Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth. The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism." All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity's most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth.The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism."All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity''s most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

In recent years philosophers of science have urged that many scientific theories are extremely useful and successful despite being internally inconsistent. Via an investigation of eight alleged ''inconsistent theories'' in the history of science, Peter Vickers urges that this view is at best overly simplistic. Most of these cases can only be described as examples of ''inconsistent science'' if we employ reconstructions of science which depart from the real (history of)science to an unacceptable degree. And where we do find genuine inconsistency he argues that the nature of—and correct response to—the inconsistency differs dramatically depending on the details of the science in question. Thus we are warned against making overly general claims about ''science'': whatare all called ''theories'' in the history of science are actually significantly different entities, which work in different ways and react to inconsistency in different ways. Vickers argues that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, fully general claims about ''how science works'' is misguided, and can be significantly circumvented if we re-frame our debates such that reference to ''theories'' is eliminated. In this way one is not tempted to think of the history of science as ahistory of instances of the same kind—theory—about which one could hope to say something substantial and general. And in addition eliminating theory means that we avoid fruitless debates about the ''real'' nature and content of ''theories''. Vickers'' account leads to a particularist philosophy of science,where the reader is urged to appreciate the often dramatic differences between the different ''inconsistencies in science'' which have been identified.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were ''sure'' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a ''scientific fact''. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were ''sure'' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a ''scientific fact''. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were 'sure' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a 'scientific fact'. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth.The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism."All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity''s most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics—those who spread doubt about science—often employ a simple argument: scientists were 'sure' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. It is argued that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95 per cent of that community would describe the claim as a 'scientific fact'. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

In recent years philosophers of science have urged that many scientific theories are extremely useful and successful despite being internally inconsistent. Via an investigation of eight alleged 'inconsistent theories' in the history of science, Peter Vickers urges that this view is at best overly simplistic. Most of these cases can only be described as examples of 'inconsistent science' if we employ reconstructions of science which depart from the real (history of) science to an unacceptable degree. And where we do find genuine inconsistency he argues that the nature of--and correct response to--the inconsistency differs dramatically depending on the details of the science in question. Thus we are warned against making overly general claims about 'science': what are all called 'theories' in the history of science are actually significantly different entities, which work in different ways and react to inconsistency in different ways. Vickers argues that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, fully general claims about 'how science works' is misguided, and can be significantly circumvented if we re-frame our debates such that reference to 'theories' is eliminated. In this way one is not tempted to think of the history of science as a history of instances of the same kind--theory--about which one could hope to say something substantial and general. And in addition eliminating theory means that we avoid fruitless debates about the 'real' nature and content of 'theories'. Vickers' account leads to a particularist philosophy of science, where the reader is urged to appreciate the often dramatic differences between the different 'inconsistencies in science' which have been identified.

This resource offers an overview of the rare genetic disease SCID, and how families affected by it cope. Chapters cover the effects of early hospitalisation on children, children''s perceptions of illness and health, the psychosocial effects on the family, and much more.

Are you new to research and daunted by the idea of constructing your own research proposal? Then this is the book you need!

This book and accompanying web resource will answer all your questions about healthcare research by introducing you to the concepts, theories and practicalities surrounding it. The aim of both the book and the web resource is to help you to write a good healthcare research proposal – which is the starting point for any would-be student researcher.

The book takes a look at the theory of research, the core of the topic, but also provides practical help and advice along the way. It takes the reader through the stages of the research process from developing the question to communicating the findings, demystifying the process on the way. The web resource works alongside the book, supplementing and expanding on the chapters, giving you the ability to prepare your very own research proposal.

Explains key concepts in a clear, easy to understand way Includes activities and scenarios for you to work through which will also increase your understanding of research and research proposals Easily navigable web resource (www.researchproposalsforhealthprofessionals.com) Both book and website are arranged in the same order in which you would develop and write a research proposal Website includes downloadable research proposal template to complete step-by-step as you work through the book and web resource

Are you new to research and daunted by the idea of constructing your own research proposal? Then this is the book you need!

This book and accompanying web resource will answer all your questions about healthcare research by introducing you to the concepts, theories and practicalities surrounding it. The aim of both the book and the web resource is to help you to write a good healthcare research proposal – which is the starting point for any would-be student researcher.

The book takes a look at the theory of research, the core of the topic, but also provides practical help and advice along the way. It takes the reader through the stages of the research process from developing the question to communicating the findings, demystifying the process on the way. The web resource works alongside the book, supplementing and expanding on the chapters, giving you the ability to prepare your very own research proposal.

Explains key concepts in a clear, easy to understand way Includes activities and scenarios for you to work through which will also increase your understanding of research and research proposals Easily navigable web resource (www.researchproposalsforhealthprofessionals.com) Both book and website are arranged in the same order in which you would develop and write a research proposal Website includes downloadable research proposal template to complete step-by-step as you work through the book and web resource

Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth. The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism." All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity's most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth.The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism."All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity''s most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

