A person can lawfully engage in an act restricted by copyright if they have the licence of the copyright owner or if their actions are covered by a statutory exception. However, if a person has the benefit of neither of these, it may still be possible to imply a copyright licence to respond to copyright infringement. In contrast to the rigidity of the statutory exceptions, implied licences are more malleable in being able to respond to a diverse set of circumstances,as the need arises. Thus, implied licences can serve as a flexible and targeted mechanism to balance competing interests, including those of the copyright owners and content users, especially in today''s dynamic technological environment. However, implication as a process is contentious, and thereare no established principles for implying copyright licences. The resulting uncertainty has prevented implied licences from being embraced more readily by the courts. Therefore, this book develops a methodical and transparent way of implying copyright licences, based on three sources: the consent of the copyright owner; an established custom; and state intervention to achieve policy goals. The frameworks proposed are customised separately for implying bare and contractual licences, whererelevant. The book goes on to analyse the existing case law in the light of these frameworks to demonstrate how the court''s reasoning can be made methodical and transparent. Underscoring the contemporary relevance of implied licences, this book tests and validates the methodology in relation to threeessential and ubiquitous functions on the internet - browsing, hyperlinking, and indexing.

A person can lawfully engage in an act restricted by copyright if they have the licence of the copyright owner or if their actions are covered by a statutory exception. However, if a person has the benefit of neither of these, it may still be possible to imply a copyright licence to respond to copyright infringement. In contrast to the rigidity of the statutory exceptions, implied licences are more malleable in being able to respond to a diverse set of circumstances, as the need arises. Thus, implied licences can serve as a flexible and targeted mechanism to balance competing interests, including those of the copyright owners and content users, especially in today''s dynamic technological environment. However, implication as a process is contentious, and there are no established principles for implying copyright licences. The resulting uncertainty has prevented implied licences from being embraced more readily by the courts. Therefore, this book develops a methodical and transparent way of implying copyright licences, based on three sources: the consent of the copyright owner; an established custom; and state intervention to achieve policy goals. The frameworks proposed are customised separately for implying bare and contractual licences, where relevant. The book goes on to analyse the existing case law in the light of these frameworks to demonstrate how the court''s reasoning can be made methodical and transparent. Underscoring the contemporary relevance of implied licences, this book tests and validates the methodology in relation to three essential and ubiquitous functions on the internet - browsing, hyperlinking, and indexing.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "e;thing-relatedness"e; of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "e;thing-relatedness"e; of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "thing-relatedness" of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.

A person can lawfully engage in an act restricted by copyright if they have the licence of the copyright owner or if their actions are covered by a statutory exception. However, if a person has the benefit of neither of these, it may still be possible to imply a copyright licence to respond to copyright infringement. In contrast to the rigidity of the statutory exceptions, implied licences are more malleable in being able to respond to a diverse set of circumstances,as the need arises. Thus, implied licences can serve as a flexible and targeted mechanism to balance competing interests, including those of the copyright owners and content users, especially in today''s dynamic technological environment. However, implication as a process is contentious, and thereare no established principles for implying copyright licences. The resulting uncertainty has prevented implied licences from being embraced more readily by the courts. Therefore, this book develops a methodical and transparent way of implying copyright licences, based on three sources: the consent of the copyright owner; an established custom; and state intervention to achieve policy goals. The frameworks proposed are customised separately for implying bare and contractual licences, whererelevant. The book goes on to analyse the existing case law in the light of these frameworks to demonstrate how the court''s reasoning can be made methodical and transparent. Underscoring the contemporary relevance of implied licences, this book tests and validates the methodology in relation to threeessential and ubiquitous functions on the internet - browsing, hyperlinking, and indexing.

A person can lawfully engage in an act restricted by copyright if they have the licence of the copyright owner or if their actions are covered by a statutory exception. However, if a person has the benefit of neither of these, it may still be possible to imply a copyright licence to respond to copyright infringement. In contrast to the rigidity of the statutory exceptions, implied licences are more malleable in being able to respond to a diverse set of circumstances, as the need arises. Thus, implied licences can serve as a flexible and targeted mechanism to balance competing interests, including those of the copyright owners and content users, especially in today''s dynamic technological environment. However, implication as a process is contentious, and there are no established principles for implying copyright licences. The resulting uncertainty has prevented implied licences from being embraced more readily by the courts. Therefore, this book develops a methodical and transparent way of implying copyright licences, based on three sources: the consent of the copyright owner; an established custom; and state intervention to achieve policy goals. The frameworks proposed are customised separately for implying bare and contractual licences, where relevant. The book goes on to analyse the existing case law in the light of these frameworks to demonstrate how the court''s reasoning can be made methodical and transparent. Underscoring the contemporary relevance of implied licences, this book tests and validates the methodology in relation to three essential and ubiquitous functions on the internet - browsing, hyperlinking, and indexing.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "e;thing-relatedness"e; of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "e;thing-relatedness"e; of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.

Copyright statutes in many jurisdictions clearly state that copyright is a property right. However, it's not always clear exactly how. Some see it as no more than a statutory right, while others think of it as a chose in action, like debts or shares. Copyright as Personal Property demonstrates why it is incorrect to conceptualize copyright as a chose in action and argues that, despite being an intangible asset, copyright is more analogous to land and chattels.This book aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to demonstrate much against popular belief that the analogies with land and chattels help contain the scope of copyright within normatively justifiable limits. Starting with the "thing-relatedness" of copyright, the monograph draws parallels with the acquisition of copyright, the nature of exclusionary rights, exclusive powers and privileges, their enforcement, and derivative interests. It employs concepts of property theory, such as numerus clausus, to provide the necessary benchmark to guide the boundaries of copyright. The second objective is to challenge the rigid and binary classification of property rights into choses in possession and choses in action. By addressing an important evolutionary gap in the conceptualization of property rights, this work lays the groundwork for a more sophisticated taxonomy, viewing property rights as existing on a spectrum. It goes on to provide the metrics to calibrate this spectrum, ensuring the incremental and orderly development of property rights.Original and thought-provoking, the analogy this book develops with land and chattels shows how the unjustifiable expansion of copyright can be curbed and offers a more sophisticated classification of property rights than that based simply on tangibility.