Differential Information Economies

AvDionysius Glycopantis,Nicholas C. Yannelis

Inbunden, Engelska, 2004

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Beskrivning

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2004-11-19
Mått:155 x 235 x undefined mm
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Studies in Economic Theory
Antal sidor:650
Förlag:Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
ISBN:9783540214243

Utforska kategorier

Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Innehållsförteckning

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies.- Core Notions, Existence Results.- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy.- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper.- The core of an economy with differential information.- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core.- On the continuity of expected utility.- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core.- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw.- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information.- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core.- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility.- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information.- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies.- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core.- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm.- Optimal multilateral contracts.- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry.- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans.- Incentive compatible contractible information.- Continuity and Stability.- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete.- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms.- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection.- Non-myopiclearning in differential information economies: the core.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET.- Cooperative games with incomplete information.- The value allocation of an economy with differential information.- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information.- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information.- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?.- Implementation.- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies.- An extensive form interpretation of the private core.- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.