In recent years philosophers of science have urged that many scientific theories are extremely useful and successful despite being internally inconsistent. Via an investigation of eight alleged ''inconsistent theories'' in the history of science, Peter Vickers urges that this view is at best overly simplistic. Most of these cases can only be described as examples of ''inconsistent science'' if we employ reconstructions of science which depart from the real (history of)science to an unacceptable degree. And where we do find genuine inconsistency he argues that the nature of—and correct response to—the inconsistency differs dramatically depending on the details of the science in question. Thus we are warned against making overly general claims about ''science'': whatare all called ''theories'' in the history of science are actually significantly different entities, which work in different ways and react to inconsistency in different ways. Vickers argues that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, fully general claims about ''how science works'' is misguided, and can be significantly circumvented if we re-frame our debates such that reference to ''theories'' is eliminated. In this way one is not tempted to think of the history of science as ahistory of instances of the same kind—theory—about which one could hope to say something substantial and general. And in addition eliminating theory means that we avoid fruitless debates about the ''real'' nature and content of ''theories''. Vickers'' account leads to a particularist philosophy of science,where the reader is urged to appreciate the often dramatic differences between the different ''inconsistencies in science'' which have been identified.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were ''sure'' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a ''scientific fact''. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were ''sure'' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a ''scientific fact''. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics - those who spread doubt about science - often employ a simple argument: scientists were 'sure' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. Peter Vickers argues that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95% of that community would describe the claim as a 'scientific fact'. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. However, they have faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever-increasing dataset bearing on the (possible) relationship between science and truth.The present volume introduces new historical cases impacting the debate and advances the discussion of cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same time, shifts in philosophical positions affect the very kind of case study that is relevant. Thus, the historical work must proceed hand in hand with philosophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this in mind that the volume is divided into two sections, entitled "Historical Cases for the Debate" and "Contemporary Scientific Realism."All sides agree that historical cases are informative with regard to how, or whether, science connects with truth. Defying proclamations as early as the 1980s announcing the death knell of the scientific realism debate, here is that rare thing: a philosophical debate making steady and definite progress. Moreover, the progress it is making concerns one of humanity''s most profound and important questions: the relationship between science and truth, or, put more boldly, the epistemic relation between humankind and the reality in which we find ourselves.

Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics—those who spread doubt about science—often employ a simple argument: scientists were 'sure' in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against this potentially dangerous scepticism. Indeed, we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appears to be a new question for science scholars, and not an unimportant one. It is argued that the best way to identify future-proof science is to avoid any attempt to analyse the relevant first-order scientific evidence, instead focusing purely on second-order evidence. Specifically, a scientific claim is future-proof when the relevant scientific community is large, international, and diverse, and at least 95 per cent of that community would describe the claim as a 'scientific fact'. In the entire history of science, no claim meeting these criteria has ever been overturned, despite enormous opportunity.

In recent years philosophers of science have urged that many scientific theories are extremely useful and successful despite being internally inconsistent. Via an investigation of eight alleged 'inconsistent theories' in the history of science, Peter Vickers urges that this view is at best overly simplistic. Most of these cases can only be described as examples of 'inconsistent science' if we employ reconstructions of science which depart from the real (history of) science to an unacceptable degree. And where we do find genuine inconsistency he argues that the nature of--and correct response to--the inconsistency differs dramatically depending on the details of the science in question. Thus we are warned against making overly general claims about 'science': what are all called 'theories' in the history of science are actually significantly different entities, which work in different ways and react to inconsistency in different ways. Vickers argues that the traditional goal of philosophy to make substantial, fully general claims about 'how science works' is misguided, and can be significantly circumvented if we re-frame our debates such that reference to 'theories' is eliminated. In this way one is not tempted to think of the history of science as a history of instances of the same kind--theory--about which one could hope to say something substantial and general. And in addition eliminating theory means that we avoid fruitless debates about the 'real' nature and content of 'theories'. Vickers' account leads to a particularist philosophy of science, where the reader is urged to appreciate the often dramatic differences between the different 'inconsistencies in science' which have been identified.

This resource offers an overview of the rare genetic disease SCID, and how families affected by it cope. Chapters cover the effects of early hospitalisation on children, children''s perceptions of illness and health, the psychosocial effects on the family, and much more.

Are you new to research and daunted by the idea of constructing your own research proposal? Then this is the book you need!

This book and accompanying web resource will answer all your questions about healthcare research by introducing you to the concepts, theories and practicalities surrounding it. The aim of both the book and the web resource is to help you to write a good healthcare research proposal – which is the starting point for any would-be student researcher.

The book takes a look at the theory of research, the core of the topic, but also provides practical help and advice along the way. It takes the reader through the stages of the research process from developing the question to communicating the findings, demystifying the process on the way. The web resource works alongside the book, supplementing and expanding on the chapters, giving you the ability to prepare your very own research proposal.

Explains key concepts in a clear, easy to understand way Includes activities and scenarios for you to work through which will also increase your understanding of research and research proposals Easily navigable web resource (www.researchproposalsforhealthprofessionals.com) Both book and website are arranged in the same order in which you would develop and write a research proposal Website includes downloadable research proposal template to complete step-by-step as you work through the book and web resource

Are you new to research and daunted by the idea of constructing your own research proposal? Then this is the book you need!

This book and accompanying web resource will answer all your questions about healthcare research by introducing you to the concepts, theories and practicalities surrounding it. The aim of both the book and the web resource is to help you to write a good healthcare research proposal – which is the starting point for any would-be student researcher.

The book takes a look at the theory of research, the core of the topic, but also provides practical help and advice along the way. It takes the reader through the stages of the research process from developing the question to communicating the findings, demystifying the process on the way. The web resource works alongside the book, supplementing and expanding on the chapters, giving you the ability to prepare your very own research proposal.

Explains key concepts in a clear, easy to understand way Includes activities and scenarios for you to work through which will also increase your understanding of research and research proposals Easily navigable web resource (www.researchproposalsforhealthprofessionals.com) Both book and website are arranged in the same order in which you would develop and write a research proposal Website includes downloadable research proposal template to complete step-by-step as you work through the book and web resource