Ragnhild L. Muriaas – författare

Illustrated by in-depth empirical research from six country studies, Gendered Electoral Financing: Money, Power and Representation in Comparative Perspective is the first cross-regional examination of the nexus between money, gender and political recruitment across the world.Money is assumingly one of the greatest barriers to women in the political recruitment process. The financial disadvantage of women is expected to constitute an obstacle for women’s entry into politics everywhere and especially in developing countries where women’s socio-economic status is disproportionately low relative to men’s. This line of reasoning has caused a global upswing in both candidate- and party-directed financial schemes introduced to enhance gender balance in political office. This book develops a typology of different kinds of gendered electoral financing schemes and builds theories about its causes and consequences. By comparing how gendered electoral financing affects political recruitment processes in both established and emerging democracies, the authors identify whether and how the funding mechanisms incentivize a shift in political behavior.Gendered Electoral Financing is a timely, informative and well-written book that does an excellent job of explaining, in language accessible to students and researchers alike, the cost of elections, gender imbalance in political office and the effects of financial incentive mechanisms to increase women’s representation in politics.

Illustrated by in-depth empirical research from six country studies, Gendered Electoral Financing: Money, Power and Representation in Comparative Perspective is the first cross-regional examination of the nexus between money, gender and political recruitment across the world.Money is assumingly one of the greatest barriers to women in the political recruitment process. The financial disadvantage of women is expected to constitute an obstacle for women’s entry into politics everywhere and especially in developing countries where women’s socio-economic status is disproportionately low relative to men’s. This line of reasoning has caused a global upswing in both candidate- and party-directed financial schemes introduced to enhance gender balance in political office. This book develops a typology of different kinds of gendered electoral financing schemes and builds theories about its causes and consequences. By comparing how gendered electoral financing affects political recruitment processes in both established and emerging democracies, the authors identify whether and how the funding mechanisms incentivize a shift in political behavior.Gendered Electoral Financing is a timely, informative and well-written book that does an excellent job of explaining, in language accessible to students and researchers alike, the cost of elections, gender imbalance in political office and the effects of financial incentive mechanisms to increase women’s representation in politics.

Can autocrats establish representative subnational governments? And which strategies of manipulation are available if they would like to reduce the uncertainty caused by introducing political decentralisation? In the wake of local government reforms, several states across the world have introduced legislation that provides for subnational elections. This does not mean that representative subnational governments in these countries are all of a certain standard. Political decentralisation should not be confused with democratisation, as the process is likely to be manipulated in ways that do not produce meaningful avenues for political participation and contestation locally. Using examples from Africa, Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas propose five requirements for representative subnational governments and four strategies that national governments might use to manipulate the outcome of political decentralisation. The case studies of Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda illustrate why autocrats sometimes are more open to competition at the subnational level than democrats. Manipulating Political Decentralisation provides a new conceptual tool to assess representative subnational governments' quality, aiding us in building theories on the consequences of political decentralisation on democratisation.

Can autocrats establish representative subnational governments? And which strategies of manipulation are available if they would like to reduce the uncertainty caused by introducing political decentralisation? In the wake of local government reforms, several states across the world have introduced legislation that provides for subnational elections. This does not mean that representative subnational governments in these countries are all of a certain standard. Political decentralisation should not be confused with democratisation, as the process is likely to be manipulated in ways that do not produce meaningful avenues for political participation and contestation locally. Using examples from Africa, Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas propose five requirements for representative subnational governments and four strategies that national governments might use to manipulate the outcome of political decentralisation. The case studies of Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda illustrate why autocrats sometimes are more open to competition at the subnational level than democrats. Manipulating Political Decentralisation provides a new conceptual tool to assess representative subnational governments' quality, aiding us in building theories on the consequences of political decentralisation on democratisation.