation from the University of Athens he proceeded with his graduate studies at Cal­ tech, where in 1973 he completed his Ph. D. degree in Mathematics under the supervision of Professor W. A. J. Luxemburg. His research career can be divided into two periods. The first one, till 1981, was devoted entirely to pure mathematics. The other one, after 1981, has been subdivided between pure mathematics and mathematical economics. The main objects of Roko's work in pure mathematics are spaces with order structure (Riesz spaces) and operators acting on them.

In 1990, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) was founded with the main purpose to advance our knowledge in theoretical economics and to facilitate communication among researchers in economics, mathematics, game theory and any other field which is po­ tentially useful to economic theory. To achieve these goals, SAET sponsors the research journal Economic Theory published by Springer-Verlag and holds international conferences every other year. The first two conferences SAET took place in the island of Cephalonia, Greece, in the summers of of 1993 and 1995. In the summer of 1997, the conference was held in Antalya, Turkey. The twenty-nine papers in this volume are mostly by participants in the Antalya meeting of SAET and form a broad sample of the 150 papers pre­ sented there. Topics covered include cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism de­ sign, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial or­ ganization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. We have chosen to present the papers according to the alphabetical order of first author names instead of grouping them by topic or theme. We have appended a complete listing of the sessions in the conference together with a list of program committee members and of sponsors at the end of the volume.