Cristiano Castelfranchi – författare

The mind is a powerful anticipatory device. It frequently makes predictions about the future, telling us not only how the world might or will be, but also how it should be - or better - how we would like it to be. These expectancies shape our lives: they impact on our actual outcomes, often acting as self-fulfilling prophecies. They also constitute a reference point for establishing whether an outcome is a loss or a gain; that is, we evaluate our own outcomes not in absolute terms, but against our expectancies. And we feel ill-treated and betrayed when our expectancies are disappointed. This book explores anticipation-based emotions, that is, the emotions associated with the dialectical interaction between 'what is' and 'what is not (yet)', be it a mere wished-for possibility or an expectation proper. It offers an analysis of both the emotions implying anticipations of future events - such as fear, anxiety, hope, and trust - and those elicited by the disconfirmation of a previous anticipation - surprise, disappointment, discouragement, sense of injustice, regret, and relief - in terms of their belief and goal components. In addition, it addresses anticipated emotions, that is, emotions we think we might experience in future circumstances, and explores how they influence our decisions. The reader will be taken on a journey of exploration and discovery into the multifarious facets and implications of an important family of emotions, aimed at understanding what they have in common, as well as the distinguishing features of each distinct emotion, and predicting their motivational and behavioral consequences.For students and researchers interested in the affective sciences, including psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience, this is a highly original and thought provoking new work.

One of the major problems in the development of virtual societies, in particular in electronic commerce and computer-mediated interactions in organizations, is trust and deception. This book provides analyses by various researchers of the different types of trust that are needed for various tasks, such as facilitating on-line collaboration, building virtual communities and network organizations, and even the design of effective and user-friendly human-computer interfaces. The book has a multi-disciplinary character providing theoretical models of trust and deception, empirical studies, and practical solutions for creating trust in electronic commerce and multi-agent systems.

Autonomy is a characterizing notion of agents, and intuitively it is rather unambiguous. The quality of autonomy is recognized when it is perceived or experienced, yet it is difficult to limit autonomy in a definition. The desire to build agents that exhibit a satisfactory quality of autonomy includes agents that have a long life, are highly independent, can harmonize their goals and actions with humans and other agents, and are generally socially adept. "Agent Autonomy" is a collection of papers from leading international researchers that approximate human intuition, dispel false attributions, and point the way to scholarly thinking about autonomy. A wide array of issues about sharing control and initiative between humans and machines, as well as issues about peer level agent interaction, are addressed.

Autonomy is a characterizing notion of agents, and intuitively it is rather unambiguous. The quality of autonomy is recognized when it is perceived or experienced, yet it is difficult to limit autonomy in a definition. The desire to build agents that exhibit a satisfactory quality of autonomy includes agents that have a long life, are highly independent, can harmonize their goals and actions with humans and other agents, and are generally socially adept. Agent Autonomy is a collection of papers from leading international researchers that approximate human intuition, dispel false attributions, and point the way to scholarly thinking about autonomy. A wide array of issues about sharing control and initiative between humans and machines, as well as issues about peer level agent interaction, are addressed.

?The purpose of the book is to propose and exploit an analytical, critical, well defined theory of a very crucial human social relation that I call “Tutelarity/ Tutelage”.

​The purpose of the book is to propose and exploit an analytical, critical, well defined theory of a very crucial human social relation that I call “Tutelarity/ Tutelage”. This will thus explain how/why such relation is so relevant at any layer of sociality: from affective relationships, to social cooperation and interactions, to politics and democracy. The approach is theoretical and strongly grounded on cognitive science and the models of human mind: beliefs, desires, expectations, emotions, etc. Written in an accessible way, it will be of interest for a large audience, specifically to researchers and scientists interested in cognitive science and the dynamics of social relationships alike.

This book is the seventh in the successful line of Intelligent Agents volumes published in LNAI. It is based on the seventh workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, ATAL '99, held in Boston, MA, USA in July 1999. The 21 revised full papers included were selected from a total of 71 submissions during two rounds of reviewing. Also included are one panel summary and the statements of panelists participating in another panel held during ATAL 2000. The book is divided into topical sections on agent theories; agent development tools and platforms; models of agent communication and coordination; autonomy and models of agent coordination; agent languages; and planning, decision making, and learning. This state-of-the-art survey is essential reading for anyone interested in agent technology.

This volume contains thoroughly refereed versions of the best papers presented at the 4th European Workshop on Modelling Automomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, held July 29 - 31, 1992 in S. Martino al Cimino, Italy.The book opens with an introductory survey by the volume editors not only on the collection of papers but also on the history and present situation of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) and its interdisciplinary relations to social sciences, artificial life, and economics. The 19 technical papers are organized into sections on artificial life and reactive systems, economics and game theory, coordination and multi-agent planning, and DAI tools and applications.

This volume contains thoroughly refereed full versions of the best papers presented at the 5th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, MAAMAW '93, held in Neuchâtel, Switzerland in August 1993.The volume opens with a detailed introduction by the volume editors bringing the papers in line and offering a readers' guide. The 15 full research papers reflect the state-of-the-art in this dynamic field of research; they are organized in sections on emergence of global properties, emergence of sociality, multi-agent planning, multi-agent communication, and multi-agent architectures.

The general idea that brains anticipate the future, that they engage in prediction, and that one means of doing this is through some sort of inner model that can be run of?ine,hasalonghistory. SomeversionoftheideawascommontoAristotle,aswell as to many medieval scholastics, to Leibniz and Hume, and in more recent times, to Kenneth Craik and Philip Johnson-Laird. One reason that this general idea recurs continually is that this is the kind of picture that introspection paints. When we are engaged in tasks it seems that we form images that are predictions, or anticipations, and that these images are isomorphic to what they represent. But as much as the general idea recurs, opposition to it also recurs. The idea has never been widely accepted, or uncontroversial among psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists. The main reason has been that science cannot be s- is?ed with metaphors and introspection. In order to gain acceptance, an idea needs to be formulated clearly enough so that it can be used to construct testable hypot- ses whose results will clearly supportor cast doubtupon the hypothesis. Next, those ideasthatare formulablein one oranothersortof symbolismor notationare capable of being modeled, and modeling is a huge part of cognitive neuroscience. If an idea cannot be clearly modeled, then there are limits to how widely it can be tested and accepted by a cognitive neuroscience community.