Robert Stainton – författare
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5 produkter
5 produkter
Inbunden, Engelska, 2006
796 kr
Skickas inom 3-6 vardagar
It is a near truism of philosophy of language that sentences are prior to words. Sentences, it is said, are what we believe, assert, and argue for; uses of them constitute our evidence in semantics; only they stand in inferential relations, and are true or false. Sentences are, indeed, the only things that fundamentally have meaning.Does this near truism really hold of human languages? Robert Stainton, drawing on a wide body of evidence, argues forcefully that speakers can and do use mere words, not sentences, to communicate complete thoughts. He then considers the implications of this empirical result for language-thought relations, various doctrines of sentence primacy, and the semantics-pragmatics boundary.The book is important both for its philosophical and empirical claims, and for the methodology employed. Stainton illustrates how the methods and detailed results of the various cognitive sciences can bear on central issues in philosophy of language. At the same time, he applies philosophical distinctions with subtlety and care, to show that arguments which seemingly support the primacy of sentences do not really do so. The result is a paradigm example of The New Philosophy of Language: a rich melding of empirical work with traditional philosophy of language.
Häftad, Engelska, 2009
580 kr
Skickas inom 5-8 vardagar
It is a near truism of philosophy of language that sentences are prior to words. Sentences, it is said, are what we believe, assert, and argue for; uses of them constitute our evidence in semantics; only they stand in inferential relations, and are true or false. Sentences are, indeed, the only things that fundamentally have meaning.Does this near truism really hold of human languages? Robert Stainton, drawing on a wide body of evidence, argues forcefully that speakers can and do use mere words, not sentences, to communicate complete thoughts. He then considers the implications of this empirical result for language-thought relations, various doctrines of sentence primacy, and the semantics-pragmatics boundary.The book is important both for its philosophical and empirical claims, and for the methodology employed. Stainton illustrates how the methods and detailed results of the various cognitive sciences can bear on central issues in philosophy of language. At the same time, he applies philosophical distinctions with subtlety and care, to show that arguments which seemingly support the primacy of sentences do not really do so. The result is a paradigm example of The New Philosophy of Language: a rich melding of empirical work with traditional philosophy of language.
Inbunden, Engelska, 2019
2 343 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
In the 1960s and 1970s questions about the semantics of natural languages were of central concern to the vast majority of analytic philosophers. The work of Chomsky, Davidson, Grice, Donnellan, Kaplan, Kripke and Putnam was widely read by non-specialists. The three main branches of linguistics that are of special philosophical significance-syntax,
Häftad, Engelska, 2020
708 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
In the 1960s and 1970s questions about the semantics of natural languages were of central concern to the vast majority of analytic philosophers. The work of Chomsky, Davidson, Grice, Donnellan, Kaplan, Kripke and Putnam was widely read by non-specialists. The three main branches of linguistics that are of special philosophical significance-syntax,
Inbunden, Engelska, 2026
1 637 kr
Kommande
What mechanisms determine the meaning of proper names? Drawing from semantic and metasemantic perspectives, this book offers a novel theory.Names raise controversial issues in philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Stefano Pugnaghi explores The first part of the text focuses on the contemporary debates on names’ meaning, discussing particularly the debates between predicativist and referentialist accounts of names and the one between constant and non-constant referentialist views. Pugnaghi describes some challenges to a predicative account of names, defending instead a Millian account of names’ meaning and offering a new way of conceiving the mechanisms through which names acquire such meaning. This approach to names’ reference-fixing is inspired by the Kripkean picture but capable of capturing the freedom with which names are introduced.