Rino Falcone - Böcker

This book provides an introduction, discussion, and formal-based modelling of trust theory and its applications in agent-based systems This book gives an accessible explanation of the importance of trust in human interaction and, in general, in autonomous cognitive agents including autonomous technologies. The authors explain the concepts of trust, and describe a principled, general theory of trust grounded on cognitive, cultural, institutional, technical, and normative solutions. This provides a strong base for the author’s discussion of role of trust in agent-based systems supporting human-computer interaction and distributed and virtual organizations or markets (multi-agent systems).Key Features: Provides an accessible introduction to trust, and its importance and applications in agent-based systemsProposes a principled, general theory of trust grounding on cognitive, cultural, institutional, technical, and normative solutions.Offers a clear, intuitive approach, and systematic integration of relevant issuesExplains the dynamics of trust, and the relationship between trust and securityOffers operational definitions and models directly applicable both in technical and experimental domainsIncludes a critical examination of trust models in economics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and AI  This book will be a valuable reference for researchers and advanced students focused on information and communication technologies (computer science, artificial intelligence, organizational sciences, and knowledge management etc.), as well as Web-site and robotics designers, and for scholars working on human, social, and cultural aspects of technology. Professionals of ecommerce systems and peer-to-peer systems will also find this text of interest.

Autonomy is a characterizing notion of agents, and intuitively it is rather unambiguous. The quality of autonomy is recognized when it is perceived or experienced, yet it is difficult to limit autonomy in a definition. The desire to build agents that exhibit a satisfactory quality of autonomy includes agents that have a long life, are highly independent, can harmonize their goals and actions with humans and other agents, and are generally socially adept. "Agent Autonomy" is a collection of papers from leading international researchers that approximate human intuition, dispel false attributions, and point the way to scholarly thinking about autonomy. A wide array of issues about sharing control and initiative between humans and machines, as well as issues about peer level agent interaction, are addressed.

Autonomy is a characterizing notion of agents, and intuitively it is rather unambiguous. The quality of autonomy is recognized when it is perceived or experienced, yet it is difficult to limit autonomy in a definition. The desire to build agents that exhibit a satisfactory quality of autonomy includes agents that have a long life, are highly independent, can harmonize their goals and actions with humans and other agents, and are generally socially adept. Agent Autonomy is a collection of papers from leading international researchers that approximate human intuition, dispel false attributions, and point the way to scholarly thinking about autonomy. A wide array of issues about sharing control and initiative between humans and machines, as well as issues about peer level agent interaction, are addressed.

This special issue is the result of the workshop Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, held in Bologna on July 15, 2002 as part of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 2002 Conference (AAMAS2002), organized by Rino Falcone, Suzanne Barber, Larry Korba, and Munindar Singh. The workshop included a special track on "Privacy and Protection with Multi-Agent Systems. " The aim of the workshop was to bring together researchers from different ?elds (Arti?cial Intelligence, Mul- agent Systems, Cognitive Science, Game Theory, and Social and Organizational S- ences) that could contribute to a better understanding of trust, privacy and protection in agent societies. The workshop scope included theoretical results and their applications inhuman-computerinteractionandelectroniccommerce. Thisissueincludesaselection oftherevisedandextendedversionsoftheworkspresentedattheworkshop,incorpor- ing many points that emerged in our discussions, as well as invited papers from expert peopleinthe?eld,whichinourviewgivesacompletecoverageofallrelevantissues. We gratefully acknowledge the ?nacial support from the Italian National Research Council, Institute for Cognitive Science and Technology and theALFEBIITE European Project, contract number IST-1999-10298.We want to express our gratitude to Cristiano Castelfranchi for his stimulating and valuable comments and suggestions both for the organization of the workshop and for the preparation of this special issue.

Based on two international workshops on trust in agent societies, held at AAMAS 2003 and AAMAS 2004, this book draws together carefully revised papers on trust, reputation, and security in agent society. Besides workshop papers, several contributions from leading researchers in this interdisciplinary field were solicited to complete coverage of all relevant topics.The 13 papers presented take into account issues from multiagent systems, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, game theory, and social and organizational science. Theoretical topics are addressed as well as applications in human-computer interaction and e-commerce.

This book is based on a workshop on Deception, Fraud, and Trust in Agent Societies held during the Autonomous Agents Conference in Barcelona, Spain in June 2000. Besides carefully reviewed revised full papers presented at the workshop the book presents invited papers from experts in the field allowing for complete coverage of the field.

The general idea that brains anticipate the future, that they engage in prediction, and that one means of doing this is through some sort of inner model that can be run of?ine,hasalonghistory. SomeversionoftheideawascommontoAristotle,aswell as to many medieval scholastics, to Leibniz and Hume, and in more recent times, to Kenneth Craik and Philip Johnson-Laird. One reason that this general idea recurs continually is that this is the kind of picture that introspection paints. When we are engaged in tasks it seems that we form images that are predictions, or anticipations, and that these images are isomorphic to what they represent. But as much as the general idea recurs, opposition to it also recurs. The idea has never been widely accepted, or uncontroversial among psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists. The main reason has been that science cannot be s- is?ed with metaphors and introspection. In order to gain acceptance, an idea needs to be formulated clearly enough so that it can be used to construct testable hypot- ses whose results will clearly supportor cast doubtupon the hypothesis. Next, those ideasthatare formulablein one oranothersortof symbolismor notationare capable of being modeled, and modeling is a huge part of cognitive neuroscience. If an idea cannot be clearly modeled, then there are limits to how widely it can be tested and accepted by a cognitive neuroscience community.